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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to investigate children's development of moral reasoning
on the basis of Kohlberg's theory. The study consists of two main studies, using
different methods. In the first study using Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas, Form
A, a total of 128 Korean and British children aged 7 to 16 years participated in order
to investigate the development of moral stages, use of moral orientations, differences
in chosen issues, and unscorable responses with Kohlberg's criteria judgments. The
second study has been conducted to supplement the findings of the first study through
using fables as an alternative method. Unlike the first study, however, the second
study focused on only Korean children's moral development so that 160 Koreans
aged 7 to 16 years were examined in terms of the moral stages, use of moral
orientations, and unscorable responses through analysing their spontaneous responses
to fables. In addition, their ability to generate morals from fables was also explored
in order to provide further information on children's moral development and ascertain
the use of fables as an alternative method to assess moral development.
As a result, the children in both studies showed similar developmental trends in moral
stages regardless of their gender and cultural background. Regarding moral
orientations, the findings indicate that the children's use of moral orientations also
developed with age and that academic achievement level could affect development.
Besides, the children tended to use the orientations differently according to cultural
background. Cultural differences were also found in the chosen issues. Some
responses unscorable with Kohlberg's system imply that there are some concepts
peculiar to Koreans and hence that Kohlberg's theory of moral development is
applicable but insufficient for Korean children even at young ages. Thus, the present
suggests that not only Kohlberg's theory but also other theories such as theories of
domain specificity and cultural psychology should be considered in order to fully
understand the moral development. Lastly, the lack of ability of the 7 year old
children to generate morals from fables suggests that it might be better to use
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modified fables rather than fables intact as an alternative method, especially with
young children.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Although morality has been defined in various ways, most people agree that it refers
to an ability to distinguish between what is right and wrong and to act according to
this distinction. Many psychologists have carried out research on moral
development based on the assumption that an individual develops morality. They
focus on different aspects of morality, such as moral affect, moral reasoning and
moral behaviour, depending on their theories. Psychoanalytic theorists have tended
to confine their research to emotional aspects of morality. Freud (1960) claimed that
the superego, one of the basic components of personality, leads individuals to have
negative feelings such as anxiety, guilt and shame when they are morally wrong and
that individuals can develop morality through making an effort to avoid these negative
feelings. Social learning theorists (e.g. Bandura, 1973; Hoffman, 1970; Sieber,
1980) concentrate on moral behaviours such as aggression, cheating, sharing, and
helping. They assume that all these behaviours are acquired through the principles
of stimulus and response as well as imitation. Cognitive theorists have emphasised
how children judge acts as "right" or "wrong" and explain their judgments.
Rest (1983) proposes a four-step process in executing a moral action, which show
how these different aspects of morality across the different approaches work together.
According to him, when faced with a situation, individuals interpret the situation in
18
1. Introduction and Overview 19
terms of how their actions would affect the welfare of others. Secondly, the
individuals figure out what the ideal moral course of action would be. As the next
step, the individuals decide what they actually intended to do and, finally, they
execute and implement the moral plan of action. The present study mainly focuses
on the development of moral judgment and moral reasoning, which are included in the
first two steps of moral conduct in Rest's four-step process, and cast them in the light
of cognitive developmental perspectives.
One of the most influential approaches to cognitive development is Piaget's.
According to Piaget (1952, 1960), individuals construct their reality or intellectual
"structures" through interaction with their physical and social environment. He
proposed that children's thinking evolves through a set of qualitatively different
stages. The current stage does not simply reflect knowledge and familiarity with that
task or tasks similar to it. Rather, it represents an underlying thought organization
which appears across various tasks. Furthermore, because later stages presuppose
the attainment of the earlier stages, it is assumed that individuals pass through each
stage in order. Each stage ofdevelopment represents a qualitative recognition of the
individual's pattern of thought, and the patterns of thought at later stages are more
complex, differentiated, and adaptive than those at prior stages. Accordingly, later
stages displace or integrate the structures constructed at previous stages.
Piaget applied the above principles and process of cognitive growth to children's
moral development (1932/1965) as well as to intellectual development. Piaget's
analysis of morality centres on the concept of justice, which prescribes how
reciprocity among individuals is to be balanced. Piaget hypothesized his theory of
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moral development on the basis of Kant's work (1785/1948) on moral autonomy and
his view on the distinction between autonomy and heteronomy, and Baldwin's theory
(1899/1973) that attainment of autonomy in moral judgment is a developmental
achievement. In order to ascertain his hypothesis, he examined moral development
by examining children's attitudes towards rules during marble games and their
judgment of the seriousness of transgressions concerning moral dilemmas in the form
of stories. Based on the findings obtained from these two experiments, he
formulated a theory of moral development that includes a premoral period and two
moral stages - heteronomous morality and autonomous morality - which are
developmentally sequenced.
According to Piaget, children as young as 4 years old are at premoral period. In a
game of marbles, Piaget observed that the children tended to use idiosyncratic or
shifting rules or even did not use rules at all. Thus, this period is characterized by
children's little concern for, or awareness of, rules.
At the ages 4 to 5, the beginning of heteronomous morality, children develop strong
concern and respect for rules. However, they seem to regard rules as moral
absolutes, that is, they understand rules to be immutable, rooted in external authority,
such as parental authority. Children at this stage also believe in immanent justice,
the belief that wrongdoing inevitably leads to punishment. For instance, if a child
who had lied to his mother fell off his bike and skinned his knee later on, the child
might conclude that this injury was punishment he deserved for his wrongdoing even
though there was no connection between the two episodes. Children are also apt to
assess behaviour in terms of objective responsibility rather than intentionality. That
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is, if an actor is punished for his act, children tend to assume that the actor must be
wrong regardless of the good or bad intentions of the actor. Piaget claims that
children remain at the stage of heteronomous morality because of two cognitive
deficits: egocentrism and realistic thinking. Egocentrism refers to an inability to
perceive situations from the perspectives of others, while realistic thinking means the
tendency to confuse external reality with one's own thought processes and subjective
experiences.
By age 9 to 11 the morality of most children begins to shift to a higher stage,
autonomous morality, in accordance with their cognitive maturation and the increase
of social experiences. At this stage children understand social rules and show great
concern for equality and reciprocity in human relationships, and regard these two
characteristics as the basis of justice. In other words, children now recognize that
social rules are arbitrary agreements which can be questioned and changed and that
obedience to authority is neither necessary nor always desirable. Children also begin
to believe that violations of rules are not inevitably punished as their belief in
immanent justice fades. With regard to punishment for wrong behaviour, children
take account of the intentions of the wrongdoer and the nature of transgression rather
than the objective consequences. Thus they tend to think that the punishment should
be given in the form of restitution that will make up for harm done or make the
wrongdoer less likely to repeat it.
Although it is true that Piaget's theory of moral development continues to stimulate
an enormous amount of research, there are some limitations (Siegel, 1982). One of
the limitations is that he concentrated on moral development only up to the age of 11
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and paid little attention to the development after that age. Piaget's theory of moral
development was extended to adulthood as well as modified and refined by Kohlberg
(1981, 1984). He was profoundly influenced by Piaget and has contributed many
new insights to the theory ofmoral development. He developed his theory based not
only on Piaget's theory of cognitive moral development (1932/1965) but also on those
of a number of moral philosophers, Rawl(1971), whose theory states that justice is
seen as the fundamental principle of moral development and can be best characterized
in terms of fairness. Kohlberg followed these theories and proposed a theory
comprising three levels - the preconventional level, the conventional level and the
postconventional level - of the development of moral reasoning, each of which were
in turn divided into two substages, consequently generating the theory of six-stage
moral development. He also developed hypothetical dilemmas in order to
investigate the development of moral reasoning. Having cognitive developmental
theory as his background, Kohlberg hypothesized that moral development is related to
the development of general skills of rational reasoning, including deductive logic and
the ability to distance oneself from what is personal, ego-centred or consensus-based.
Thus the development of moral stages could mean the development of the cognitive
ability to construct, and to transcend to a detached, impartial vantage point from
which right and wrong are evaluated objectively. Moreover, he claimed that the
development of moral reasoning is universal and that their sequence is invariant.
This means that the moral stages develop in the same fixed order without skipping
any stage for everyone in all cultures and groups.
Kohlberg's (1981, 1984) theory of moral reasoning has been examined in various
cultural settings by many researchers, including Kohlberg himself, in order to test his
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claim that the development of moral reasoning is universal. According to these
studies, the claim of universality of the sequence of moral stages was supported by
findings of many cross-cultural and longitudinal studies. Nevertheless, the claim of
universality of the sequence allowed the possibility of differences in the rate and
endpoint of the development of moral reasoning across variant cultures (e.g. Edwards,
1975; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Tietjen & Walker, 1985; Turiel, Edwards & Kohlberg,
1978; White, 1975; White, Bushnell & Regnemer, 1978).
Beyond suggesting the .cultural differences in the rate and endpoint of moral stages,
some researchers question Kohlberg's basic assumption of ~oral stages. Turiel and
his colleagues (e.g. Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Turiel, 1983; Turiel & Smetana, 1984), the
domain-specificity theorists, criticized Kohlberg's assumption that moral stages and
the moral understandings that determine them emerge out of conventional
understandings (This is why Kohlberg denominated moral levels proposed by him as
preconventional, conventional and post conventional levels). They found that
children can distinguish between morality and convention during early childhood.
Thus they suggest that children's moral and conventional understanding are different
domains and the development exists within each domain. Moreover, Shweder,
Mahapatra, and Miller (1990), based on their study in India and US, also criticized
Kohlberg's disregard of the crucial role of culture in development since he claims that
justice is a single moral code and hence that the development of moral stages from
preconventional level to postconventional level is universal. Shweder et al. (1990)
place great emphasis on culture as an integral part of moral development. They
argue that morally relevant interpretations of events (i.e. whether the event is morally
right or wrong) vary across cultures, an argument long made by anthropologists who
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noted cultural variations in judgment (e.g. Murdock, 1980). Besides, Shweder et al.
(1990) indicate that the interpretations oflocal guardians (e.g. parents) on the events
are typically presented and conveyed to young children through routine family life
and social practices so that the children internalize the interpretations and gradually
develop and reconstruct their own moral code. Thus, in contrast to Kohlberg, they
propose that there is more than one way to rationalize a moral code across cultures.
For instance, Indian Brahmans thought that not only in their culture but also in any
other culture for a widow to eat fish is morally wrong and a great sin, while
respondants in US considered it just a matter of convention. This does not mean that
the Brahmans was not able to distinguish between moral 'and convention while the
Americans was and hence that the former was at a less mature level of morality than
the latter. Rather, it implies that the Brahman and the American have different moral
codes in some ways and hence their end-points of development are different.
Therefore Shweder et al. (1990) claim that there may be alternative rationally based
moral codes that Kohlberg does not illuminate and they question the universality of
Kohlberg's moral stages. Other studies (e.g. Gilligan, 1982; Ma, 1988b) support the
findings of Shweder et al.(1990) by providing different perspectives on moral
development, which Kohlberg probably overlooked or could not figure out.
Many findings on cultural variations serve as a motive to examine the use of moral
orientations in the present study. When moral orientations are considered, only a
few studies have been conducted, and these have pointed out the difference in moral
reasoning according to ethnic cultural background. Further, they argued that there
were certain concepts which Kohlberg was not able to treat because of cultural
uniqueness (Lei & Cheng, 1984, as cited in Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Snarey, Reimer
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& Kohlberg, 1985; Tietjen & Walker, 1985; Walker & Moran, 1991). With respect
to age, differences in moral orientation were also observed in some empirical studies
(e.g. Tappan, Kohlberg, Schrader, Higgins, Armon, & Lei, 1987; Walker, 1989).
Unlike Gilligan's claim (1982) that Kohlberg's theory of moral development has
gender bias, Walker's review (1986b) states that gender differences were apparent
neither in moral orientations nor in moral stages. (Here, it is preferable to use
"gender differences" rather than "sex differences" because the differences seem to be
due to social influence rather than biological aspects.)
In order to confirm the universality of moral reasoning in t~rms of moral stages, and
especially, moral orientations, more comparative studies across various cultures -
including Western and non-Western cultures - are needed. British society is
representative of the Western culture that influenced Kohlberg's theory of moral
reasoning. On the other hand, Korea is a non-Western society which is still guided
by the traditional maxims, such as Confucian ethics and Buddhism, in spite of the
modernization of almost the whole country. For instance, the emphases on loyalty to
the governing class, respect for elders, obedience to one's parents, courtesy in human
relationships, and duty to the community over individual rights are all regarded as
characteristics of Korean society generated from Confucian ethics. Thus, Korean
society preserves a more traditional, conforming, authoritarian and statLis-oriented
culture compared with Western society (Park & Johnson, 1984). A cross-cultural
study between Korean and American children (Song, Smetana & Kim, 1987) partly
supports the hypotheses of a greater emphasis in Korean society on cultural traditions,
social status, and appropriate role behaviour than in Western societies, which could
lead to cultural differences between Korea and Western societies in terms of moral
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and social conventional orientations. In the light of these distinctive features of each
society, a comparison between Koreans and the British in terms of the moral
reasoning could provide further information on the universality of moral reasoning in
terms of not only moral stages but also moral orientations.
In Korea, some empirical studies have already been carried out with reference to
Kohlberg's theory of moral stages, but not his theory of moral orientations (e.g. Kang,
1994; Lee, 1981; Lee, 1985). Most studies were aimed at investigating relationships
between the moral stage model and individuals' backgrounds such as age, gender, and
socio-economic status, and showed similar results to studies carried out in other
cultures. A limitation of these studies is that they did not inquire into aspects
peculiar to Korean culture which might influence the development of moral reasoning.
Based on empirical studies, the present study makes the following hypotheses: First,
both Korean and British children will show age differences in not only moral stages
but also the use of moral orientations. Secondly, although the sequence of moral
stages might be similar, there might be cultural differences between Korean and
British children in terms of moral orientations due to the cultural variance. Lastly,
there could be some concepts peculiar to Koreans that affects their moral reasoning
but which Kohlberg has not illuminated. In order to test these hypotheses, the moral
reasoning of Korean and British children will be compared by means of Kohlberg's
methodology and hypothetical dilemmas. Furthermore, a further study using an
alternative method, fables, is also conducted in order to supplement the findings of the
study using Kohlberg's dilemmas.
Traditional tales such as folktales, myths, legends and fables were developed from
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ancient times in order to explain the origin of the universe and natural phenomena and
to pass down the group's history to the next generation (Norton, 1987). Inculcating
morality of the group could be one of the important purposes of diffusing the tales and,
especially for this purpose, fables could be widely used because of their
characteristics. That is, fables are differentiated from other traditional tales in
leading people toward a certain moral, often summarized at the end of the fable in a
single line. Among fables, those of Aesop have been translated into various
languages for children in many countries. The publication of Aesop's fables for
children in various cultures could imply not only that Aesop's fables are one of the
most familiar fables to children but also that their morals are generally acceptable in
most societies. Thus it seems appropriate to use Aesop's fables and their morals as
an alternative method of assessing moral reasoning.
There are previous empirical studies which have examined children's moral
development through usmg fables. For instance, Chia (1993) and Dorfman &
Brewer (1994) indicate that children develop an understanding of fables and their
embedded morals based on their belief in a "just-world" during early childhood.
Pillar (1983) states that the developmental patterns of the understanding of fables
approximately coincides with those of Kohlberg's as well as Piaget's moral reasoning.
Also, the relationship between children's cognitive and moral development (Lambrou,
1988) and Gilligan's moral orientations (Johnston, 1988; Daniels, D'Andrea & Heck,
1995) were examined by analysing children's responses to fables.
On the other hand, some studies point out that individuals' understanding of fables
and their morals vary according to the content of fables and their own characteristics
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such as age, gender and culture (e.g. Johnston, 1988; Lambrou, 1988; Lewis, 1993;
Reinstein, 1983). The cultural differences in the understanding of fables and their
morals suggest that Korean children would show peculiarity in terms of the
understanding of fables in addition to the universal pattern of the understanding of
fables.
Based on the literature review on children's understanding of fables and their morals,
the second study of children's moral reasoning using fables was planned. In the
second study, children's judgment regarding various aspects of fables such as
characters, events and conclusion, as well as their ability to identify morals in fables,
are examined. This has been conducted in order to supplement the findings on
Korean children's reasoning obtained through using Kohlberg's hypothetical
dilemmas and to explore the use of fables as an alternative method to assess children's
moral reasoning.
In brief, the present study consists of two experiments using Kohlberg's dilemmas
and fables respectively. The purpose of the present study is to examine the
universality of Kohlberg's theory of moral development and the uniqueness of Korean
children's moral reasoning by means of comparing the consistency and differences in
moral reasoning, and to assess fables as an alternative to Kohlberg's hypothetical
dilemmas for children.
CHAPTER TWO
KOHLBERG'S THEORY OF MORAL REASONING
2.1 THE 6 STAGES OF MORAL REASONING
Kohlberg (1981) proposed three major levels in the attainment of moral understanding
and divided each level into two stages; the preconventionallevel (stages 1 and 2), the
conventional level (stages 3 and 4), and the principled or postconventional level
(stages 5 and 6). These levels are differentiated from one another according to the
individual's understanding of the relationship between the self and society's moral
rules and expectations. According to Colby and Kohlberg (1987) the
preconventional level is a perspective from which rules and social expectations are
something external to the self. This level is found in the moral reasoning of most
children under the age of 9, some adolescents and many adolescent and adult criminal
offenders. Adolescents and adults in American society and in most other societies
show the conventional level, in which the self is identified with or has internalized the
rules and expectations of others, particularly those of authorities. Individuals in the
postconventionallevel, who are a minority of adults usually aged over 20, are able to
differentiate the self from the rules and expectations of others. They define moral
values on the basis of self-chosen principles. Colby and Kohlberg argue that the
conventional level does not mean that individuals at this level are unable to
distinguish between morality and social convention but rather that morality consists of
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socially shared systems of moral rules. In contrast, although individuals at
postconventional level understand and generally accept the rules of the society, they
accept the rules based on formulating and accepting the general moral principles that
underlie these rules. Thus, when these principles conflict with the society's rules,
the individuals at this level judge by principle rather than by convention. Those at
preconventional level have not yet fully understood and accepted socially shared
moral norms and expectations.
These three moral levels include two stages each. The social perspective and what is
considered to be morally right in each moral stage are as follows. Also, Table 2.1.1
shows the characteristics of the six stages of moral development.
Table 2.1.1 Six Stages of Moral Judgment
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Source: From Kohlberg, L. (1976) moral stages and moralization: The cognitive developmental
approach in T. Lickona (ed.) Moral Development and Behaviour N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart & Wanston
Stage 1 parallels the stage of heteronomous morality in the Piagetian sense. Moral
realism does not appear yet at this stage. It represents a failure to differentiate
multiple perspectives in the dilemmas. In other words, stage 1 involves only a
concrete, individual point of view. In addition, the judgment between wrong and
right is determined by authority and power. Stage 2 is regarded as a concrete
individualistic and instrumental morality. There is an awareness that a number of
individuals have their own interests to pursue and that these may conflict. Although
there is a recognition of more than one perspective at this stage, it tends to be rigid.
Individuals tend to take the viewpoint of one actor, and fail to provide consideration
of what is best from everyone's viewpoint. Thus good behaviour in their
perspective is that which allows people to satisfy their own needs or the needs of a
particular person. Stage 3 represents interpersonal normative morality. At this
stage, the separate perspectives of individuals are coordinated into a third person
perspective, which is embodied in a set of shared moral norms according to which
people are expected to live. These moral norms and expectations transcend or are
TABLE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
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generalised across particular persons and situations. Individuals at this stage also
emphasize a good, altruistic or prosocial role and motives as indicative of general
personal morality. Based on these perspectives, they are particularly concerned with
maintaining interpersonal trust and social approval, the so-called "good-boy
orientation."
Individuals at stage 4, the stage of social system morality, tend to hold the viewpoint
of the social system. They regard the social system as a consistent set of codes and
procedures that apply equally to all members of the society. Thus, they decide what
is right according to the point of view of institutional wholes rather than the point of
view of shared relationships between two or more individuals such as relations based
on caring, trust, respect and so on. That is, moral judgments at this stage are based
on rules that maintain the social order so that showing respect for authority and doing
one's duty are valued highly.
Stage 5 orients towards human rights and social welfare morality. Individuals at
stage 5 recognise that the validity of actual laws and social systems can be evaluated
in terms of the degree to which they preserve and protect these fundamental human
rights and values. They also recognise that there are circumstances in which existing
laws cannot bind the individual's behaviour. Thus individuals are sometimes aware
of the conflict between moral and legal points of views, and experience difficulties in
integrating them.
Stage 6, the highest stage, pursues the morality of reversible and prescriptive general
ethical principles. Individuals at this stage define right and wrong on the basis of the
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self-chosen ethical principles of hislher own conscience. These principles are not
concrete rules but abstract principles of universal justice which are to be applied in all
situations.
2.2 UNIVERSALITY OF MORAL REASONING
2.2.1 Universality of Development of Moral Stages
Kohlberg's claim that the moral stage model is universal is based on his belief that the
moral reasoning of an individual develops according to hislher overall cognitive
development. In other words, a universal and invariant cognitive developmental
pattern rather than specific learnt moral rules underlies and organizes the development
of moral reasoning. The claim of universality of moral development can be
examined by means of three cognitive developmental criteria for the stage model;
structure, sequence and hierarchy.
In terms of the structure, Kohlberg proposed the existence of a logical cohesiveness or
unity of moral reasoning within each stage. That is, there is a relatively constant
form of reasoning across varying contents and contexts. Consequently, individuals
should be either "in" a stage or "in transition" between two adjacent stages, but not be
in a combination of the three stages.
Another claim of Kohlberg is that the moral stage development has an invariant order
in the acquisition of the stages that constitute the sequence. The development should
progress irreversibly, one stage at a time, to the next higher stage with no regression
or stage-skipping.
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Kohlberg also discussed the hierarchy of the development of moral reasoning.
Successive stages represent more equilibrated and complex levels of functioning, i.e.
they provide increasingly adequate bases for moral decision making. The claim of
the hierarchy is based on his view that moral reasoning is linked to cognitive
development. This link between the development of moral reasoning and cognitive
development was pioneered by Piaget. According to him, development is a
procedure of transformation, reconstruction and reorganization from the preceding
stage into the new stage rather than a simple addition or substitution of the stage for
the previous stage. This procedure results from universal features of social
experience, the latter is a process of reciprocal interaction between the self and others.
In his recent reformulation of the theory (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983),
Kohlberg eventually admitted the importance of the interaction and reciprocity of an
individual with others which foster perspective-taking opportunities in line with the
Piagetian view. Thus, he emphasizes not only cognitive development but also
perspective-taking ability as necessary, though not sufficient, conditions for the
development of moral stages. Moreover, he accepted the influence of cultural and
class differences beyond the influence of other individuals. Therefore, he admitted
that differences in social perspective-taking that exist across cultures and socio-
economic class can speed up or slow down the development through the moral stages
and even that it differentiates the endpoint of the development. These differences in
moral reasoning across culture and social economic class will be discussed later on.
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2.2.2 Universality of Moral Orientations
It is true that Kohlberg's theory focused on the sequence of moral stages rather than
the moral orientations, and consequently his theory is less well elaborated in terms of
the orientations. Moral orientations represent conceptually distinctive perspectives
for organizing and understanding the moral domain and provide an individual with
justification of hislher moral reasoning. Kohlberg's claim that moral reasoning is
universal applies to moral orientations as well as moral stages. He argued not only
that progress through the moral stages is based on invariant cognitive development,
but also that there are basic moral principles which are universally valid, such as
justice. Kohlberg's theory is regarded as "justice-based" moral reasoning.
Kohlberg (1981) believed that "virtue is not many but one, that is justice," influenced
by Rawl's theory of justice (1971). Regarding this belief of Kohlberg's, Gilligan
(1982) pointed out a bias in Kohlberg's theory ofmoral reasoning. According to her,
morality has two distinctive orientations; a "care and responsibility orientation" and a
"justice orientation." Based on this distinction, she has argued that Kohlberg's
moral stages only focus on the development of justice so that Kohlberg's theory has
failed to account for an important area of morality, the so-called "caring and
responsibility" orientation. With respect to this claim, Kohlberg (1984) has argued
that justice in his terms could include "care and responsibility" in Gilligan's terms.
Although Kohlberg characterized his stage scheme as the development of justice
reasoning, it does not mean that the system can handle only judgements that are
explicitly rights or justice oriented (Kohlberg, 1984). Rather, he proposed four
moral orientations which seemed universal and were reflected in responses to his
hypothetical dilemmas; normative orientation, utilitarian orientation, ideal or
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harmony-serving orientation and fairness or justice orientation.
The four moral orientations identified are described as follows. The normative
orientation focuses on duty or rightness as deriving from "rulefulness" or
"lawfulness." That is, the basic considerations in decision making centre on the
prescribed rules of the social or moral order. For example, it could be wrong to lie
even to a murderer in order to save a victim from the murderer because such lying
contradicts the universality of the norm of truth. The utilitarian orientation
emphasizes the good or bad welfare consequences of action in the situation for others
and/or the self. Actions are morally right if they maximize welfare and happiness
and minimize pain and bad consequences for individuals or groups of individuals.
The utilitarian orientation can be subdivided into egoistic utilitarianism and social
utilitarianism. The concern of the egoistic utilitarianism is related to consequences
to oneself whereas the concern of the social utilitarianism stands for consequences to
the group. The fairness or justice orientation emphasises justice with a focus on
liberty, equity and equality, reciprocity and contract between persons. Thus, for
instance, it should not be wrong or unfair to lie to the potential murderer in order to
protect the intended victim in terms of the fairness orientation. The ideal self or
perfectionistic orientation focuses on an image of the actor as a good self or as
someone with conscience, and to his/her motives or virtue (relatively independent of
approval from others). That is, it is morally right to contribute to the harmony of the
acting self or to the harmony of society. These orientations seem to be related to the
content, rather than the structure, of moral reasoning. Thus it is possible to obtain an
additional perspective on individuals' moral reasoning that may be helpful in
interpreting cross-cultural variability through analysing the usage of these orientations.
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Table 2.1.2 summarises the elements included in each orientation. These elements
represent the way of expressing an individual's orientation toward a particular moral
norm, by indicating what value that norm holds in his/her moral reasoning.
Kohlberg (1976) divided each moral stage into two substages, Substage A and B
according to the usage of orientations. The normative order, the egoistic
consequences and the utilitarian consequences are grouped together to define
Substage A at each stage and the ideal or harmony-serving consequences orientation
and the fairness orientation are grouped together to define Substage B at each stage.
Table 2.1.2 The Elements of Moral Orientations
Source: Colby and Kohlberg (1987)
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Kohlberg hypothesised that Substage B represents the morally autonomous version of
the judgment structure characteristic of a particular stage while Substage A represents
the morally heteronomous version. On the basis of these hypotheses, the B substage
is regarded as more developmentally advanced than the A substage.
With regard to these orientations, Gilligan (1982) argued that males typically had a
justice/rights orientation whereas females tended to focus on a care/responsibility
orientation so that Kohlberg's approach was not adequate for describing the moral
thinking of females because his system was based on justice and rights. However,
Kohlberg (1984) argued that, of the orientations proposed by him, only the fairness
orientation explicitly focuses on justice while the other three orientations implicitly
reflect justice. Justice within the normative order orientation is impartial or
consistent with general rules. The utilitarian orientation regards justice as the
operation of quantitatively maximizing social welfare consequences. Whereas in the
ideal orientation, justice is considered as fairness or the avoidance of exploitation of
others and the need to benefit them. Kohlberg pointed out that many or most moral
concerns about care were concerns about enhancing the welfare of other persons, of
not hurting them and about preserving and embracing relationships with others.
These concerns could fall within the domain of justice as the utilitarian orientation of
concern for others' welfare or the ideal orientation of promoting harmonious social
relations. Thus Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning dealt with not only the
morality of justice but also the morality of care and responsibility, counter to
Gilligan's claims. However, he admitted that the most structurally distinctive feature
of moral stages was in the fairness orientation, in which equality, reciprocity and
contracts between persons were explicitly focused on.
CHAPTER THREE
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF MORAL REASONING
3.1 EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON THE UNIVERSALITY OF KOHLBERG'S
MORAL STAGE MODEL
Since Kohlberg claimed the universality of the development of moral reasoning, the
claim has remained controversial among researchers. Many researchers have
examined Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning in a variety of cultural settings in
order to test the claim of universality. According to Snarey's review (1985), 45
studies - 38 cross sectional and 7 longitudinal studies - of Kohlberg's moral reasoning
have been carried out in 27 different cultural areas, including the US, England,
Guatemala, Japan, Kenya, Pakistan, Yucatan, Alaska (Eskimos), Israel, Turkey and
India. The types of samples vary considerably in terms of not only the range of
cultural diversity but also the range of age groups, from children to adults. Also,
more than half of the studies included both male and female participants. Based on
the review, it was suggested that Kohlberg's dilemmas are reasonably fair in terms of
culture when the content is creatively adapted. The findings also indicated that
stage skipping and stage regressions were rare and always below the level that could
be attributed to measurement error. From these studies of moral reasoning, several
well-designed studies are presented in this section.
Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs and Lieberman (1983) conducted a 20-year longitudinal study
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of the development of moral reasoning in US males to attempt to document the basic
assumptions of Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development. They assumed that
moral stages would develop with age and argued that there would be differences in
the moral stage according to the sociometric status and social class of participants.
The postulation of an influence from sociometric status on the moral stages reflected
Piaget's (1965) concept that peer group participation was an important determinant of
moral reasoning maturity. Colby et al. (1983) also pointed out the socio-economic
status as another aspect which was related to the moral stages. Kohlberg (1969),
influenced by Mead (1934), had interpreted social class differences in the rate and
terminus of development of moral stages as reflecting differential participation in and
identification with society and its secondary institutions. Fifty eight boys, aged 10,
13 and 16 at time 1, were divided equally whose groups at each age by socioeconomic
and sociometric status. In order to minimize the possibility that intelligence might
affect their level of moral reasoning, participants were selected on the basis of having
an IQ score in the range 100 to 120. They were tested at total of 6 times at 3-4 year
intervals during the study. At each testing, participants were individually
interviewed on their moral reasoning with respect to Kohlberg's nine hypothetical
moral dilemmas (three dilemmas from each form; Form A, B and C). All scoring
was done blind by individual dilemma to minimize the bias of scorers. Data were
subjected to test-retest, alternative form and interrater reliability tests in order to
estimate the measurement error for the invariant stage sequence. Validity of the
instrument was also discussed.
With increasing age, participants showed development through the sequence of moral
stages, without stage skipping. In only 4% of cases (6 occasions) of the adjacent
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testing times was there a downward stage change. This percentage was less than the
downward change based on test-retest reliability data (5-6%), thus it could be
regarded as a measurement error. The findings implied that the moral stages
developed in an invariant order as Kohlberg claimed. When factor analyses of issue
and dilemma were administered for several age groups and for the sample as a whole,
no more than one interpretable factor emerged. This study demonstrated the
existence of a single factor of moral stage across varying contents and contexts.
That is, there is a general dimension ofmoral reasoning that is not issue-specific.
Based on the results, it was concluded that a cognitive developmental stage model of
moral reasoning was supported and that the standard scoring system was a valid
measure of Kohlberg's moral stages. It was also found that the stage of moral
reasoning was positively correlated with age, socio-economic status and educational
level but not with sociometric status. Regarding educational attainment, it was
confounded with social class. Middle-class individuals had usually had more post-
compulsory formal education in comparison with those from a working-class
background. According to the finding of the moderate relationship (r = .54) between
the moral stages and education, it seemed that development to higher stages was
facilitated by educational experience. It implied that the moral stage development of
an individual was influenced by not only his/her cognitive abilities but also the social
environment surrounding himlher. Additionally, it was found that stage scores in
childhood were significantly related to those in adulthood. However, participants in
this study were limited to Western males. This was a limitation in terms of the claim
of the universality of moral stages even though the study was well designed and
carefully conducted.
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The cultural universality of moral stages could be supported by longitudinal and
cross-sectional studies in other cultural backgrounds. Nisan and Kohlberg (1982)
conducted a study of moral reasoning in Turkey to examine the claim of the
universality ofmoral stages, as a further step, by broadening and elaborating the study
of Turiel et al. (1978). The aim of the study was to examine whether all observed
individuals did develop in the sequence proposed by the theory. Participants aged
from 10 through to 28 years were divided into two groups; participants from a fairly
traditional rural village and participants from middle-class, city background.
Interviewing took place four times in total in 1964, 1966, 1970 and 1976. Some of
the participants were interviewed only once, while others were interviewed 2-4 times.
All the participants were included in the cross-sectional study. In the longitudinal
study, however, only the participants who were interviewed 2-4 times were included.
Each participant was given an individual oral interview, including the same six
hypothetical moral dilemmas and a standard set of probing questions. These
dilemmas were revised versions of Kohlberg's standard stories, adapted to make them
more suitable for the Turkish setting.
The results showed a sequential advance through the moral stages with age. Out of
35 changes, only 4 cases (11.4%) showed a regression against the prediction, a
distribution whose chance probability is .001 by sign test. All participants were
either at a single stage or at two adjacent stages but not at more than three stages.
The results supported the claim of structural universality in moral reasoning; the
Turkish responses fitted the moral stages and exhibited the claimed sequence in both
the longitudinal and the cross-sectional studies. However, the claim of universality
admits the possibility of differences in the rate and endpoint of moral development.
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This study revealed such differences. Village participants showed a slower rate of
development of moral stages than city participants. A comparison of the oldest
participants in the village with those in the city showed a difference in the endpoint of
moral stage between the two groups. Even though all the village participants over
the age of 16 showed some conventional judgments, they seemed to stabilize at stage
3 whereas some city participants reached up to stage 4/5. This finding coincided
with that of an earlier study by Edwards (1975) and, consequently, supported her
suggestion that stage 3 was the final point of moral development in the traditional
culture. On the basis of the findings, it was suggested that stage 3 was a necessary
and sufficient level of functioning in societies having a social order based on face-
to-face relationships and a high level of normative consensus. These conditions
might not necessitate differentiation and integration beyond stage 3.
Before confirming the claim of universality, some methodological aspects of this
study should be considered. Whether gender differences exist in development
through the moral stages could not be considered because participants in this study
were also limited to males. As in the previous US study, females were excluded.
In addition, it should also be noted that the interviews in 1964 and 1966 were
administered by only one interviewer. Thus there is a possibility of biases and/or
misinterpretations of the responses.
Another well-designed cross-cultural longitudinal study that supported the claim of
the universality of moral stages was conducted by Snarey et al. (1985). Ninety-two
kibbutz-born and Middle Eastern Aliyah adolescents participated, and 64 of them
were interviewed longitudinally over a two-to-nine year period. Kohlberg's moral
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judgment interview, Form A, was used to collect the data. To maximize reliability,
all interviews were scored blind from English transcripts, i.e. without knowing the
participant's name, age, gender, cohort membership, time of testing or scorers
assigned to other interviews. Interrater reliability and translations reliability were
also administered. Further, a 13-point scale as well as a 9-point scale were used,
thus, the developmental sequence and regression could be examined more carefully.
Stage change was found to be upward, gradual and without significant regression. In
line with the two above studies, the findings also strongly supported Kohlberg's
claims regarding structural wholeness and internal consistency, Age showed a
positive relationship with stages. The age norms compared favourably with the
findings from the US and Turkish longitudinal studies. The two previous
longitudinal studies of moral stage development had used the same standardized
scoring system as this study. The mean stage scores of the kibbutz participants was
higher than those of other participants of parallel studies in the US and Turkey. The
finding that higher scores of kibbutz participants than those of the participants in
urban areas is somewhat different from the previous research that had found that
individuals in rural areas generally progress more slowly than urban individuals
(Edwards, 1975; Turiel, 1969).
Another cross-cultural study was carried out in Hong Kong, Mainland China and
England (Ma, 1988a). A total of 507 participants (329 in Hong Kong sample, 78 in
Mainland China sample, and 100 in England sample respectively) administered Rest's
Defining Issues Test (DIT). The sample consisted of both males and females aged
from 16 to 26 years old. Generally speaking the findings in the Hong Kong and
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England studies supported the claim of an ordered sequence of Kohlberg's moral
stages measured by the DIT. The findings in Mainland China were less obvious.
Ma attributed the reason mainly to the small sample size and the homogeneity in the
age and education background of the participants.
Regarding gender differences, most findings have opposed Gilligan's claims (1982).
Through abortion counsellees Gilligan found that when they encountered the matter
of abortion, females tended to be more concerned with caring and responsibility rather
than justice and rights. Based on these findings, she argued that Kohlberg's system
based on justice and rights had a sexual bias against females as mentioned earlier in
the previous chapter (see section 2.2.2 in Chapter II). She pointed out that males
were encouraged to think of moral dilemmas as inevitable conflicts of interest
between two or more parties in terms of laws and other social conventions, which
were designed to be resolved (a perspective that represents stage 4 reasoning in
Kohlberg's scheme), whereas females were encouraged to consider moral dilemmas
as conflicts between one's own selfishness and the needs and desires of others (a
perspective that approximates stage 3 in Kohlberg's scheme). It seems that females
lag behind males in terms of moral stages. However, she claimed that the
interpersonal oriented morality that females adopted was neither more nor less mature
than the rule-bound morality of males based on the belief that males and females
adopted different perspectives on moral issues. That is, she viewed these two
moralities as "separate but equal" and suggested that females underwent a different
series of moral stages rather than the same series as males.
As far as the moral stages were concerned, many studies showed no gender
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differences (e.g. Snarey et al., 1985; Walker, 1989; Walker & Morgan, 1991).
According to the review of gender differences in moral reasoning by Walker (1984,
J.986b) a few studies have shown gender differences in moral stages. Moreover,
when the gender differences occurred in childhood and early adolescence, studies
tended to show more mature development for females although even these infrequent
differences were relatively small. The precociousness of girls in moral reasoning
was also supported by other studies. Gregg, Gibbs and Basinger (1994) examined
differences in moral reasoning among 170 delinquent and 178 nondelinquent
adolescents aged 13 to 18 through the Sociomoral Reflection Measure - Short Form
(SRM-SF). In this study the moral reasoning of male adolescents (both delinquent
and nondelinquent) was less advanced than that of females. Thoma (1986) also
analysed findings from 54 studies in which the DIT was used. Gender differences
favoured females among junior and senior high-school students, college youth and
even adults (mean d (effect size) = .15, .17, .21, and .28, respectively). These
findings were opposed to Gilligan's claim of gender differences favouring males.
Cohn (1991) pointed out gender differences in moral reasoning, ego development,
aggression, and empathy during early and mid-adolescence, in favour of girls, and
explained the overall precociousness of females in adolescence mainly by two factors;
differences in maturation rate and socialization experiences. The former explanation
was based on the assumption that psychological maturity accompanied physiological
maturity. The most likely explanation was thought to be the factor of socialization
experience. Lever (1978) studied the spontaneous play of 183 fifth-grade children
and found gender differences in social activity. That is, boys played in large groups
with little opportunity for discussion or conversation whereas girls tended to
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expenence extensive discussions and other social expenences during spontaneous
play in dyads or small groups, in which they mimicked basic human relationships.
The girls' activity might generate the growth of interpersonal awareness, which was
more likely to be associated with development ofmoral reasoning.
Some studies in Walker's review (1984) indicated that in adulthood males showed
more mature moral reasoning than females, in line with Gilligan's claim. However,
in these studies, it was found that the apparent gender differences were actually
confounded with differences in educational and occupational achievement. That is,
participants who showed the highest levels of moral reasoning had had more
education and occupational experience at higher levels and most of them were males.
Against Walker's review, Baumrind (1986) argued that gender differences still remain
through adulthood even when effects of educational and occupational status were
controlled for. However, based on a meta-analysis - i.e. a statistical procedure for
combining findings-, Walker concluded that there were no significant gender
differences in the overall pattern ofmoral reasoning.
At the same time, it should be realized that the lack of evidence for gender differences
in moral stages does not diminish the possibility of gender differences in the
preferential use of various orientations in moral reasoning or in the content of
reasoning within a stage such as reliance on particular norms. Gender differences in
the use of moral orientations will be discussed later.
In summary, cross-cultural and longitudinal findings showed that Kohlberg's moral
stage model seemed universal although there remains the possibility of differences in
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the rate and endpoint of the development through the moral stages across variables
such as ethnic or cultural background. There is evidence that individuals were
relatively consistent in their moral stages across dilemmas of varying content and that
their stage development was irreversibly progressive, one stage at a time.
Additionally, the claim of gender differences in moral reasoning was not apparently
accepted in so far as such differences were not salient.
3.2 EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON THE STRUCTURE OF MORAL REASONING
Regarding the structure of moral reasoning, it was assumed that there was cultural
variation. Tappan (1997), in his recent paper, challenged Kohlberg's view of moral
reasoning in the light of the Vygotskian perspective. Vygotsky (1934/1986) argued
that the development of thinking is directed from the social to the individual rather
than from the individual to the social. That is, an individual develops his/her
thinking through communicative interaction with others, especially those who are at a
more mature level of development, over years through using psychological tools such
as language, and hence the psychological tools are crucial to maintain the interaction.
It implies that social interaction always takes place in the context of culture because
words, language and forms of discourse are inherently sociocultural phenomena.
From this perspective, Tappan questioned Kohlberg's view that moral development is
the result of a constructive process undertaken by a transcendental epistemic
participant. Rather, he suggests an alternative perspective that an individual tends to
develop the moral reasoning through conversations and interactions with others that
occur in specific social, cultural and historical contexts. Furthermore, many studies
have indeed found cultural differences in the content of moral reasoning (e.g. Dien,
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1982; Lei & Cheng, 1984, as cited in Snarey, 1985; Tietjen & Walker, 1985; Walker
& Moran, 1991). The findings indicated limitations of Kohlberg's theory in its
applicability to some cultures. However, it was suggested that although orientations
of moral reasoning were different across cultures, the moral stages were at the same
level. In this section, some studies that found cultural differences in the structure of
moral reasoning will be presented followed by a section that presents studies which
examined Kohlberg's model ofmoral orientation.
3.2.1 Empirical Studies of Cultural Variations in Moral Reasoning
The study by Snarey et al. (1985) is one of the studies that found cultural variation in
moral reasoning. In the study, a substantial difference was observed for reasoning on
the Joe dilemma (Dilemma I), but not on the Heinz's dilemma (Dilemma III) nor in
Officer Brown dilemma (Dilemma III'), between kibbutz and non-kibbutz youth, aged
15 to 17 years and at the conventional stages. The kibbutz-born youth nearly always
chose the contract issue and argued that the father should keep his promises, whereas
the Middle Eastern youth often made choice of the authority issue and advocated that
the son should give his father the money. The study showed that participants who
were primarily at the conventional stages were more likely to make moral choices that
reflected the conventions of their society. However the youngest group, the 12-14
age cohort, were primarily at the preconventional stages, and seldom reflected cultural
conventions in their moral reasoning. With respect to the oldest group, aged 18-26
years, they made greater use of the less convention-bound stages 4 and 4/5. That is,
use of or conformity to conventions in moral reasoning decreased again in the oldest
group. The findings implied that cultural differences in moral reasoning were more
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likely to emerge in the reasoning of individuals who were at conventional moral
stages than those at either preconventional or postconventional stages.
In addition, some difficulties in scoring the kibbutzniks' postconventional reasoning
were reported. They argued that the kibbutzniks' communal emphasis, greater
investment in the presentation of social solidarity, and greater emphasis on collective
happiness seemed to have been missed or misunderstood when evaluated solely by
the existing criterion judgments of the scoring manual (see Snarey et al., 1985 for
examples and details). Some of the moral reasoning was guess-scored as being at
stage 4 and 4/5 by the standard scoring procedure, which held a middle class
American perspective. However, under a culturally sensitive second scoring, the
same reasoning was evaluated as being at stage 5. The researchers suggested that
culturally indigenous examples of higher stage reasoning should be included, that
postconventional moral principles should be added to the scoring manual so as to
avoid cultural bias, or both.
Tietjen and Walker (1985) examined the applicability of Kohlberg's approach to a
collectively oriented, small-scale, traditional face-to-face society by interviewing 22
men in a Maisin village in Papua New Guinea. Participants were divided into four
groups -traditional, government, and religious leaders and non leaders - and
interviewed with a new, culturally appropriate dilemma as well as with Kohlberg's
moral dilemmas (adapted to the setting).
Most responses of participants could generally be coded according to Kohlberg's
system. However, it was found that some responses reflected particular cultural
III. Empirical Studies ofMoral Reasoning 52
concepts such as maintaining the harmony or amity within the community, and that
those were not clearly matched to scoring criteria. For instance, all the men in the
experiment said that the story character should not steal the drug to save his wife's
life in Heinz's dilemma. According to Kohlberg's scheme, this response signifies that
the men placed a higher value on obedience to the law than to life. However, in
terms of the concepts of Maisin men, the salient moral issue in this dilemma seemed
to be not life versus law but the individual versus the group, or personal gain versus
causing a disruption of community harmony, Clearly such concepts were difficult to
score with the existing scoring system. Thus, t~ey pointed out that the Kohlberg's
scoring manual was not able to deal with maintaining human relationships between
the level of individual interpersonal relation and the level of society in general.
Additionally, the findings concerning development through the moral stages in this
study supported Edwards' (1975, 1978, 1982) contention that cultural variation also
exists in the endpoint of moral development. For instance, stage 3 reasoning
represented an appropriate form of moral reasoning for face-to-face traditional rural
societies.
When interrater reliability was examined, 81.1% agreement, with 90.9% agreement
on modal stage; r =.75 for Weighted Average Scores (WASs), and r = .76 for scoring
of orientations reliability were reported. On the basis of these findings, the
researchers concluded that the reliability was not substantially different from that in
other studies although it was lower than ideal (see Walker's review, 1984). However,
it should be noted that the sample size was so small that it was difficult to
conclusively test the claims with these findings.
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Some moral reasoning of Oriental people also seemed to be missing in Kohlberg's
system. Dien (1982) claimed that there were cultural differences between the
Western and Chinese society on account of the uniqueness of Chinese culture. The
Western view of man is as an autonomous being who makes free and rational choices
as a moral agent. This view was based on Christianity and is clearly reflected in
Koh1berg's theory of moral development through his methodology and the
hypothetical dilemmas. However, the Chinese view of man, which is based on the
Confucian philosophy, is quite different from the Western view. They tend to regard
man as an integral part of an orderly universe with an innate moral sense to maintain
harmony. Further, the preferred manner of resolving human conflict in Chinese
society tends to be reconciliation and collective decision making rather than
individual choice, commitment, and responsibility as in the West. In light of these
fundamental differences in the two cultural traditions, Dien questioned the
applicability of Kohlberg's theory of the development of moral reasoning to Chinese
society even within the lower levels. Unfortunately, Dien could not provide any
empirically comparable analysis to support her hypothesis conclusively.
Lei and Cheng (1984, as cited in Snarey, 1985) supported Dien's hypothesis through
their research with Chinese people living in Taiwan. They interviewed a total of 212
Chinese, aged 7 years to adulthood. When their moral reasoning was analysed,
much of the reasoning could be scored by matching with the criterion judgments in
the Standard Form Scoring Manual. However, a considerable number of
participants' moral concerns were hard to score due to the lack of appropriate
criterion judgments to match with. More interestingly, many Chinese participants
gave reasons for their moral judgments in terms of traditional Chinese values, such as
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filial piety and collective utility. However, examples of these values were absent in
the criterion judgments given for the higher stages. For instance, filial piety was
represented in the criterion judgments given for stage 3 - affiliation - but no example
was given for stage 5. Regarding these unique cultural concepts, Lei and Cheng
argued that the current scoring manual failed to capture certain concepts such as filial
piety, and suggested that these concepts could be articulated at a number of
structurally distinct levels.
Based on the literature review, Ma (1988b) also pointed out the cultural differences
between Chinese and Westerners at least in the last three moral stages although the
first three stages could be culturally universal. The Chinese perspectives, such as
Confucianism, Taoism and common traditional thought seemed to influence the
Chinese to have different moral reasoning from the Westerners. Thus Ma proposed
Chinese sub-structures of the last three moral stages, apart from the Western sub-
structure, through integrating the Chinese prospective into the general structure of
moral reasoning. For instance, at the stage 4, both Chinese and Western people
would think that it is important to maintain the stability and prosperity of the society.
However, Chinese seemed to hold a strong collectivistic prospective which allows
individuals less freedom to develop their own characteristics and personal opinions
while Westerners tended to consider the relations between an individual and the group
to be rational and individualistic. Later on, Ma (1992) proposed to integrate
Kohlberg's and the Chinese perspectives on moral development into a single model,
which places more emphasis on the affective aspect of moral development in
comparison to Kohlberg' s theories.
III. Empirical Studies ofMoral Reasoning 55
Similarly, Heubner and Garrod (1991, 1993) argued against Kohlberg's metaethical
assumption on moral reasoning in their recent study of moral reasoning of adolescent
and young-adult Tibetan Buddhist monks. They interviewed 20 monks living in a
Tibetan Buddhist monastery in Nepal using a culturally adapted form of Kohlberg's
hypothetical dilemmas. They (1993) were able to trace a developmental pattern of
moral reasoning with age - from a mean stage of 2/3 to a mean stage of 3/4 - among
the participants. However, they reported difficulties in interpreting the monks'
moral reasoning using scoring categories provided by Koh1berg's scheme because
they gave the reasons for their moral decision on the basis of the concept peculiar to
Buddhists such as "karma." Thus Heubner and Garrod raised a profound question
about the universality of Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning since it disregarded
socioculturally specific aspects.
As mentioned in Chapter I, Shweder et al. (1990) also supports cultural variations in
the moral reasoning. They found that distinction between moral and convention is
culturally relative on the basis of a comparative study between individuals in India
and US and hence suggested that moral code might be different across cultures and
questioned the universality of Koh1berg's moral development.
The empirical findings of the above studies highlighted two points in relation to
cultural variation in moral reasoning. Firstly, moral reasoning was influenced by
specific norms and values which were emphasised by the culture to which participants
belonged. Secondly, Kohlberg's moral dilemmas were not adequate to account for
the full range of cultural variation in moral reasoning. These cultural variations in
moral reasoning seem to be verified through research on moral orientations.
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3.2.2 Empirical Studies on Moral Orientations
It is true that Kohlberg's model of moral orientation has not been examined as
vigorously as his model of moral stages. However, there have been some studies
that tried to ascertain differences in moral orientations across age, gender, as well as
cultural background (e.g. Walker, 1986a; Walker & Moran, 1991; Walker, de Vries &
Trevethan, 1987).
With respect to moral orientation, Tappan et al. (1987) analysed early empirical
studies (e.g. Colby etal., 1983; Lei & Cheng, 1984, as cited in Snarey, 1985; Nisan &
Kohlberg, 1982; Snarey et al., 1985) in terms of moral types which were based upon
differences in moral orientation. They divided four orientations into two types; the
normative and utility orientations as Type A and the fairness and the ideal orientations
as Type B. These corresponded with the substages of moral reasoning as mentioned
earlier (see 2.2.2 in Chapter II).
Tappan et al. predicted that social relations and socio-cultural environment would
have an effect on the development of moral type. For example, Type B would be
more likely to occur in a social system stressing cooperation, sharing and equality.
This prediction was clearly supported in an Israeli kibbutz sample. When analysing
the reasoning of the kibbutz sample, a majority of the men and women aged 16 and
almost all the participants aged 20 were categorised as Type B. However, the
majority of a sample of American males did not show Type B until their early 30s.
In other samples, Type B applied to the reasoning of a majority of 25 year old
Taiwanese males and females and half of a small sample of 26 year old Turkish males.
Two possible reasons for this difference between kibbutz and the other cultural groups
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in terms of moral types were provided. One was that on the kibbutz the sanctity of
life was much more highly valued than property rights were. Thus, the hierarchical
valuing of life over property on the Heinz's and Officer Brown's dilemmas (dilemmas
III and III') represented the influence of the content of cultural values as an
explanation for the high frequency of kibbutz participants scored as making Type B
judgments. The other possible reason was that the kibbutz simply placed strong
emphasis on the values that define Type B reasoning such as equality, cooperation and
mutual respect in the social relations. In fact, the kibbutz group was found to stress
these values more than the other three cultural groups did. The reasoning of the
other cultural groups seemed to be a more complex mixture of both gerontocratic and
democratic forms. Thus a relationship between cultural differences and moral
orientations was partially supported by the above findings.
Walker and Moran (1991) also suggested cultural variation in moral orientation in
their study ofmoral reasoning in communist Chinese society. Their study involved a
total of 52 adolescents and adults drawn from five groups according to their social
status; moral leaders, intellectuals, workers, college and junior high school students.
They were asked to respond to hypothetical moral dilemmas and discussed a real-life
dilemma from their own experiences in individual interviews. The interviews were
scored in terms of the participants' moral orientations as well as their level on the
moral stages in order to test the hypothesis that cultural variation exists in orientation
ofmoral reasoning.
When the moral orientation of the five social groups was examined, significant
differences between the groups were revealed. Moral leaders were more likely to
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show the normative orientation whereas intellectuals tended to orient towards the
ideal orientation. This pattern was somewhat different from that found in Tietjen
and Walker's (1985) study in which the moral orientation of leaders and non-leaders
in Papua New Guinea was examined. In their study, leaders oriented more to the
ideal orientation and less to the normative orientation than non-leaders, which was
similar to the intellectuals in the above study. The tendency of the moral leaders in
communist China towards the normative orientation was explained in terms of the
social environment of China. The moral leaders have been mandated to maintain a
normative order. Thus their moral reasoning stressed the importance of obedience,
meeting one's obligations and duties, rights and retribution. These findings revealed
that moral orientation differs across social groups. Moreover, the differences across
social groups can vary from one culture to another, thus implying the existence of
cultural variation in moral orientation.
When the results of the study in China are compared to those of Walker's other
studies (1986a, 1989) which involved samples of Canadian adults, the Chinese tended
to orient more to the utilitarianism and less to the ideal consequences than the
Canadians. Although this comparison appears to demonstrate the existence of
cultural differences, it requires careful consideration because the cross-cultural
samples were not exactly comparable in terms of their age and social status.
To summarize, empirical studies on moral orientation have generally shown various
cultural differences in moral orientations. Thus it could be concluded that moral
orientation does differ according to aspects of the cultural environment such as
emphasised values and norms, and social relations.
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Gender differences in moral orientations have also been investigated. Gilligan
(1982) proposed two kinds of moral orientation: a "rights" orientation and a
"responsibility" orientation (see section 2.2.2 in Chapter II). She argued that the
former was typically used by males in their moral reasoning whereas the latter was
used by females. Based on these hypotheses, she criticised Kohlberg's approach to
moral orientations claiming that it tended to undervalue the responsibility orientation,
identifying such reasoning with lower stages of moral thought (also see section 3.1 in
Chapter III).
In order to ascertain whether Kohlberg's theory did ~imply reflect the rights
orientation as Gilligan claimed, Walker et al. (1987) examined Kohlberg's moral
dilemmas in a study with 240 participants from 80 family triads (father, mother and
child). The children were drawn from grades 1,4, 7, and 10. Each individual was
interviewed using three hypothetical moral dilemmas from Moral Judgment Interview
(MJI) and one real-life dilemma. All the interviews were scored for both moral
stages and moral orientations. The moral orientation seen in the responses to each
dilemma was scored according to Lyons' manual (1982, as cited in Walker et al.,
1987) that was based on the moral orientations proposed by Gilligan. The
participants were categorised as reflecting the responsibility, the rights or the split
orientation. The split orientation was for participants who had an equal number for
each orientation according to the manual. It should be noted that Gilligan's
theorizing about moral orientations was actually predated by Kohlberg's moral
orientations. Gilligan's responsibility orientation is similar to Kohlberg's utility and
ideal orientations whereas her rights orientation shares features of his normative and
fairness orientations.
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The findings were that most individuals tended to use a considerable mix of both
orientations for most dilemmas regardless of their gender. The study failed to
support Gilligan's claim that there was a difference in moral orientation between
males and females and that Kohlberg's moral dilemmas were biased against the
female responsibility orientation. However this study examined moral orientations
in terms of only Gilligan's model but not Kohlberg's model. In other words, it has
not provided any particular pattern of the use of Kohlberg's moral orientations
although the dimensions of moral orientations of Gilligan were originated from
Kohlberg's moral orientations.
Walker's later study (1989) supported the findings of Walker et al (1987). In order
to examine Kohlberg's model of moral orientation as well as Gilligan's, he extended
the study of Walker et al. (1987) to a longitudinal study with 233 participants (from
78 families) who ranged in age from 5 to 63 years. They participated in 2 identical
interviews separated by a two-year interval. In each interview, they discussed three
hypothetical dilemmas from MJI and a personally generated real-life dilemma.
Responses to each of these were scored for moral orientation. One of the aims of the
study was to see if the findings of Walker et al. (1987), i.e. the lack of gender
differences in Kohlberg's moral orientations, were replicated. The results, again, did
not support the claim that moral orientations were gender-related, in line with the
findings of Walker et al. (1987). Gender differences were almost completely absent
when the responses were analysed according to both Gilligan's and Kohlberg's moral
orientations.
Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) also found that there was almost no significant gender
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difference in the use of moral orientations. They asked 80 educationally advantaged
adolescents and adults living in the US. The results showed, although women were
more likely to focus on the care orientation and men on the justice orientation, two-
thirds of the participants used both the orientations regardless of their gender.
In addition, a study of moral reasoning in China (Walker & Moran, 1991) showed
somewhat interesting findings in relation to moral orientations. No significant
gender differences were found in responses to Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas in
terms of moral orientations or moral stages. However, regarding real-life dilemmas,
it was found that Chinese females were more inclined towards a rights/justice
orientation and less towards a responsibility/care orientation than were Chinese males.
The findings were in contrast to Gilligan's claim that females were more likely to
adopt the responsibility/care orientation than the rights/justice orientation.
To summarize, since Gilligan made the claim that there was a sexual bias in
Kohlberg's model, gender differences in moral orientation have been examined.
Although there is only limited empirical evidence, most findings did not support the
existence of gender differences in moral orientation.
Tappan et al. (1987) found evidence of a significant relationship between age and
moral orientation in a review of longitudinal and cross-sectional studies (e.g. Colby et
al., 1983; Lei & Cheng, 1984, as cited in Snarey, 1985; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982).
According to the findings, as participants get older, they tend not only to reach a
higher moral stage but also to make moral reasoning on the basis of the ideal and the
fairness orientations (Type B) more than the normative and the utilitarian orientations
(Type A). Conversely, the younger the participant, the more likely he was to be
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scored as making Type A judgments as well as to obtain the lower moral stage score.
In addition, these longitudinal samples also provide some support for the relationship
between age, moral stages, and moral orientations through shifts in the proportion of
participants from Type A to Type B with increasing age. The developmental shift
from Type A to Type B was two to four times more likely to occur in these samples
than the Type B to Type A reversal.
Furthermore, the study with Canadians (Walker, 1989) revealed a relationship
between moral stages and moral orientations although moral orientations were
proposed to be conceptually independent from moral stages (i.e. stage development
occurs in each orientation). According to the study, the moral reasoning of Canadian
individuals at a lower moral stage was more likely to entail the normative and the
utilitarianism orientations, whereas the reasoning of individuals at a higher moral
stage tended to orient to a greater extent towards the fairness and the ideal orientations
as Kohlberg claimed.
In summary, empirical findings indicated an age trend in moral orientations and,
consequently, a possible relation between moral orientation and moral stages within
Kohlberg's approach. That is, the normative and the utilitarianism orientations were
more frequently expressed by younger people at lower stages whereas the ideal and
the fairness orientations were more common in older people at higher stages.
Walker et al. (1987) also reported that different types of moral dilemma (that is,
whether it is a hypothetical or a real-life dilemma) elicited differences in moral
orientations. Hypothetical dilemmas generated more normative and fairness
orientations whereas real-life dilemmas produced more utilitarianism and ideal
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orientations. In addition, analyses of the content of real-life dilemmas revealed that,
regardless of individuals' gender, the type of dilemma was clearly related to the use of
moral orientations. That is, impersonal-relationship dilemmas were more likely to
produce a rights orientation whereas personal-relationship dilemmas tended to elicit a
responsibility orientation.
In this section empirical studies on moral orientation have been reviewed. In
summary, the studies revealed that people generally use different moral orientations
according to their cultural background, age, and even the type of moral dilemmas they
are responding to, but not according to their gender. When age trends of moral
orientations were considered, there was evidence that the orientations were related to
moral stages that also develop with age.
3.3 CRITICISM OF KOHLBERG'S THEORY AND OTHER THEORIES
In spite of reporting some variations in the rate and endpoint of moral stages across
individuals' background with variables such as culture and gender, many researchers
generally accept Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning. However, Kohlberg's theory
has not escaped legitimate criticism. Here, the criticism of Kohlberg's theory is
reviewed, especially with reference to domain-specificity theory and cultural
psychologists'theory.
3.3.1 Criticism of Kohlberg's Theory
Shweder et al. (1990) identified the limitations of Kohlberg' s theory as follows. One
criticism addresses Kohlberg's claim that the development of cognitive stages as
described by Piaget, that is preoperational, concrete operational, and formal
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operational stages, preceded the development of moral stages. Unfortunately,
empirical studies have been inconclusive on the relations between performance on
Piagetian logical tasks and performance on Kohlberg's moral dilemmas (Haan, Weiss,
& Johnson, 1982). Moreover, Gelman and Baillargeon (1983) concluded that, unlike
the Piagetian account, cognitive development is not stagelike. If cognitive
development is not stagelike, then moral development based on it cannot be stagelike
either. Like the cognitive stages, it may also be possible that the moral stages are
flexible depending on how individuals perceive a moral dilemma and on the content
of a moral dilemma. For example, an individual may show stage four when the
dilemma concerns stealing but stage three when considering a dilemma about
extramarital sex (Gilligan, 1982).
A second criticism is related to several biases in Kohlberg's moral stages.
According to the findings of empirical studies (e.g. Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Snarey,
1985; Snarey et al., 1985; Walker, 1984), higher stages are achieved by males
compared with females, and by people in a certain social class, i.e. westernized elites
such as Israelis of European origin, upper middle-class American and Western-
oriented members of the urban elite in non-Western countries like Taiwan and India.
Few researchers would deny that those who are schooled receive higher scores
because they would have had more opportunities to think about or even write down
the rules for moral or logical thinking. This seems to be an indication of bias in the
moral stages in favour of certain populations.
A third criticism is that very few people are seen to reach the postconventional level
of moral reasoning. On a worldwide scale, only 1 or 2 percent of all responses are
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pure postconventional and even pure preconventional responses are rarely found
(Snarey, 1985). The infrequency of the postconventional level raises doubts about
the logic of Kohlberg's conceptual scheme, his method of interviewing, or both.
With respect to the conceptual scheme, infrequency of the postconventional responses
seems to occur because Kohlberg's conceptual scheme of morality contains not only
mandatory but also discretionary concepts (Shweder et al, 1990). The mandatory
concepts enable moral code to maintain its rational appeal whereas the discretionary
concepts permit replacement by alternative concepts whose substitution into the code
would not diminish its rational appeal. Therefore these discretionary concepts do
not appeal to everyone, regardless of their culture. In other words, there are
"divergent rationalities" in the moral domain (Shweder, 1986). Besides, Kohlberg's
interview technique is criticised in relation to the rarity of postconventional level.
His method presents the individual with a verbal production task that seems to require
high ability to generate verbal arguments that represent complex concepts in order to
obtain a high score ofmoral reasoning. However, much developmental research (e.g.
Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) has indicated that knowledge of concepts often preced~s
their self-reflective representation in speech. This implies that Kohlberg's method
could underestimate the moral reasoning of individuals who do not have the ability to
explicitly state the knowledge that they have.
Furthermore, there are also other researchers who criticize Piaget's and Kohlberg's
structural explanations of moral development with reference to the theory of domain-
specificity (e.g. Nucci, 1981; Smetana, 1993; Tisak, 1995; Turiel, 1983) and cultural
psychology (e.g. Shweder et al. 1990). Before describing this critique, Piaget's and
Kohlberg's assumptions, the target of the criticism, will be briefly reviewed.
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Piaget (1932/1965) considered moral development one type of specific branching
from general cognitive development. Thus he attempted to formulate a theory of
moral development which was closely related to his explanations of nonsocial
cognitive development. Piaget's explanation of moral development contains two
sequential levels of moral development: the heteronomous level and the autonomous
level (see Chapter I for details). Piaget interpreted the moral development from
heteronomy to autonomy as if there is a clear boundary between the two. The
obedience of constraint of the heteronomous level, which is equated with custom and
-
convention, precedes and is displaced by the concept of justice. In other words, it
was proposed that, at this level, children are unable to distinguish morality from
convention so that they regard all rules, whether they are moral or conventional rules,
as externally determined and fixed by authority figures. By contrast, children at the
autonomous level view rules as owing to mutual agreement or consensus, and thereby
as changeable and relative to the social context, and recognize that obedience to
authority is neither necessary nor always desirable. Also, they can distinguish
between rules and their underlying justification. In other words, they make intrinsic
moral judgments. The criteria of obligatoriness and universality, in their moral
senses, apply to autonomous-level thinking in which concepts ofjustice, equality, and
mutual respect are seen to be generalizable.
Since Kohlberg (1969, 1981) conducted his most extensive research of moral
development on the basis of Piaget's work, their research on moral development
shares some common features. For instance, Kohlberg, like Piaget, proposed that
there are some general relations between the sequence of the development of moral
reasoning and the sequence of nonsocial cognitive development. Also, Kohlberg's
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primary assumption is parallel to that of Piaget. Both of them assumed that children
view all rules as stemming from authority, so that they have a unitary concept of
social rules and treat all social rules alike. Thus, Kohlberg characterized children as
failing to differentiate between moral and nonmoral rules.
In spite of the comrnoness between the two theories, Turiel (1983) pointed out two
major modification of Piaget's formulation made by Kohlberg. One is that, at the
earliest levels, moral judgments are based not on respect for authority and feelings of
sacredness for social rules, but on an orientation to power, punishment, and physical
consequences. Although young children do equate right with obedience to adult
authority, Kohlberg's explanation of children's obedience is based on a pragmatic
orientation to the rewards and punishments administered by adults rather than on
respect for authority. Similarly, Kohlberg interpreted children's belief in strict
adherence to rules on the basis of fear and prudence, not a sense of sacredness. Thus,
Kohlberg's position regarding punishment and sanctions in children's moral judgment
is stronger than that of Piaget. The other difference between Kohlberg and Piaget is
that Kohlberg argued that the conventional level occurs during adolescence so that
autonomous morality is seen as developing during late adolescence or early childhood,
which is later than Piaget's assumption (Turiel, 1983).
3.3.2 Domain-Specificity Theory; An Alternative Theory on Moral Development
As opposed to the assumption of Kohlberg and Piaget, some researchers, based on
empirical studies (e.g. Davidson et al, 1983; Nucci, 1981; Smetana, 1981, 1985;
Weston & Turiel, 1980), claim that young children can distinguish morality from
other social rules such as conventional rules. Distinguishing morality from other
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social rules presupposes that individuals think about social relationships, emotions,
social practices, and social order, and that thinking about morality has features
distinctive from other aspects of thinking about the social world. This is the idea of
domain specificity (Turiel, 1998).
Domain specificity theorists (e.g. Smetana, 1993; Tisak, 1995) identified different
domains of social judgment. Concerning the different domains of social judgment,
Turiel (1975, 1978a, b, 1979, 1983) and Nucci (1981), according to the criteria of rule
contingency and personal jurisdiction, identified- three distinct domains of the
development of social judgment: moral domain, societal domain, and psychological
domain. The moral domain encompasses prescriptive judgments about how
individuals ought to behave towards one another. Because moral issues pertain to
matters of justice, fairness, individual rights, and welfare, moral rules are
characterized by obligatoriness, generalizability, and impersonality across situations,
and the wrongness of moral acts such as hitting, lying, or stealing is considered to be
non-contingent on specific social rules or authority dictates. The societal domain
includes concepts regarding systems of social relations, including groups, social
conventions, social system, and social institutions. The concept of social
conventions is the most researched area of the societal domain. Conventions are
defined as behavioural uniformities reflective of shared knowledge that coordinates
interactions within social system. Thus they are hypothesized to be contextually
relative, arbitrary, and changeable, and the wrongness of conventional acts such as
forms of dress and modes of address is thought to be contingent on the rules and
dictates of authority within that context. The psychological domain includes
judgments concerning people as psychological systems. Concepts of personality,
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person, self and identity are aspects of this domain. The psychological domain is
defined in terms of personal issues involving social actions outside both moral
concern and societal regulation. Keeping correspondence private, joining a
recreational group, and choosing of one's friends could belong to this domain.
These actions primarily affect only the actor without yielding injustice to others or the
disruption of social order.
The three domains described above are labeled "the moral," "the social conventional,"
and "the personal," respectively; some researchers have examined the development of
social judgment pertaining to these three domains. Most studies of the domain
model of social development have revolved around the moral and the social
conventional domain distinction. As mentioned earlier, the theory of domain
specificity began in opposition to Piaget (1932/1965) and Kohlberg's (1969, 1971)
assumptions that morality and social conventions are part of the same conceptual
domain, and therefore, that moral concepts (referring to justice) emerge from the non-
moral (i.e. conventions). In contrast, Turiel and his colleagues, theorists of domain
specificity (e.g. Turiel, 1977, 1983; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987; Turiel & Smetana,
1984; Weston & Turiel, 1980) argue that morality and conventions are two separate
conceptual domains from the outset, so that each domain develops independently and
entails differential social experiences. Indeed, their empirical findings showing
young children's ability to distinguish between morality and conventions support their
claims.
The study of Weston and Turiel (1980) examined the criterion dimensions of
institutional practice, which is closely related to rule contingency, and jurisdiction or
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power of authority, in order to ascertain how children relate the policies of the
institution and of those in authority to their own judgments of actions. Children
from 5 to 11 years of age were told hypothetical stories containing four types of action
by a child; undressing on the playground, hitting another child, leaving toys on the
floor in the classroom and refusing to share a snack with another child. In each case,
children were asked to evaluate the actions, the school policies regarding each act
(permitting or prohibiting), and teachers' responses to rule conformity and violation.
It was found that children at all the ages did not accept the legitimacy of the school
policy regarding hitting, an act in the moral domain. The majority (87%) said that a
school policy that would allow people to hit and hurt one another was wrong because
this could result in harm to persons. By contrast, more than half of the children
accepted the legitimacy of the other three actions (67% for undressing, 60% for
leaving toys, and 52% for refusing to share). Regarding undressing, an act in the
conventional domain, most of the children (60%) stated that it would be wrong to be
naked in school although they assumed that the school authorities could legitimatize
the policy. Similarly, children at all ages showed discriminations in evaluating an
authority's (i.e. teacher's) response to children's acts. Children did not assume that
a teacher would simply go along with a school policy regardless of the action; rather,
they expected a teacher to respond to the actions according to the consequences of
actions. In the case of the hitting story, a great number of children assumed that a
teacher would reprimand a child for hitting even though the act was consistent with
school policy. In the case of the other three acts, however, most children predicted
that a teacher would reprimand children engaging in those acts only when the acts
were prohibited by the school policy. The results demonstrated that young
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children's evaluation of actions is related to the consequences of those actions on
others, and not on the legitimacy of the action by an authority, showing that children
made a clear distinction between a rule pertaining to persons causing physical harm to
others and rules pertaining to nakedness, leaving toys on the floor and refusing to
share a snack. Hence, the findings imply that young children distinguish between
morality and conventions, since moral rules were evaluated on the basis of factors
intrinsic to acts, such as harm inflicted on others and violation of rights and treated as
unalterable.
The study by Smetana (1981) showed that children even between 2 'li and 4 'li years
of age can distinguish between morality and social conventions. She examined
middle-class preschool children divided into two age groups; those from 30 to 42
months old and those from 44 to 57 months old. The children were presented with
pictures illustrating familiar moral and conventional transgressions. The moral items
included hitting, not sharing, shoving, throwing water at another child, and taking
another child's apple, while the conventional items were rules that were enforced at
the nursery schools, including not participating in show-and-tell, not sitting on the rug
during story time, not saying grace before snack, not putting a toy away in the correct
place, and not putting belongings in the designated place. For each transgression,
they were then asked, "Would the event be alright if there were no rules about it in the
preschool?" (indicating rule contingency), and "Would the event be alright at home or
in another school?" (indicating relativity). They were also asked about the
senousness of the acts and the amount of punishment the transgressor deserved,
("Whether the teacher should punish the transgressor," and if so, "a little or a lot").
Children judged nearly all moral transgressions to be more wrong in the absence of
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rules, and evaluated all moral transgressions as more senous, more deserving of
punishment, and less contextually relative than conventional transgressions.
However, age trends were observed in children's judgments of rule relativity. Older
children were more likely than younger children to regard moral transgressions as
universally wrong. All children were more equivocal in their judgments about the
relativity of conventional transgressions. The results indicate that preschool children
as young as 30 months distinguish between moral and conventional rule violations.
These overall findings are consistent with research on older subjects (Nucci, 1981;
Weston & Turiel, 1980), but contradict Piaget and Kohlberg's description of young
children's inability to distinguish between moral and conventional rules.
Another study by Davidson et al. (1983) found a similar pattern of children's
judgments for moral conventional transgressions during middle childhood. In this
study, 6, 8, and 10 year old children were asked to make judgments and to provide
justifications for four types of social transgression: familiar moral (e.g. bullying),
unfamiliar moral (embezzling), familiar conventional (eating with fingers) and
unfamiliar conventional (changing husband surname to wife's after marriage). As
expected, children distinguished between moral and conventional transgressions in
terms of the acceptability of authority intervention, the relevance of expected
punishment, and the acceptability of alternative rules. Furthermore, the types of
reasons children at all ages gave differed for moral and conventional transgressions.
Justifications for moral transgressions pertained to fairness, whereas justifications for
conventional transgressions pertained to appeals to authority, punishment avoidance,
and customs or traditions. Thus, in line with the above studies, Davidson et al.' s
study also demonstrates that children distinguish morality from conventions.
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Another study (Smetana, 1985) provides further information about children's
conceptions of moral and conventional transgressions. In this study, preschool
children were presented with stories describing familiar moral or conventional
transgressions, or stories varying in the consistency of prohibitions regarding actions
and in responses to events, but in which the events themselves were left unspecified
through the use of nonsense words instead of actual words. In some stories, for
instance, events were depicted as prohibited in two contexts (horne and preschool),
whereas in others events were depicted as prohibited only in preschool. This
manipulation varied the consistency of prohibitions. Concerning variation in
responses to events, some of the stories described "moral" reactions to the unspecified
transgressions (e.g. another child cried) whereas other stories depicted teachers
issuing commands to stop the behaviour. Children were then asked to justify the
transgressions and make a series ofjudgments based on criteria such as permissibility,
generalizability, seriousness, rule contingency, teacher's authority, and rule utility.
As in other studies, children in this study differentiated between familiar moral and
conventional transgressions. That is, children whose reasons reflected moral
concerns (e.g. others' welfare, fairness to others) judged transgressions to be more
serious than children who focused on the social conventional aspects of the
transgression (e.g. maintaining order in the classroom). These results suggest that
young children differentiate moral and conventional actions and that the basis for this
differentiation lies in children's ability to infer different features of moral and
conventional actions. In addition, the results also indicate that children do not make
inferences solely through the knowledge of the content of specific acts that are
prohibited or permitted. Instead, children tend to integrate information regarding
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emotional reactions, contextual status, and generalizability to form different
categories (moral and conventional).
Although children can distinguish between moral and conventional events from their
early ages, age differences in their distinction and justifications were found (Davidson
et al., 1983). In their study, the youngest children (the 6 years olds) distinguished
between moral and conventional events more sharply on familiar than on unfamiliar
issues. In other words, familiarity of the events could have an effect on younger
children's responses, in particular. Thus it seems that children's ability to apply
criteria to a broader range of social events increases with age. Development
proceeds from a reliance on specific personal experiences to an ability to abstract or
generalize to unfamiliar events. Also, there were age differences in the types of
justifications used. For instance, although younger and older children were equally
likely to explain that moral transgressions are wrong because they cause harm, older
children were significantly more likely to refer to fairness in condemning these
transgressions. So, in the moral domain, reasoning develops from a focus primarily
on others' welfare to inclusion of a notion of reciprocity between individuals' rights.
In contrast, a decrease with age in children's appeals to authority and the avoidance of
punishment was observed in the conventional domain. Rather, the children were
more likely to focus on the functions of convention in the coordination of social
interactions. These results suggest that reasoning or level of conceptual
understanding develops within a given domain and becomes more sophisticated with
age.
Tisak and Turiel (1988) found similar age differences in children's judgments on the
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seriousness of transgressions. In this study, children (1st, 2nd, and 5th graders) were
asked to evaluate moral and social conventional transgressions when the magnitude of
the consequences was controlled. The events consisted of a moral transgression with
minor consequences (stealing an eraser from a classroom), a moral transgression with
major consequences (hitting someone), and a conventional transgression with major
consequences (wearing pajama to school). When asked to evaluate each act, most
children considered both moral and conventional transgressions to be wrong. The
conventional transgressions were wrong because they would result in much ridicule
from peers and disruption in school whereas the moral transgressions were
unacceptable because of negative consequences to others' (that is, others' welfare).
However, children across all ages judged the major conventional transgression to be
less wrong than either of the moral transgressions. These findings suggest that
differences between morality and social convention are not solely quantitative or
based on the seriousness of the transgressions, but rather are made on the basis of
fundamental differences between the acts. Although the authors found that young
children distinguish between the moral and the conventional acts regardless of the
seriousness of the transgressions, they also reported age differences. When asked to
indicate whether the conventional act would be right or wrong if an authority
permitted it, the younger children still regarded the conventional transgression as
wrong. Furthermore, Tisak and Turiel also found that, with age, children's moral
reasoning shifted from focusing on others' welfare to focusing on fairness and rights.
Concerning conventional acts, the level of children's reasoning about the role of
conventions in structuring social interactions increased with age. These age
differences in social reasoning are similar to those found by Davidson et al. (1983).
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According to the findings of the above two studies, children, as their age increased,
seem to apply the distinctions between moral and conventional acts to a broader range
of social acts, including more abstract and unfamiliar social acts, even though they
can distinguish between these different types of social acts at very early ages.
Furthermore, the level of conceptual understanding within a domain changes with age.
In summary, Turiel and his colleagues, against Piaget and Kohlberg's assumption,
found that even as young as 36 months of age children distinguish between moral and
conventional rules. Tisak (1995) carefully reviewed the empirical studies examining
children's ability to distinguish between moral and conventional rules in terms of
their methodologies and findings. Tisak categorized methodologies into criterion
judgments analyses, justifications, ratings and rankings, and then described findings
in relation to each methodology. The criterion judgments analyses include
evaluation (whether an act is right or wrong), permissibility (whether an individual
should be permitted to do an act), altemativity (whether the rule can be changed or
negated), rule contingency (whether an act is right or wrong regardless of existence of
the rule regulating the act), authority contingency (whether it is right or wrong for an
authority to permit an act), and generalizability (whether an act is universal or
contextually relative). The findings consistently revealed that both moral and
conventional transgressions were wrong. However, the moral transgressions were
viewed as less permissible, less alterable, less contingent on rules and authority, and
more generalizable than the conventional transgressions. Along with criterion
judgments analyses, children's justifications were also considered to determine
whether children distinguish between moral and conventional rules. Although
children considered both a moral and a conventional transgression wrong, the
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justifications children provided were different. The moral transgressions were
evaluated on the basis of individuals' welfare and rights, justice, equity, and fairness,
whereas evaluations of conventional transgressions were based on sanctions, custom,
order, and authority. The methodologies of ratings and rankings also demonstrate
that children differentiate moral from conventional acts. According to the findings,
children considered moral rules to be more important than conventional rules; hence
they considered moral transgressions to be more wrong than conventional
transgressions. Also, moral transgressors were viewed to deserve more punishment
than conventional transgressors.
Although young children as well as older children and adolescents can make moral
judgments that are distinct from conventions, this does not imply that no moral
developmental changes occur within the moral domain (Turiel, 1983). Concerning
the development within a domain, Turiel and Davidson (1986) proposed that stage
transition involves a change in the relation between the elements and regulations
internal to a given knowledge structure, and that both elements and regulations are
transformed during the consolidation of a structure. The findings of Davidson et al.
(1983) and Tisak and Turiel (1988) showed the age-related development in moral
judgments in relation to the above assumption of Turiel and Davidson (1986). As
mentioned earlier, it has been found that moral judgment at age 6 years is limited to
familiar issues. By the age of 10, however, children apply their moral reasoning to
relatively unfamiliar as well as familiar issues. Also, 6 year old children's reasoning
is systematic but regulated by concrete and categorical concerns with maintaining
welfare and avoiding harm whereas the older children's judgments show a concern
with maintaining reciprocity and justice (Turiel & Davidson, 1986).
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A number of studies in non-Western cultures has been conducted in order to
determine whether children in different cultures make similar distinctions between
moral and conventional rules (e.g. Song, Smetana, & Kim, 1987; Nisan, 1987;
Shweder et al., 1990). In these studies, the moral transgressions pertain to events
that are generally considered wrong in most cultures such as harming others or
stealing whereas as the conventional transgressions are culturally specific. For
instance, in the study in Korea, the conventional items included eating food with
fingers, a girl wearing earrings and nail polish, and not putting shoes in the shoe rack
before entering the classroom. In contrast, in Nisan's study in Israel, the items
pertained to addressing a teacher by first name and bathing of boys and girls together.
Song et al. (1987) asked children between the ages of 5 and 18 to evaluate the moral
and the conventional transgressions in terms of permissibility (whether the act is right
or wrong), justifications (why the act is right or wrong), generalizability (if the act
would be right or wrong in another country), and contingency (if it would be wrong if
there were no rules about it here). The results indicate that Korean children, like
American children, distinguish between moral and conventional rules from their early
years. They treated moral transgressions as more generalizably wrong, less
contingent, and less permissible than conventional transgressions. Also, Korean
children referred to others' welfare, obligation and fairness in order to justify the
wrongness of moral transgressions whereas they referred to authority, sanctions,
social nonconformity, social coordination, custom, and tradition concerning
conventional transgressions. These findings are very similar to the findings for
American children (e.g. Nucci, 1981; Smetana, 1981, 1985; Turiel, 1980; Weston &
Turiel, 1980). Furthermore, the age trends found in this study parallel findings of
III. Empirical Studies ofMoral Reasoning 79
other studies in America (Davidson et al., 1983; Tisak & Turiel, 1988). When
children were asked to justify moral transgressions, reference to obligation increased
with age whereas reference to others' welfare decreased. In the case of justifying
conventional transgressions, children's pragmatic understanding and reliance on
external sanction decreased with age whereas their understanding of social
conventions as customary or as means of coordinating social interactions increased.
However, some cross-cultural differences were found in children's justification only
for conventional transgressions. Korean children tended to make much greater use
of justifications pertaining to social status, social roles, appropriate role behaviour,
and courtesy, which are not commonly observed in American children's reasoning.
On the basis of the overall findings, Turiel and Davidson (1986) argue that, in moral
judgment, initially elements are not comprehensively defined and regulations are
partial. However, age differences in children's moral judgments concerning familiar
and unfamiliar issues indicate that older children show a more comprehensive
understanding of moral elements than younger children. On the other hand, age
differences in the types of moral justifications used indicate that older children's
conceptual regulations are more comprehensive. For younger children, the concern
for welfare and avoidance of harm is a consolidated regulation and regulations based
on relational issues of justice are not elaborated. By the age of 10, children
consolidate a more mature concern for maintaining justice, which includes a concern
with achieving a just reciprocity between the welfare claims of various individuals.
That is, the concern for welfare, a regulation in a prior structure, becomes an element
in a subsequent structure (Davidson et al., 1983).
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Turiel's studies (1978a, 1983) showed a similar age development within the
conventional domain through cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses. For instance,
children conceive of conventions as empirical social uniformities at about 6 years, as
concrete rules or authority expectations by age 10, and as mediated by social system
by age 15. Turiel and Davidson viewed this age-related development of the
conception of conventions as the formation-deformation process. That is, the shift in
the conception of conventions between ages 6 and 10 involves a period of formation
in which uniformities begin to be viewed as elements subordinated to concrete rules
and authority expectations. __Correspondingly, the shift between ages 10 and 15
involves a period in which rules and authority are rejected as regulations and begin to
be regarded as elements that fall under the more general and adaptive concern with
social organization.
Based on these findings on the development within each domain, Turiel and his
colleague, the theorists of domain-specificity, view that the acquisition of each
successive form of cognitive regulation entails a deformation of the prior form. This
does not mean that prior cognitions disappear, but rather that they are subordinated to
the subsequent structure in the form of elements. Therefore, earlier structures
gradually become the basis for, and part of, later structures over a period of time
(Turiel and Davidson, 1986). Furthermore, the development of social judgments
entails individuals' social interaction. Individuals seem to broaden the range of
components for evaluating social judgments and to further regulate those components
as the complexity of their social interaction increased with age (Turiel & Smetana,
1984; Turiel & Davidson, 1986).
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3.3.3. Culture as an Integral Part of Moral Development
As anthropologists have long noted the cultural variations in the social judgment of
right and wrong (Murdock, 1980), cultural psychologists (e.g. Miller & Bersoff, 1995;
Shweder et al., 1990) assume that conceptions of morality reflect views of self and
problems in adaptation which are culturally variable, and hence that culture is an
integral part of moral development. In their perspective, children are assisted in
constructing their moral judgment and reasoning through communicating with others
within a framework of tradition-based modes of apperception and evaluation.
However, in contrast to assumptions of traditional learning theorists (e.g. Bandura,
1973), this does not mean that children merely passively receive, in unchanged form,
the cultural understanding of adults. Rather, children negotiate, transform, and
create social meaning through interactions. Thus, it is expected that although
children's understandings are always constructed within a given cultural context, they
may differ qualitatively from those of adults in ways that reflect the children's
experiences and developmentally-related ways of interpreting the world (Miller, 1986;
Shweder & LeVine, 1975).
This perspective challenged Kohlberg's claims that the idea of moral obligation
universally develops out of the idea of conventional obligation and hence that there
are no fundamental differences from culture to culture in the moral development;
stated simply, the claim that cultural learning affects only the rate but not the path of
development. Furthermore, cultural psychologists, in contrast to Turiel and his
colleagues' view (e. g. Davidson et al., ]983; Nucci, 1981; Smetana, 1981, 1985,
1993; Turiel, 1983; Turiel & Davisdon, 1986; Weston & Turiel, 1980) suggest that the
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differentiation of moral events from conventional events is not a necessarily
developmental universality and that the distinction between morality and conventions
may well be culture-specific (Shweder et al., 1990). The overall findings of cross-
cultural studies (e.g. Miller and Bersoff, 1995; Shweder et al., 1990) support the claim
that moral development is culturally grounded.
In order to examine American and Indian childhood and adult interpretations and
understandings of 39 behavioural cases, representing a range of family life and social
practices, Shweder et al. (1990) adapted the form used by Turiel (1983) with a slight
modification. The participants were asked to rank the serious of transgressions, to
evaluate whether the behaviour is right or wrong, and to judge alterability, relativity,
and genealizability of the behaviour. Concerning ranking the seriousness of
transgressions, Shweder et al. (1990) found high correlations among Americans and
high correltaions among Indians but little correlation between the two groups, which
indicates that Americans and Indians rank the seriousness of transgressions in very
different ways. Similarly, Miller and her colleagues (Bersoff & Miller, 1993; Miller
& Bersoff, 1992; Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood 1990) consistently reported that
American and Hindu Indian children's moral judgment regarding interpersonal
responsibilities more closely resemble those of adults from their own culture than
those of children from the comparison culture. This result, combined with the result
of Shweder et al. (1990), could imply that qualitatively distinct types of moral codes
develop in American and Hindu Indian cultures. However, Miller found certain
commonalties among young children's judgments, which reflect that they do not
merely passively take information provided by adults. For instance, young children
in both cultures tended to treat interpersonal responsibilities as more obligatory than
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do adults (Miller et al. 1990). Also, they were more likely than adults to absolve a
transgression performed under specific types of emotional duress (Bersoff & Miller,
1993). Another interesting finding is that, with increasing age, Americans judged
the issues in more relativistic ways and were more likely to take situational features
into account. By contrast, with increasing age, Indians judged the prohibitions as
applicable universally and across varying contexts. In light of Damon's suggestion
(1988) that moral maturity in some cultures means an ever-expanding tendency to
universalize one's beliefs whereas, in other cultures, moral maturity implies applying
one's beliefs flexibly to an array of changing situations, Indians, in contrast to
Americans, seem to have a tendency to universalize their morals. Although there
was agreement between Americans and Indians in evaluating some moral issues
dealing with harm, promises, assault, etc., as wrong, they also showed disagreement
on issues pertaining to conventions, liberty, equality, sanctity, chastity and status.
For example, Indians, but not Americans, viewed a widow eating fish as "a great sin."
It was also found that Indians regarded more things as wrong than Americans.
Indians considered some transgressions unalterable and universally wrong, and some
unalterable but specific to the Indian context. Shweder et al. (1990) suggest that
these types of judgments (unalterable and universal; unalterable and context specific)
demonstrate that conventional thinking is almost a nonexistent form of thought in
their Indian participants. Furthermore, there are some cases showing disagreement
between the two cultures about the issue although the issue pertains to harm. For
instance, both Americans and Indians regarded kicking a harmless animal or breaking
promise as wrong. However, Indians, in contrast to Americans, viewed a husband is
beating his wife "black and blue" after she disobeys him by going to a movie alone
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without his permission as right.
Based on the cultural differences in moral judgment, Shweder et al (1990) claim that,
although Indians as well as Americans recognize a domain of moral issues centred
around issues of justice, there are more than one moral code across cultures. That is,
in contrast to Americans, Indians tend to give great priority to duties relative to
competing rights. Thus, they proposed a distinction between 'justice-based" and
"duty-based" moralities, which represent the morality of American and Indian
cultures respectively. According to Shweder et al. (1990), in the right-based
morality, the social order is separated from the natural order,,which.entails a definition
of the moral as "free contracts, promises, or consent among autonomous individuals."
In the duty-based morality, however, the social order is the organizing features of
moral rationality. Customary social practices are viewed as part of the natural law,
but not as within individual discretion or as a function of social consensus.
Individuals in this moral code are supposed to subordinate their rights and the domain
ofwhat is private to interpersonal duties.
The distinction between the two moral codes proposed by Shweder is supported by
other studies which distinguish between Western and non-Western views of the self.
It is generally claimed that Western people highly emphasize individualistic cultural
views of self (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; Dumont, 1965;
Lukes, 1973) whereas non-Western people emphasize more relational or
interdependent cultural views of self (Dumont, 1970; Kakar, 1978; Markus &
Kitayama, 1991).
Markus and Kitayama (1991) described the differences in the view of self between
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Western and non-Western cultures in terms of independence and interdependence.
According to them, in most Western cultures, there is a faith in a clear separateness of
distinct persons. Thus, the cultures require an individual to construct himself as an
individual whose behaviour is organized and made meaningful primarily by reference
to his own internal repertoire of thought, feeling, and action. In contrast, in non-
Western cultures, there is a fundamental connectedness of individuals to each other so
that maintaining interdependence among individuals is imperative. The person
conceived as an independent agent is central in the individualistic frame, whereas the
group conceived as an interdependent network of relationships is central in the
collectivistic frame (Turiel, 1998). Based on this distinction, Miller and her
colleagues (e.g. Miller & Luther, 1989; Miller et al., 1990; Miller & Bersoff, 1995)
have also demonstrated that Indians are more likely than Americans to treat
interpersonal responsibilities as socially enforceable moral duties rather than as
matters of personal decision making and as applying across a wider range of need and
role situations.
Up to now, the claims of cultural psychologists and the empirical findings supporting
their claims have been reviewed. Based on their view of culture as the main source
of morality, they argue that the view of universal stages of moral judgment proposed
by Kohlberg is culturally biased in favour of a Westernized elite (Simpson, 1974) and
that, in contrast to Kohlberg's assertion, there is more than one way to rationalize a
moral code (Shweder et al. 1990). Duty-based morality is an example of an
alternative moral code applied in India. Furthermore, incompatible with Turiel, they
showed that even the distinction between morals and conventions is culturally relative.
By asking Indians the same kind of questions put by Turiel (1983) to Americans,
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Shweder et al. (1990) found that Indians often raised what Western people would
consider to be conventions and traditions to the status of morals. Moreover, this
tendency increased with age, strengthening the view that the content and structure of
the moral domain were culturally determined and not universal.
Furthermore, it could be assumed that differences in moral reasoning exist not only
between cultures but also within cultures (i.e. subcultures). Gilligan (1982)
proposed that there are two distinct styles of thought on moral reasoning, which are
gender-related. She argued that Kohlberg's moral theory reflected only males'
perspective emphasizing the themes of justice, right and contract, and disregard
females' view concerned with responsibility and caring (see Chapter II for details).
Miller and Bersoff (1995) criticized the Gilligan gender-linked differences in moral
reasoning stating that she did not pay attention to the many non-gender based
differences in cultural meaning systems and practices that affect individuals' view of
self, morality, emotion, and even attachment (e.g. Harwood, 1992; Harwood & Miller,
1991; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989). As a consequence, they claimed,
Gilligan ended up with the implausible prediction that concepts of self and morality
would be more similar among individuals of the same gender from divergent cultural
contexts as compared with among individuals of different genders from similar
cultural contexts. For instance, a secular woman shared more similar moral concept
with a traditional Hindu Indian woman than with a secular American man. However,
Archer and Lloyd (1985) pointed out that most cultures clearly differentiated the
subcultures of male and female, and asserted that their behaviours are consistent with
the main parameters by which categorization within the culture takes place.
Furthermore, there are many studies that show how boys and girls grow up with
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different expectations, and are explicitly treated differently in a variety of ways, and
how they define themselves as members of a social group according to the
expectations and norms of group (e.g. Caldera, Huston, & O'Brien, 1989; Hogg &
Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1982). On the basis of these findings of gender differences,
Haste and Baddeley (1991), in contrast to Miller and Bersoff (1995), postulated that it
would be sufficient to create separate cultures based on gender. According to them,
women differ from men in terms of the framework they employ for understanding the
world. The common features of the female perspective, in contrast to that of the
male, is a preference for holism and connection, which can be interpreted as care and
responsibility in Gilligan's terms, rather than separation and mastery.
In their study, Haste and Baddeley (1991) asked British adolescents aged between 12
and 17 a question, which represents the "private" moral domain: "Why is it important
to keep a promise." They also examined the manifestation of different ways of
understanding in the "public" domain in several ways, including a modified version of
Adelson's "islanders story," which presents the situation of a thousand people
marooned on an island confronting the problems of forming a community (see
Adelson & O'Neil, 1966 for details). The results suggest that both boys and girls
have access to each orientation (the justice and the care orientation) and each
perspective (the connection and the separation) but that girls are more likely than boys
to show greater mixture and move more easily between them. These gender
differences consonant with other findings (e.g. Johnson, 1988; Wingfield & Haste,
1987) imply that the social life of adolescent boys tends to reinforce the individualism
and autonomy ethos, and that there is little to counter it, whereas girls are exposed to
the dominant cultural message as well as to the alternative female culture.
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Furthermore, based on the findings, Haste and Baddeley (1991) suggest that Western
culture consisting of a variety of subcultures is more complex than can be accounted
for by a single dominant moral or social theory and that gender experience is at least a
quasi-culture. However, the claim of existence of gender differences in moral
reasoning is still controversial since many studies (e.g. Snarey et al., 1985; Walker,
1984, 1986b, 1989; Walker & Morgan, 1991) found no gender differences (see section
3.1 in Chapter III).
In summary, overall findings consistently revealed that children's development entails
the formation of different but systematic types of domains of social reasoning as they
interact with a varied social world. Furthermore, it is suggested that children's
moral development needs to be understood alongside and in interaction with their
understanding ofvarious aspects of the culture which they belong to.
3.4 EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON MORAL REASONING IN KOREA AND
UNIQUENESS OF KOREAN CULTURE
3.4.1 Empirical Studies on Moral Reasoning in Korea
Theories of moral reasoning, especially Kohlberg's theory, have also been studied in
Korea (e.g. Kang, 1994; Lee, 1981; Lee, 1985). However, most of these studies
were limited to cross-sectional rather than longitudinal designs that examined
relationships between moral stages and various variables such as age, gender, and
SES. Additionally, there has been no empirical study that examined moral reasoning
with respect to Kohlberg's moral orientations.
Lee (1981) examined the development of moral reasoning in a total of 738 children,
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who were from primary, middle and high schools, based on the hypothesis that the
moral stages varied across age, gender, social background and psychological home
environment such as the quality of interaction with parents and the parents' discipline.
The educational and economic levels of parents were investigated so as to be used as
indicators of social background. In order to measure the psychological home
environment, the Home Environment Diagnosis Test (Chung, 1969 in Lee, 1981) was
carried out. Kohlberg's moral dilemmas, translated into Korean, were used to
measure the moral stages of the children. Although the original type of response to
Kohlberg's test was open-ended, a multiple-choice test was used in this study because
of the difficulty in scoring a large number responses (i.e. this is extremely time
consuming).
The results revealed that the moral stage attained by participants increased with age.
Development through the moral stages with age was in line with the findings of other
studies conducted in different cultures (e.g. Edwards, 1975; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982;
Tietzen & Walker, 1985; Turiel et al., 1978; Walker, 1989). All differences between
the age groups (the groups of the primary, the middle, and the high schools) were
significant at the level ofp < .001.
With respect to gender differences, the girls' scores were significantly higher than
those of boys in all the three age groups (p < .01). Lee attributed the gender
difference to the characteristics of Korean society. Korean society was traditionally
more likely to emphasise certain virtues such as gentleness, sincerity and decency for
girls in comparison with boys. Thus girls may be more mentally mature than boys in
certain respects including moral reasoning. However, based on other studies which
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were mentioned earlier (e.g. Cohn, 1991; Gregg et al., 1994; Walker, 1984, 1986b),
the gender difference in progression through the moral stages in adolescence, in
favour of girls, seems to be universal trend rather than a phenomenon in one particular
cultural context.
When the two further variables, social background and psychological home
environment, were considered, no relationship between social background and the
moral stages was found and the positive correlation between psychological home
environment and moral stage was not statistically significant. However it has been
suggested that psychological home environment seemed more crucial in the
development ofmoral stages than social background.
The use of the multiple-choice test instead of the open-ended response in examining
moral reasoning could limit the validity of this study. That is, it is possible that a
child might choose an item presented even though the item did not exactly match the
child's own moral reasoning, or even when the child did not understand it. The
problem of validity in the two forms of the test was already reported by Rest (1986).
He found out that a multiple-choice test of moral reasoning such as a Defining Issues
Test (DIT) was easier than an open-ended test such as Kohlberg's Moral Judgment
Interview (MJI). When the two tests were compared, DIT credited participants with
more advanced thinking than did MJl. For instance, in MJI, stage 5 of moral
reasoning was rare even among professional, middle-aged adults, whereas, when DIT
was administered, stage 5 thinking was found even in adolescents. Therefore it was
concluded that a multiple-choice test was vulnerable to overestimating the moral
stages ofparticipants while an open-ended test had a possibility of underestimation.
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Lee (1985) conducted a study in Korea to examine the development of moral stages
across gender and SES with 487 children aged 12 using the same method that Lee
(1981) had used. In contrast to the findings of Lee (1981) and others (e.g. Kang,
1994; Park, 1983), this study showed no difference between boys and girls in moral
stages. There have been other studies which have supported the absence of a gender
difference (e.g. Ahn, 1987; Chung, 1987). With regard to Socio Economic Status
(SES), Lee (1985) supported the findings of Lee (1981) that showed no significant
relationship between SES and moral stages.
Cho (1990) also examined the relationship between moral reasoning and SES with
290 primary school children who were at third- or fifth-grade. The moral stage was
measured with Kohlberg's moral dilemmas while SES was classified according to
mother's education level and economic status. The findings revealed that older
children showed higher moral stages than younger children. However, SES was not
significantly correlated with the moral stages in either age group.
On the other hand, a significant relationship between SES and moral reasoning has
been found in some studies (e.g. Kim, 1988; Kim, 1990; Park, 1983). Having
adapted them to the Korean situation, Park (1983) administered Kohlberg's moral
dilemmas to 353 students aged 10, 13 and 16 years. One of the hypotheses of the
study was that the development of moral stages might differ according to parents'
occupations that were used to indicate SES. Professional and administrative posts
were regarded as upper-middle class, clerical workers, sales workers and skilled
labourers as middle class and those in unskilled labour as lower class in this study.
Differences in moral development according to the parents' occupations were found
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in this study. The children whose parents' occupations fell into the upper middle
class category attained a higher moral stage than children whose parents' occupations
fell into the other two categories. Based on these findings, it was suggested that
children with a higher SES background show a higher moral stage compared with
those having lower SES backgrounds.
The above results concur with the findings of Kim (1988) and Kim (1990) who also
examined differences in the development of moral reasoning according to parental
occupation, but using DIT. DIT is closely related to the Kohlberg system and the
two tests show similar kinds of longitudinal trends, correlational patterns and
responsiveness to educational interventions (see Rest, 1983). Nevertheless, the DIT
and the Kohlberg system should not be regarded as equivalent because there are
methodological and conceptual differences between the two tests (see Rest, 1986).
In addition, the correlation of the tests varied in the range of .3 to .7, depending on
which version of the Kohlberg scoring system was being used and on sample
homogeneity (Rest, 1983; 1986). Thus the findings of Kim (1988) and Kim (1990)
should be carefully applied since the present research is aimed at examining
Kohlberg's moral stage model in particular.
Conclusions drawn from the empirical studies in Korea were very similar to those
based on studies carried out in other cultural contexts. First of all, Koreans also
showed a clear trend towards the moral stages increasing with age combined with
educational level. This suggested that Kohlberg's moral stage model is applicable to
Koreans, at least in terms of the age trend. Secondly, there were few studies
showing a gender difference. Besides, where a gender difference in moral stages
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was found, girls tended to be superior to boys in terms of moral stages. The girl-
superior trend could be explained with the overall precocity of girls by late
adolescence since this is also a finding common across different cultures. Finally,
the difference in moral stages across SES (Socio Economic Status) remains
controversial. Where a difference was found, children from families with a higher
SES showed more advanced moral reasoning than others.
Regarding the issue of translation of the dilemmas and coding system, most studies
used materials that had already been translated, adapted and used by Koreans before.
For that reason, the translation equivalence was not directly examined in most studies.
Although the assumption is a little convoluted, Rest, Thoma, Moon, and Getz (1986)
assume that if the translations are adequate, and if the theory of moral judgment
applies to other cultures, then the translated materials given in other cultures should
behave as the original materials do. Consequently, it is proposed that the degree to
which translation provided similar patterns of reliability, the more appropriate are the
translations. Based on these assumptions, test-retest reliability was provided as an
indirect indicator of the equivalence even though it was only for DIT. Park and
Johnson (1984) obtained a test-retest coefficient of DIT (.69) comparable with those
found with the original DIT (.77) in a heterogeneous sample of Korean students.
According to these reliability scores, the translations seemed adequate for Koreans.
As previously considered, Nisan and Kohlberg (1982) indicated that there may be
differences in the endpoint of moral development according to ethnic or cultural
background even if the sequence through the moral stages is universal. However,
most studies conducted in Korea and presented here limited the samples to children
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and adolescents. This means that the question of the development through the
endpoint of moral stages for Koreans, which could be influenced by the uniqueness of
Korean culture, remains unanswered.
Lastly, most empirical studies in Korea have examined Kohlberg's theory of moral
development in terms of relationships between the moral stages and variables such as
age, gender and socio-economic status and concluded that the theory was applicable
to Koreans. However, these studies failed to explore cultural aspects peculiar to
Koreans which might cause cultural differences in moral reasoning between Koreans
and people from other cultures. This failure appears to be due to a lack of interest in
cultural influence rather than the absence of the cultural influence itself. In the next
section, uniqueness of Korean culture, which might affect Koreans' moral reasoning
will be reviewed.
3.4.2 Uniqueness of Korean Culture
Korean society has rapidly modernized in a few decades, but is still considered
regarded as maintaining its own unique characteristics, which are different from those
of Western societies (Song et al., 1987). That is, Koreans still strongly show
traditional, authoritarian, conforming, and age-graded culture compared with Western
societies (Park and Johnson, 1984). This uniqueness of Korean culture is probably
based on a mixture of Buddhist, Confucian, and Korean traditional thought, which
have mainly been employed to elaborate Koreans' perspective for a long time. In
this section, some features of Korean society which could lead to cultural differences
in moral reasoning will be reviewed.
First of all, filial piety is thought to be one of the most important virtues among
III. Empirical Studies ofMoral Reasoning 95
Oriental people, including Koreans and Chinese, and Middle Eastern people (Dien,
1982; Lei & Cheng, 1984, as cited in Snarey, 1985; Snarey et al., 1985; Song et al.,
1987). In those societies, parental respect and authority are greatly emphasized on
the basis of the traditional concept of filial piety. However, filial piety seems to be
attenuated among Koreans (Kim, 1992) and Chinese people in recent years (Walker &
Moran, 1991). Walker & Moran (1991) referred to the impact of the Cultural
Revolution and the subsequent fading of the importance of elders in order to explain
weakened filial piety in Chinese society. Similarly, Kim (1992) pointed out that
Korean adolescents' concept of filial piety seems to have changed greatly within the
last decade. In Kim's study (1992), when the adolescent' participants were directly
asked what they would do when their parents asked them to do something morally
regarded wrong, 59% of them answered that they would not obey, 40% answered that
they would obey and tell the parents that it was wrong afterwards, while only 2% said
they would obey unconditionally. In 1984, in response to the same question, the first
answer was given by 30% of the adolescents, the second by 63%, and the last by 7%,
respectively. This change in the concept of filial piety seems to be due to a recent
tendency of parents to be more tolerant of and less strict with their children owing to
the decrease in the number of children in a family as well as the change of the family
system to a child-centred nuclear family (Adolescent White Paper, 1992). Thus,
these findings imply that child-centred family relationships have brought about
changes in the concept of filial piety in Korea, such as the erosion of both the
authority of the parents and absolute obedience of the children. However, it is true
that Korean society still emphasizes filial piety and hence it could still affect Korean's
moral reasoning as it did in other cultures (e.g. Dien, 1982; Lei & Cheng, 1984, as
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cited in Snarey, 1985; Snarey et al., 1985).
The concepts of 'Chung' and 'we' seem to be another concepts peculiar to Koreans
and to influence their moral reasoning. Chung refers to the emotional bond, mostly
in positive terms, between individuals that accumulates slowly over a long period of
time. It is sometimes used as in contrast to the concept of "reason". Korean
psychologists, Choi and Choi (l990a), stated that, if two people were tied based on
chung, the boundary between individuals is dimmed and a sense of one-ness, same-
ness, affection, comfort, and acceptance etc. emerges. They also pointed out
Koreans' belief that one cannot consciously develop chung towards others, but that
this spontaneously and involuntarily occurs in the heart. Ma (l988b, 1992) also
found a similar concept, so-called 'ch'ing' (human affection or sentiment), in Chinese
people. According to Ma, Chinese people at Kohlberg's moral stage 4 would uphold
or maintain the law. However, the Chinese view of law is less rational, objective or
rigorous in comparison with the Western one, probably because of the emphasis on
ch'ing, In fact, cb'ing in Chinese and chung in Korean are written with the same
character only the pronunciation is different. This implies that Koreans and Chinese
may have similar concepts of chung, although it might not be exactly the same.
Therefore chung might affect moral judgment among not only Chinese people but
also Koreans.
The concept of 'we' is one of the most important component of interpersonal
relationships among Koreans (Choi, 1997; Choi & Choi, 1990b). According to them,
being part of 'we' means that individuals develop close empathic interpersonal bonds,
emotionally, experientially, and even cognitively with each other. Consequently, the
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boundary between individuals becomes vague. The ideal relationship between
individuals who were in the same 'we' group is to provide unlimited care, mutual
dependency, and unconditional, self-sacrificing help for each other. The concept of
'we' appears even in the way ofusing language. Koreans tend to use the words 'we',
'our', and 'us' rather than'!', 'me', and 'my'. For instance, a Korean would say
'our parents' rather than 'my parents' even though he or she is an only child. Choi
& Choi (l990b) claim that the concept of 'we' is representative of collectivism among
Koreans. In the collectivistic culture, the tranquillity of community sometimes takes
precedence over the rights of individuals; thus the individuals are asked to relinquish
some freedom and identity in order for society to function. (e.g. Dein, 1982; Ma,
1988b; Snarey et al., 1985; Tietjen & Walker, 1985)
The concept of 'we' cannot be separated from the concept of chung (Choi, 1997; Choi
& Choi, 1990b). That is, in order to share the strong concept of 'we' among
individuals, there must be chung between themselves. At the same time, they must
share the concept of 'we' in order to feel chung between them. Thus having the
concept of chung as well as the concept of 'we' is fundamental in interpersonal
relationships among Koreans. Besides, the findings of the present study indicate that
Koreans tend to apply the concept of chung not only to the relationship between
individuals but also to the entire society since they develop a concept that the society
is a kind of 'we' group.
The concepts of chung and 'we' seem to relate to Koreans' general VIew of
individuals. Western people view an individual as an independent, self-contained,
autonomous entity who compromises a unique configuration of internal attributes
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such as abilities, traits and values, and behaves primarily as a consequences of these
internal attributes (Dien, 1982; Shweder & LeVine, 1984). In contrast, the Korean
view of individuals is similar to the view, so-called interdependent self, commonly
found in non-Western cultures, which have collectivistic perspectives (Markus &
Kitayama, 1991). In those cultures, an individual is viewed as an imperfect partial
being in the surrounding context rather than an independent being. Thus, Koreans
try to make close interpersonal relationships with other partial individuals by means
of sharing the concept of 'we' and chung, which relates to emotional state (Choi,
1997).
Another value peculiar to Koreans is so-called "the rewards of virtue and the
punishment of vice," which means that virtue should be rewarded while the vice
should be punished. This concept is distinguishable from Piaget's concept of
"immanent justice" (1965/1932) although they seem similar. The "immanent
justice" concept represents the young children's belief that "a fault automatically
brings about its own punishment." Thus, although two events may not be related to
each other, children tend to infer that a bad event is a result of a bad deed that
occurred before, while a good event is a result of a good deed. For instance, if a boy
stole an apple and fell down on the way home, children tend to believe that he fell
down because he had stolen an apple before. However, concerning the concept of
the rewards of virtue and the punishment of vice, individuals simply believe that an
individual should be punished when he/she acts badly and should be rewarded when
the act is good without attempting to make a connection between unrelated events.
The fact that most Korean folk tales contain the concept of the reward of virtue and
the punishment of vice (Lee & Chang, 1986) indicates that Koreans have traditionally
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valued these concepts. Korean children are exposed to many Korean folk tales
teaching such values from an early age. Thus it might be natural for Koreans to
internalize the concept of the rewards of virtue and the punishment of vice and hence
to demonstrate this concept in their moral reasoning.
Koreans' traditional tendency to expect men and woman to play different social roles
could influence Koreans' moral reasoning although the different role expectation is
greatly attenuated nowadays. "A wise mother and good wife" has been regarded as
the ideal type of woman in Korea from the old days. The wise mother and good
wife has to do her best and sometimes sacrifice herself for the sake of other family
members. Based on this concept, in Korea, women are more likely than men to be
asked from childhood to take account of the feelings of other family members in order
to maintain family harmony. Thus Korean women may place a greater value on
reconciliation and collective decision-making as far as interpersonal relationships
within the family are concerned. If indeed different gender-role expectation is found
to have an influence on Korean people's moral reasoning, it could partially support
Gillian's claim of gender differences in moral reasoning.
Furthermore, smce Korean culture is characterized as having a collectivistic
perspective, Koreans may emphasize compromise and reconciliation rather than
choice and commitment when confronting interpersonal conflict. Also, they give
great consideration to maintenance of the normative order, showing a tendency to
adhere to the norms and rules of society and the fulfilment of one's duty as a member
of society. In fact, the importance of keeping rules, especially the law, is promoted
through mass-media as well as within a unified school curriculum over the country.
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Song et al. (1987) also pointed out that Korean society emphasizes the importance of
authority, conformity, and duty, and uses them as public justification for adhering to
all rules. These general characteristics of collectivistic culture could differentiate
Koreans' moral reasoning from that of Westerners.
The uniqueness of Korean culture, which probably affects moral reasoning, can be
inferred from studies conducted in China and Japan. These two countries share
much common history and culture with Korea so their perspectives are very similar to
one another. Ma (1992), in his study of Chinese people, asserted the existence of a
commonly shared respect for all human and animal life based on Buddhism, and
argued that this concept influences the moral development of Chinese. Buddhism
teaches that benevolence should be applied to all living things in nature as well as to
the human being (Tachibana, 1975). Since Koreans, like Chinese people, share a
Buddhism tradition, the concept of respect for all lives may equally influence
Koreans'moraljudgment. Iwasa (1992), in a comparative study of moral reasoning
between Japanese and Americans, found that the Japanese tended to prefer dying with
a pure conscience over extending life with a contaminated conscience. According to
the study, 10 out of 15 Japanese adults at postconventionallevel of Kohlberg' s stages
chose "a short life with honour and dignity" rather than "prolongation of life by
illegal means," unlike Americans at the same level. Since Koreans also traditionally
value "a life with honour and dignity" on the basis of Confucianism, this perspective
may also influence their moral reasoning
Up to now, the uniqueness of Korean cultural thought patterns which might affect
Koreans' moral reasoning was reviewed. Koreans generally emphasize the concepts
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of filial piety, chung and 'we,' the rewards of virtue and the punishment of vice,
different gender-role expectation, compromise and reconciliation, the conformity to
the norms and rules of society, fulfillment of one's duty, the respect for all lives, and a
life with pure conscience or honour, and these concepts are considered to be different
from those of Western people. The influence of these concepts on Koreans' moral
reasoning will be examined in two separate studies in the present paper and described
in the next chapters.
3.5 CONCLUSION
By and large, the literature review on Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning focused
on several points of moral stages and the content of moral reasoning. Concerning
the moral stages, some studies showed variations in the rates and endpoints of
development across cultural backgrounds. However, most studies in various cultural
settings supported the developmental sequence of moral stages regardless of
individuals' background attributes such as culture, gender and socio-economic status.
As to the content of moral reasoning, including moral orientations, not only age-
related tendencies but also cultural and gender influences were indicated. In
particular, many studies suggested that individuals' moral reasoning should be
understood in connection with their cultural background. Based on these findings,
the present study will examine two assumptions, namely that (1) Koreans follow
Kohlberg's developmental sequence of moral stages in spite of a possibility of
differences in the rate of the development, and (2) that concepts peculiar to Korean
culture could affect Koreans' moral reasoning, especially the use ofmoral orientation.
CHAPTER FOUR
METHODOLOGY
4.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Several questions will be addressed concerning the applicability of Kohlberg's theory
of moral reasoning to Korean and British children, aged 7 to 16 years, in terms of the
moral stages, orientations, chosen issues and responses unscorable with Kohlberg's
criteria judgments. The questions are as follows.
1. Development through Kohlberg's moral stage
i) Do children show an increase through the moral stages with age?
ii) Is there any difference between the two cultures in children's progression
through the moral stages?
iii) Is there any difference between boys and girls In their progression
through the moral stages?
iv) Is there any interaction between these variables (culture, age, gender),
which affects the development of moral stages?
2. Usage of Kohlberg's moral orientations
i) Does the usage ofmoral orientations differ according to age?
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ii) Is there any difference between Koreans and British children in the usage
of moral orientations?
iii) Is there any difference between boys and girls in the usage ofmoral
orientation?
iv) Is there any interaction between these variables (culture, age, gender),
which affects the usage ofmoral orientations?
v) Is there any age, cultural, and/or gender difference in children's chosen
issues for each dilemma in connection with the use ofmoral orientations?
3. Chosen Issues
i) Is there any age difference in children's chosen issues?
ii) Is there any difference between the two cultures in children's chosen
issues?
iii) Is there any difference between boys and girls in their chosen issues?
iv) Is there any interaction between these variables (culture, age, gender),
which affects the development of moral stages?
4. Unscorable responses
Are there any responses that are not able to be matched to Kohlberg's criteria
judgments due to cultural uniqueness?
In summary, Kohlberg's theory of moral stages, orientations, and chosen issues Will
be examined in relation to age, gender and culture and children's unscorable
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responses are explored.
4.2 PARTICIPANTS
A total of 128 children were selected as participants. They were evenly divided into
subgroups by their cultural background (i.e. Korean and British), age, and gender:
eight boys and eight girls were chosen from each age group of7, 10, 13 and 16 years
old in each cultural group (Table 4.2.1).
All children had similar socio-economic status (SES) and level of academic
achievement in order to control any effect of these variables on moral reasoning.
Children's SES levels were based on the educational level and the occupations of
their parents. All parents of children in the sample had at least 12 years of education
or were educated to university level, and most were in "white collar" occupations.
Table 4.2.1 Subgroups of Participants
Nation Koreans
Age 7 (16) 10 (16) 13 (16) 16 (16) Total (64)
Gender Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls
(8) (8) (8) (8) (8) (8) (8) (8) (32) (32)
Nation British
Age 7 (16) 10 (16) 13 (16) 16 (16) Total (64)
Gender Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls
(8) (8) (8) (8) (8) (8) (8) (8) (32) (32)
Age 7 (32) 10 (32) 13 (32) 16 (32) Total (128)
Gender Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls
(16) (16) (16) (16) (16) (16) (16) (16) (64) (64)
( ) = numbers of participants.
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The teachers selected the children as being average or just above average in academic
level. The teachers selected them according to certain criteria: reading age for
British children and their academic rank in the classroom for Korean children. One
of the aims of the present study is to investigate differences in moral reasoning
between the Western and non-Western culture. Thus, for the British sample, only
those who had a Christian-based background (that is, English children) were selected
for interviews. "Christian-based" did not mean that it was necessary for subjects to
be religious. Rather, that the child experienced a typical Western culture. Ethnic
minority groups such as other Europeans, Muslims or Asians were excluded in order
to represent British culture as Western culture.
4.3 INSTRUMENT
Kohlberg's moral judgment inventory, Form A was used for the interviews. Form A
consists of three stories: these are Dilemma III, the classic Heinz's dilemma, Dilemma
III' , Officer Brown's dilemma and Dilemma I, Joe's dilemma. Each story presents
a different type of dilemma between two issues such as life vs law for Heinz's
dilemma, morality and conscience vs punishment for Officer Brown's dilemma, and
contract vs authority for Joe's dilemma.
For Koreans the dilemmas and probe questions were translated into Korean and were
also back-translated in order to ascertain the preciseness of the translation. These
materials were hardly modified except for characters' names and the unit of currency.
Some difficulties in terms of understanding the stories were found in 7 year old
children during the pilot study. Thus the stories and probe questions were slightly
modified for 7 year old children based on the pilot study (see the section on the pilot
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study for details).
10-12 probe questions were provided for each story to clarify a participant's moral
judgment and the reasons for it. According to the manual it was possible to
eliminate some of the questions in certain occasions such as when time for
interviewing was limited. The questions which could be eliminated were identified
in the manual. In addition flexibility was admitted so that an interviewer could
slightly modify them according to the circumstances even though the questions were
standardized. In the present study participants were asked approximately 10
questions for Heinz's dilemma, 6 questions for Officer Brown's dilemma, and 11
questions for Joe's dilemma. In Officer Brown's dilemma there were originally 12
questions to be asked. However questions 7- 12 were eliminated as these were
originally designed to elicit the participant's theory of ethics and not be scored for
moral stage so those questions were eliminated. There were two main reasons for
this elimination. First of all, the interview would be too long for children if all the
questions were asked. Secondly the questions seemed too abstract for children to
answer. The set of questionnaires is presented in the appendix.
4.4 PROCEDURE
4.4.1 Administration
Oral interviews were conducted individually for all the children in the schools which
they were attending. It took approximately 30 minutes for an interview. All
interviews were administered individually, tape-recorded, and transcribed for scoring
afterwards.
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4.4.2 Scoring
Children's responses to the dilemmas were scored in two ways in order to examine
moral stage and moral orientation respectively. The scoring followed the manual,
the Measurement of Moral Judgment vol. II: Standard Issue Scoring Manual (Colby
& Kohlberg, 1987).
Moral Stage
Each dilemma represents a conflict between two moral issues such as life vs law in
Heinz's dilemma. The participant is asked to make a choice as to which issue should
take priority. That is, the issues reflect what the participant thinks should be done.
The scoring procedure begins by determining the "chosen issue" (i.e. the action
choice favoured by the participant in each dilemma) through reading over all the
participant's responses and asking what basic choice the participant makes. For
instance, if a child mostly argued that Heinz should steal the drug for his wife during
the interview, he or she is presumed to have chosen the life issue.
The next step is to classify all the responses according to not only issue but also norm
and element. The norm represents the moral value or object of concern that is being
brought to bear by the participant in justifying a choice. In other words, the norms
could clarify the rationale for why the participant chose the issue. The moral norms
include life, property, truth, affiliation, authority, law, contract, conscience and
punishment. Kohlberg defined these norms based on fundamental human rights and
freedom and he assumed these rights to be universal. These rights and freedom are
right to life, the protection of law, freedom of conscience (moral-religious beliefs) and
affiliation (freedom, marriage, parenting), the right not to be subject to arbitrary
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authority or punishment, the right to voice in the government or political authority
system, right to property and the freedom to make contractual agreements. The
element provides the different ways in which the significance of a norm may be
explained. An element is the reason given for endowing the norm with value. The
17 elements are presented in Table 2.2.1 in Chapter II. The issues, norms and
elements of the criterion judgments have been strictly classified in the scoring manual.
For instance, regarding Heinz's dilemma, if a participant said that "Heinz should not
steal the drug because it is the druggist's, he invented it," the manual indicates that
he/she chose the law issue, stage 2, based on the "property" norms and the "having a
right" element (#CJ 6; the number of the Criterion Judgment, 6).
The issue, norms and elements of participants' responses can be coded by means of a
careful comparison between the responses and the criterion judgements. There were
two types of match between a response and a criterion judgements; the clear match
and the marginal match. The clear match demands at least the minimum number of
required critical indicators to be presented in the interview response. The marginal
match includes some ambiguity between a response and criterion judgement although
the interview judgement is essentially the same as the criterion judgement. Also a
guess score was assigned in certain cases such as where no interview judgement and
criterion judgement matches had been found not in the relevant issue but other issues.
Concerning the response for Officer Brown's dilemma, "the judge should let Heinz go
free because he might steal the drug out of a great responsibility to care for his wife,"
there is no criterion judgment applicable to this response under the morality and
conscience issue, the relevant issue. However a guess score can be assigned in this
case since the responses matched a criterion judgment in the life issue of Heinz's
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dilemma (#CJ 21). The scoring of all the interview judgements was followed by
assigning stage .scores. It started with calculating the stage score for each issue.
The obtained issue scores were used to calculate not only a global score as a whole
but also a weighted average score (WAS).
In calculating issue scores, all the numbers of interview judgement and criterion
judgment match in each stage for an issue were added. When a match was on a
stage transition each stage was counted as half. The stage which was represented by
25% or more of the scores was regarded as the issue score. If two or more stages
were represented by 25% or more of the scores and the frequency was the same, then
a transition score was assigned to the issue. Two or more stages were over 25% and
one stage was represented more than the other(s) then the former stage was the
"major" stage while latter stage(s) was(were) "minor" stage(s). If a child had two
responses scored at stage 2, one response scored at stage 2/3, and one response scored
at stage 3 for the life issue in Heinz's dilemma, the child's stage for the life issue
consists of 63% (2.5 out of 4) of stage 2 and 38% (1.5 out of 4) of stage 3. Both the
stages 2 and 3 are over 25% and consequently the child's stage for the life issue in
Heinz's dilemma is stage 2/3.
The global stage score was computed through calculating each stage score of the six
issues. The weights of issue scores were different in computing the global score.
Scores for chosen issues were given the greatest weight (3 points) followed by those
of nonchosen issues (2 points). The guess scores were given the least weight (l
point) regardless whether on a chosen or a nonchosen issue. Table 4.4.1 shows how
to score for each issue in detail. Then the weighted points of each stage was
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Table 4.4.1 The Way to Weight Points for Chosen and Nonchosen Issues and Guess Scores
Source: Colby and Kohlberg (1987)
converted into percentage and the global stage score was assigned according to the
percentage. If a stage was over 25% of the total number of weighted points then the
stage was the global stage for the interview. If two or more stages reached at least
25% then a mixed stage that included all stages at or above the 25% level was
assigned. If a child was scored stage 3, 3(2), and 2/3 for the chosen issues and stages
2/3,2, and 2(3) for nonchosen issues for the dilemmas respectively the total weighted
points for stage 3 is 8.2 (55%) and for stage 2 is 6.8 (45%) according to Table 4.3.1.
Since both stages are over 25%, the global stage of the child is 2/3.
To calculate WAS, each stage represented in the interview was multiplied by the
weighted points for that stage and then the product for all the stages were added.
The sum of the products was divided by the total number of weighted points and then
multiplied by 100.
When WAS of the child in the above example is calculated according to the formula,
{(2 x 6.8 + 3 x 8.2) 1I5} x 100 = 255
2, 3 ; stages 2 and 3 respectively
6.8, 8.2 ; the weighted points for stages 2 and 3 respectively
15 ; the total number of weighted points
Thus, the WAS of the child is 255.
TABLE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
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It was assumed that the WASs showed more precise moral scores of individuals.
That is, the global stage only indicated the stage at which weighted points reached at
least 25% of the total weighted points and ignored the other stages of which scores
were under 25% of the total weighted points. However the WAS did consider all the
scores that a participant obtained. Thus, it was possible for individuals to have
different WASs although they were at the same global stage. It even happened that a
participant who was at higher global stage than the others showed a lower WAS than
the others. For this reason WAS tended to be used more frequently than the global
stage when difference of moral reasoning across sub-groups, such as age groups,
gender groups, and ethnic groups, were compared.
Moral Orientation
Each participant's use of moral orientations was also scored through matching the
participant's responses with criterion judgments. These matches indicate which
elements the participant used, and the elements were classified into five orientations
(see section 2.2.2 in Chapter II). Consequently the use of the orientations can be
generated from the use of the elements. For instance, the response for Heinz's
dilemma, "Heinz should steal the drug because the druggist was trying to rip him off"
matches the criterion judgment (#CJ 5), which indicates that the retributing element
was used under the life issue. Therefore the individual is scored as using the
normative orientation for the moral reasoning since the retributing element falls under
the normative orientation.
4.5 RELIABILITY OF MJI
Reliability data have been complied from several studies on MJI for moral stages and
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orientations. These will now be reviewed.
4.5.1 Review of Reliability Studies
4.5.1.1 Reliability o/Moral Stages
The reliability of Kohlberg's moral judgement interviews for assessing moral stages
have mainly been examined by means of test-retest interviews and interrater
agreement. Colby and Kohlberg (1987) conducted test-retest interviews with 84
individuals using Form A, B or both. The same forms were used at Time 1 and 2 in
consistent testing conditions and the intervals between the two tests ranged from 3 to
6 weeks. Approximately equal numbers of males and females, aged 8 to 28 years
were chosen from elementary to graduate schools in the Boston area. Correlations
between Time 1 and 2 for Form A and B are both in the range of .96-.99.
Comparison with the these reliability figures of DIT, .68-.92 (Rest, 1979), further
supports the fact that MJI is highly reliable. With regard to percentage of absolute
agreement, complete agreement between scores at Time 1 and 2 occurred in 75%-88%
of responses for the 9-point standard scale (the five stages and the four transition
points between stages) and 53%-78% for the IT-point scale (this includes two
transition points between each stage, e.g. stage 1, 1(2), 2(1), 2). Overall, it appears
that almost all participants received scores within one third of a stage of each other
(one step-from 1 to 1(2), 1(2) to 2(1), 2(1) to 2 and so on) on the two interviews.
With respect to interrater reliability, Snarey (1985) reviewed the interrater reliability
data of studies conducted in various cultural settings such as United States, Kenya,
Taiwan, Turkey. Ten studies used the latest version of Kohlberg' s moral judgement,
the 1978 standardized manual, and had an interrater reliability in the range from .75
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to .98. Colby and Kohlberg (1987) also examined interrater reliability with twenty
Form A interviews which were used for the test-retest reliability, and scored
independently by five raters. The raters included both experienced and new scorers.
Percentage agreement figures for interrater reliability on Form A ranged from 88% to
100% for agreement within a third of a stage, from 75% to 88% for complete
agreement using the 9-point scale, and from 53% to 63% for complete agreement
based on the 13-point scale. With respect to interrater reliability figures, Colby and
Kohlberg (1987) compared the MJI with Loevingers Sentence Completion Test (1970,
as cited in Colby and Kohlberg, 1987). Interrater agreement on total protocol
Sentence Completion scores using a 10-point scale is reported to range from 50% to
80%, which is lower than the agreement on MJI, using the 13-point scale as well as
using the 9-point scale. Other studies also show high figures of interrater reliability
(e.g. Walker, 1989; Walker & Moran, 1991; Walker et al., 1987). In the study of
Walker et al. (1987), interrater reliability was determined by a second rater who
independently scored 24 randomly selected interviews. In terms of the 9-point scale,
there was 87.5% complete agreement between the raters and, for WASs, the
correlation is .94.
4.5.1.2 Reliability ofMoral Orientations
It is true that the research on the reliability of MJI in relation to moral orientations is
not as active as the research in connection with moral stages. There are two studies
which examined interrater reliability of MJI for moral orientations which will be
briefly reviewed here. Walker (1989) determined the agreement between two raters,
who independently scored 32 randomly selected interviews. Reliability coefficient
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for the moral orientation was .80. In the study of Walker and Moran (1991), 15
interviews were randomly selected in order to assess the interrater reliability and a
correlation of .85 was revealed.
In conclusion, the data that examined the reliability of MJI in terms of moral stages
and orientations were presented here. The reliability of MJI for moral stages was
assessed by means of test and retest interviews and interrater agreement, while with
respect to moral orientations, only the interrater reliability was used. According to
these data, the instrument has proven to be highly reliable.
4.5.2 A Reliability Test of the Present Study
The present study conducted an interrater reliability test for both children's moral
stages and use of moral orientations. The reliability test was separated into two parts
according to cultural groups. Two second raters whose mother tongues are Korean
and English respectively, were asked to score Korean and British children's responses
to dilemmas respectively. Both the raters have completed a Masters course in
psychology. A total of 40 interviews, 20 interviews from each cultural group, were
selected for the reliability test. In order to strengthen the reliability, three to four
interviews were randomly selected from each stages (stage 1, 1/2,2, 2/3, 3, and 3/4).
In addition, a 13-point scale (stage 1, 1(2), 2(1), 2, 2(3), 3(2), 3,...) was used for the
reliability test although the children's moral stages were scored with a 9-point
scale(stage 1, 1/2, 2, 2/3,...) in the main study. Concerning moral stages, there was
60% perfect agreement between the two raters for Korean children's moral stages and
65% for British children's. In terms of WASs, r =0.97 for Korean children and 0.93
for British children. Figures 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 show the correlation between the two
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Figure 4.5.1 The Correlation between the Two Raters in terms of Korean Children's WASs
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Figure 4.5.2 The Correlation between the Two Raters in terms of British Children's WASs
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raters scoring Korean and British children's WASs respectively. For the interrater
reliability of moral orientations, 20 moral orientations, one from each interview
scored by a second rater, were randomly selected and agreement between the two
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Table 4.5.1 The Agreement between the Two Raters
for Korean Children's use of Moral Orientations
Children 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
e e e f
1st Rater n n feu e u
2nd Rater n n f u u e u
u
u
f
f
n u f
n u f
e e f
n = The Normative Orientation e = Egoistic u = Utilitarian i = Ideal f= Fairness
The emboldened letters denote disagreement between the raters.
Table 4.5.2 The Agreement between the Two Raters
for British Children's use of Moral Orientations
Children 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14. 15 16 17 18 19 20
1st Rater u u u n i e e f f u u n n e n n f f
2nd Rater u u n e e f f u u n n e n e f
n = The Normative Orientation e = Egoistic u = Utilitarian i = Ideal f=Fairness
The emboldened letters denote disagreement between the raters.
raters was computed using Cohen's kappa. As a result, k = .875 for Korean children
and .81 for British children. Tables 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 indicate the agreement between
the two raters scoring children's use ofmoral orientations.
4.6 PILOT STUDY
The pilot study was conducted in order to ascertain whether the dilemmas were
recognized as conflicting and relevant by children at the age of 7 to 16, especially by
younger children. It was claimed that Kohlberg's moral dilemmas were generally
not meaningful to children under the age of 10, although some studies (e.g. Lei, 1980,
1981, see Snarey, 1985; Lei & Cheng, 1984, also see Snarey, 1985; White, 1975;
White, Bushnell, & Regnemer, 1978) used the dilemmas for 7 year old children.
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Thus it was necessary to examine whether the dilemmas were suitable for younger
children (i.e. 7 year old children).
Participants interviewed were 22 children aged 7 to 16 having either Korean or British
cultural background. The sample consisted of 6 Koreans, aged 10 to 16, who
currently live in London, two 7 year old Koreans in Korea, six British aged 11 to 14
and eight British boys and girls, aged 7. In the cases of 10 to 16 year old Koreans,
children who were born and had lived in Korea and recently moved to London were
selected so as to minimize the British cultural influence. The instrument and
procedure of interviews in the pilot study were the same as those that were described
in the sections on instrument and procedure.
During the interviews with the 7 year old children, it was observed that they had
difficulties in understanding the original stories completely, although they could grasp
the content. Thus the stories and probe questions had to be slightly modified for the
7 year old children. Some difficult words were changed to relatively simpler and
Table 4.6.1 Moral Stages and WASs of Each Participant
NATION CASE 1 CASE 2 CASE 3 CASE 4 CASE 5 CASE 6
AGE 10 (B) 10 (G) 13 (B) 13 (G) 16 (G) 16 (G)
KOREANS (Gender)
STAGE 2/3 1/2 2/3 2/3 3 3/4
WAS 235 175 263 262 320 331
AGE 11 (B) 11 (G) 13 (B) 13 (G) 14 (B) 14 (G)
BRITISH (Gender)
STAGE 1/2 1/2 2/3 2/3 2/3 3
WAS 172 182 267 248 258 289
B = Boys, G = Girls
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easter ones. Also, the stories were described more specifically than the original ones
so as to help them understand the stories more clearly. For instance, the word,
"drug" was changed to the word, "medicine" in order to prevent children from
confusing drugs as a medicine and drugs used for recreational purpose such as
cocaine. The sentence that "a woman was near death from a special kind of
cancer" changed to the sentence that "a woman was very ill so she was nearly dying."
After the modification, 7 year old children were interviewed using the modified
stories in order to examine whether the dilemmas could be used for 7 year old
children.
When the interviews were analyzed it was found that most answers which were
obtained from the children were able to be scored according to the manual.
Furthermore, age trends in moral stages were observed (Table 4.6.1). That is, the
moral stage -from stage 1/2 to stage 3/4- and WAS increased according to age.
Regarding cases 1 and 3 of the Koreans, although both cases were stage 2/3, the case
1 was closer to stage 2 (64%) than stage 3 (35%) while case 3 showed 37% of stage 2
and 63% of stage 3. Based on these results, it seemed that Kohlberg's moral
dilemmas were applicable for children aged 10 to 16 years in both Korean and British
cultures with a little modification, and with an easier version for 7 year old children in
terms of testing moral reasoning. Unfortunately, the size of sample was too small to
conduct statistical analyses, thus it was impossible to report whether these differences
were statistically significant. The sample that was used in the pilot study was not
included in the main study.
CHAPTER FIVE
RESULTS
The present study examined Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning through analysing
children's spontaneous responses to moral dilemmas. The background of the
children varied across age, culture and gender so as to enable a comparison of the
moral reasoning of children in different groups. The comparison was carried out in
terms of moral stages, moral orientations, and chosen issues. With regard to moral
orientations, the differences in the usage of orientations in the three dilemmas were
examined as a whole as well as separately. The findings on moral stages,
orientations, and chosen issues are presented below. When analysing Korean
children's responses, it was not possible to match some of them to Kohlberg's criteria
judgments. The responses that were unable to be matched are also described in the
present chapter.
5.1 MORAL STAGE
Kohlberg established the universal theory of moral stages which inferred that moral
reasoning developed with age in a sequence. Although a number of studies
supported the universality of Kohlberg's moral stage model, some variation in the
moral stage model across cultures was indicated by empirical studies (e.g. Edwards,
1975; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982). Furthermore, Gilligan (1982) claimed the
119
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Figure 5.1.1 The Distribution of WASs
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possibility of gender differences in the development of moral stages. One aim of the
present study is to examine these differences in moral stages in addition to the
applicability of the moral stage model to both Korean and British children by
analysing the moral reasoning of children in different groups according to their age,
cultural background and gender. The group difference was statistically examined
Table 5.1.1 Analysis of Variance; Differences in WASs
F DF Significant
Within & residual 112
Age 252.05 3 .000
Culture 3.11 1 .081
Gender 1.38 1 .242
Age by Culture .68 3 .563
Age by Gender 2.27 3 .084
Culture by Gender .83 1 .364
Age by Culture by Gender .33 3 .804
V. Results 121
Table 5.1.2 Age differences in WASs (Moral Stages)
Age Mean S.D. N F DF P
7 170.25 (1/2) 29.97 (.37) 32
10 225.78 (2) 26.75 (.36) 32 245.75 3, 124 .001
13 271.06 (3(2» 17.61 (.24) 32 (144.72)
16 325.09 (3) 18.32 (.23) 32
( ) indicates figures for moral stages.
through comparing WASs (weighted average scores). The range ofWASs was from
122 to 373, which is equivalent to the range of moral stages from stage 1 to 4. Since
WASs seemed to be normally distributed (Figure 5.1.1), it was subjected to ANOVA,
in combination with Scheffe test, a post-hoc test, at p < .05.
The results showed a strong tendency for WASs (moral stages) to increase with age,
F(3, 124) = 245.75, p < .001, but neither cultural nor gender difference was indicated,
at least within the limits of the sample. In addition, no interaction among variables
was observed as shown in Table 5.1.1. According to the post-hoc test, all the
differences among the age groups were significant at p < .05. Tables 5.1.2 shows the
mean and the standard deviation of each age group. Additionally, in order to get
more specific information, the differences in WASs across the age groups were
examined separately within each of 8 sub-groups; 2 cultural groups (the Korean and
Table 5.1.3 Analysis of Variance; Age Differences in WASs for Sub-Groups
Sub-Groups
Korean Boys
Girls
Children
British Boys
Girls
Children
F DF Sub-Groups F DF
63.51* 3, 28 Boys 139.72* 3,60
38.08* 3, 28
92.19* 3, 60 Girls 116.55* 3,60
68.18* 3,28
115.25* 3,28 Total 245.75* 3, 124
174.77* 3,60
*=p < .001
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Table 5.1.4 Mean and Standard Deviations forWASs (Moral Stages)
Age Nationality Gender Mean S.D. N
7 Koreans Boys 165.50 [1/2] 23.63 8
Girls 190.75 [2(1)] 37.70 8
Children 178.13 [1/2] 33.07 16
British Boys 159.38 [1/2] 27.11 8
Girls 165.38 [2(1)] 24.38 8
Children 162.38 [1/2] 25.10 16
Overall 170.25 [112] 29.97 32
10 Koreans Boys 223.13 [2] 28.62 8
Girls 238.38 [2(3)] 24.15 8
Children 230.75 [2(3)] 26.77 16
British Boys 217.38 [2] 32.10 8
Girls 224.25 [2] 21.51 8
Children 220.81 [2] 26.63 16
Overall 225.78 [2] 26.75 32
13 Koreans Boys 278.88 [3(2)] 18.67 8
Girls 264.00 [3(2)] 21.70 8
Children 271.44 [3(2)] 21.01 16
British Boys 276.13 [3(2)] 16.44 8
Girls 265.25 [2/3] 9.47 8
Children 270.69 [3(2)] 14.12 16
Overall 271.06 [3(2)] 17.61 32
16 Koreans Boys 322.00 [3] 24.99 8
Girls 331.00 [3] 19.96 8
Children 326.50 [3] 22.08 16
British Boys 322.50 [3] 17.94 8
Girls 324.88 [3] 10.41 8
Children 323.69 [3] 14.22 16
Overall 325.09 [3] 18.32 32
] indicates mean of moral stages.
the British groups), 2 gender groups (the boys and the girls groups), and 4 culture X
gender groups (the Korean boys and the girls, and the British boys and the girls
groups). All comparisons within each sub-group also indicated the significant
relationship between moral stages and age (Table 5.1.3). The post-hoc test, as a
further analysis, revealed that all the age differences in each sub-group were
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Table 5.1.5 Cultural and Gender Differences in WASs
Koreans British Total F D.F Sig.
M S.D. M S.D. M S.D.
251.70 60.48 244.39 63.53 248.05 .45 1, 126 .5
Boys Girls Total F D.F Sig.
M S.D. M S.D. M S.D.
245.61 64.77 250.48 59.28 248.05 62.09 .20 1, 126 .5
significant at p < .05, except the difference between 10 and 13 year old Korean girls.
Thus, the evidence of increase in moral stage with age was found in line with other
studies (e.g. Edwards, 1975; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Tietjen & Walker, 1985; Turiel
et aI., 1978), which also supported Kohlberg's theory of the moral stage model. The
mean and the standard deviation of each group are represented in Table 5.1.4.
With respect to cultural background and gender, neither cultural nor gender difference
was found as far as the moral stage model was concerned as mentioned before (see
Table 5.1.5). It indicated that the children traced the moral stage model at a similar
rate without regard to their culture and gender.
In summary, children's moral reasoning on the three different dilemmas was analysed
in order to ascertain Kohlberg's moral stage model. When differences in the moral
stages of the children across age, culture and gender were examined, only the age
difference was observed at least up to the moral stage 4. Based on these findings, it
was concluded that the development of moral stages with age was applicable to both
Korean and British children regardless of their gender. The findings will be
discussed in the next chapter.
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5.2 MORAL ORIENTATION
It was postulated that the content of dilemmas as well as children's background
attributes such as age, gender, and culture are related with their choice of moral
orientations, independent of moral stages. On the basis of this hypothesis, the
children's spontaneous responses to three moral dilemmas were analysed in order to
examine the differences in the use of each orientation across age, culture, gender, and
the content of dilemmas. For statistical analyses, the children were divided into two
categories, "no mention (NM)" and "mention (M)," according to whether they
referred to the orientation. After categorizing the children according to their
responses, differences in the use of each orientation across sub-groups, divided by age,
culture and gender, were examined by means of comparing the numbers of children in
each category for each orientation. The statistical approach taken to analyze the
association between mention of the orientations and age, cultural background, and
gender was to conduct hierarchical loglinear analyses with backward elimination
unless crosstabs analyses of the two-way associations revealed unsatisfactorily low
expected frequencies, i.e. expected frequencies less than 1 or more than 20% expected
frequencies less than 5 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). In addition, chi-square was
used as a post-hoc test as necessary. These statistical methods allow for the
identification of factors and interactions among factors which influence children's use
of moral orientations. The findings on differences in the use of orientations through
these comparisons are as follows.
5.2.1 The Patterns of Orientations in Dilemma III, Heinz's Dilemma
The children's spontaneous moral reasoning regarding Heinz's dilemma was analysed
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Figure 5.2.1 Percent Usage of Orientations for Heinz's Dilemma
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III terms of the use of 5 moral orientations. Each orientation was considered
separately on the basis of the hypothesis that the children might use the orientations in
different ways according to their age, cultural background, and gender.
Differences in the use of orientations were found. The normative orientation was
used by a number of individuals (72%; 92 out of 128) whereas the fairness orientation
was hardly mentioned (6%; 8 out of 128). When comparing the proportion of those
using the other orientations, a great difference among them was not found. Rather,
they referred to the orientation in about equal percentages: 55%, 38%, and 44.5% of
children used the egoistic, the utilitarian, and the ideal orientations, respectively
(Figure 5.2.1). Table 5.2.2 shows the numbers of children who mentioned the
orientations according to age, culture, and gender.
Concerning the use of the normative orientation, a hierarchicalloglinear analysis with
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Table 5.2.1 The Number of Individuals Who Mentioned Orientations for Heinz's Dilemma
Normative Egoistic Utilitarian Ideal Fairness
7 years Korean boys 7 2 5 0 0
girls 6 3 3 1 0
children 13 4 8 1 0
British boys 4 7 3 0 0
girls 3 7 2 0 0
children 7 14 5 0 0
overall 20 19 13 1 0
10 years Korean boys 1 6 5 3 1
girls 6 5 3 5 0
children 7 11 8 8 1
British boys 5 6 4 3 0
girls 4 7 0 1 0
children 9 13 4 4 0
overall 16 24 12 12 1
13 years Korean boys 7 6 1 5 0
girls 8 7 4 5 0
children 15 13 5 10 0
British boys 7 2 3 3 0
girls 5 7 3 6 1
children 12 9 6 9 1
overall 27 21 11 19 1
16 years Korean boys 7 1 3 6 1
girls 7 3 3 5 3
children 14 4 6 11 4
British boys 8 1 2 8 2
girls 7 0 5 6 0
children 15 1 7 14 2
overall 29 5 13 25 6
backward elimination was conducted as the crosstabs analyses revealed no
unacceptably low expected frequencies. The statistical analysis identified a minimal
model including an effect of age and an interaction between culture and gender. The
model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2 (18, N = 128) = 14.83, p = .67.
Eliminating either effect produced a significant increase in deviance: age, likelihood
ratio X2 (3, N = 128) = 17.75, p < .001, culture X gender, likelihood ratio X2 (1, N =
128) = 4.0, p < .05. As table 5.2.2 suggests, the use of the orientation increased with
age. A post-hoc comparison of 7 and 10 year-olds with the two older age groups
showed a significant difference (likelihood ratio X2 (1, N = 128) = 16.15, p < .001).
The interaction between culture and gender reflects the lack of difference between
boys of the two cultures (likelihood ratio X2 (1, N = 64) = .58, n.s.), but the Korean
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Table 5.2.2 Differences in the Use of Moral Orientations for Heinz's Dilemma
Koreans> the British in the Girls' Group
Orientations Age Differences
Normative Increase with Age
Egoistic Decrease with Age
Utilitarian Steady across Age
Ideal Increase with Age
Fairness Increase with Age
Cultural Differences
none
none
none
none
Gender Differences
none
Girls < Boys in the Younger Group
none
none
girls mentioned the orientation more often than the British girls (likelihood ratio X2 (1,
N = 64) = 5.08, p < .05).
In the use of the egoistic orientation, a hierarchical loglinear analysis with backward
elimination identified a minimal model that indicates an interaction only between age
and culture. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2 (16, N = 128) =
11.16, P = .8. According to a post-hoc comparison, the British children showed a
clear tendency to use the orientation as age decrease (likelihood ratio X2 (3, N = 128)
= 30.24, p < .001). In the Korean group, however, the 7 year old children
unexpectedly used the orientation as much as the 16 year old children (likelihood ratio
X2 (3, N= 128) = 15.47, p < .001) (see Table 5.2.1).
With respect to the use of the utilitarian orientation, an interaction between age and
gender was identified as a minimal model. The model was a reasonable fit:
likelihood ratio X2 (16, N = 128) = 9.35, p = .90. A post-hoc comparison showed
that there was no substantial change with age in the use of the orientation. However,
a gender difference in the use of the utilitarian orientation among younger children
was observed: the boys in the 7 and the 10 year old groups used the orientation more
than the girls in the same age groups (likelihood X2 (1, N = 64) = 5.41, p < .05).
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Also, the boys at the younger ages were more likely to refer to the orientation than
those at the older ages (likelihood X2 (l, N = 64) = 4.20, P < .05).
Concerning the use of the ideal and the fairness orientations respectively, each
statistical analysis identified a minimal model showing only an effect of age. The
model for the use of each orientation was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2 (24, N =
128) = 14.94, p = .92 for the use ofthe ideal orientation; likelihood ratio X2 (24, N =
128) = 11.08, p = .99 for the use of the fairness orientation. A post-hoc comparison
revealed that the use of the ideal orientation increased with age (likelihood ratio X2 3,
N= 128) = 47.82, P < .001). However, in the case of the fairness orientation, only a
few children (8 out of 128%; 6%) referred to it, which means that expected
frequencies less than 5 are over 20%. Thus, Fisher's exact test was used in order to
ascertain whether the age difference was statistically significant. Since, p < .005
using a two-tailed test, it was affirmed that the oldest children used the orientation
more than others. The differences in the use of the five orientations across age,
culture, and gender are described in Table 5.2.2.
5.2.2 The Patterns of Orientations in Dilemma III', Officer Brown's Dilemma
The usage of each moral orientation was also compared across children's age, cultural
background and gender. The method of comparison was the same as was used for
Heinz's dilemma. The usage of orientations in Officer Brown's dilemma varied
across children's age, culture and gender. With respect to the proportion of mentions,
the orientations were spread over a wide range (Figure 5.2.2). Children used both
the normative and the utilitarian orientations the most (66%; 85 out of 128 for both),
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Figure 5.2.2 Percent Usage of Orientations for Officer Brown's Dilemma
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whereas they used the egoistic orientation the least for their moral reasoning (11 %; 14
out of 128). The ideal and the fairness orientations were mentioned by 21% and
33% of children respectively. The numbers of individuals who mentioned
orientations for Officer Brown's dilemma are presented in Table 5.2.3. As far as the
normative, the egoistic, the ideal, and the fairness orientations were concerned,
hierarchical loglinear analyses yield a final model for the use of each orientation
showing only an effect of age regardless of culture and gender. The model was a
reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2 (24, N = 128) = 12.94, p = .97 for the use of the
normative orientation; likelihood ratio X2 (24, N = 128) = 7.77, p = .99 for the use of
the egoistic orientation; likelihood ratio X2 (24, N= 128) = 15.10, p = .92 for the use
of the ideal orientation; likelihood ratio X2 (24, N = 128) = 12.45, p = .97 for the use
of the fairness orientation.
Post-hoc comparisons revealed that the children in the oldest group were more likely
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Table 5.2.3 The Number of Individuals Who Mentioned Orientations
for Officer Brown's Dilemma
Normative Egoistic Utilitarian Ideal Fairness
7 years Korean boys 6 0 3 0 0
girls 5 2 6 0 2
children II 2 9 0 2
British boys 6 I 4 0 0
Girls 4 2 5 1 0
Children 10 3 9 1 0
Overall 21 5 18 1 2
10 years Korean boys 6 1 7 3 4
girls 3 1 8 1 3
children 9 2 15 4 7
British boys 5 3 6 2 1
Girls 1 4 6 0 2
Children 6 7 12 2 3
Overall 15 9 27 6 10
13 years Korean boys 6 I 6 1 3
girls 6 0 2 3 4
children 12 1 8 4 7
British boys 5 1 5 3 1
Girls 3 I 8 3 2
Children 8 2 13 6 3
Overall 20 3 21 10 10
16 years Korean boys 7 0 5 2 4
girls 8 0 3 1 6
children 15 0 8 3 10
British boys 6 0 6 3 4
Girls 7 0 5 5 5
Children 13 0 II 8 9
Overall 28 0 19 11 19
to orient themselves towards the normative concern for this dilemma in comparison
with children in other age groups (likelihood X2 (3, N= 128) = 11.41, p < .01). Only
lout of32 (3%) of the youngest children mentioned the ideal orientation. However,
the use of the orientation slightly increased with age and reached 34% (11 out of 32)
by the age of 16 (likelihood X2 (3, N = 128) = 13.76, p < .005). The use of the
fairness orientation also increased with age (likelihood X2 (3, N = 128) = 19.37, p
< .001). Two great increases in these cases occurred between the ages of 7 and 10
and between the ages of 13 and 16. Unlike the age tendencies in the use of the
normative, the ideal, and the fairness orientations, the use of the egoistic orientation
decreased with age. Only a few children (14 out of 128; 11 %) used this orientation
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Table 5.2.4 Differences in the Use of Moral Orientations for Officer Brown's Dilemma
Orientations Age Differences
Normative Increase with Age
Egoistic Decrease with Age
Cultural Differences
none
none
Gender Differences
none
none
Utilitarian Younger> Older Korean Girls Group
Koreans> the British in the 13 Year Old Girls Group
Ideal
Fairness
Increase with Age
Increase with Age
none
none
none
none
across all the age groups. At the age of 16, none of them, mentioned it. However,
when the younger group (the 7 and the 10 year olds) was compared with the older
group (the 13 and the 16 year-olds) in the use of the orientation, the preponderance of
younger children over older children in the use of the orientation was revealed
(likelihood X2 (1, N = 128) = 5.42, p < .05).
With respect to the use of the utilitarian orientation, a hierarchical loglinear analysis
generated a final model identifying an interaction between age, gender, and culture.
The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2 (0, N = 128) = .00, p = 1.00.
Younger children used the orientation more than the older children only in the Korean
girls group (likelihood X2 (1, N = 128) = 11.30, p < .001). In addition, at the age of 13,
Korean girls used the orientation less than British girls (Fisher's exact two-tailed test
p < .01, N = 16). Fisher's exact two-tailed test was used as a post-hoc comparison
here since expected frequencies less than 5 are over 20%. The differences in the use
of the five orientations across age, culture, and gender are described in Table 5.2.4.
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5.2.3 The Patterns of Orientations in Dilemma I, Joe's Dilemma
The usage of orientations for Joe's dilemma was carefully analysed in order to
examine differences in each orientation in terms of children's age, cultural
background and gender. The same types of analyses used for Heinz's and Officer
Brown's dilemmas were conducted here. The children used the orientations in the
range of 36% to 58 % (Figure 5.2.3). The fairness orientation was referred to the
most, at a level of 58%, followed by the utilitarian (49%), the egoistic (48%), and
then the ideal orientations (40%). The children used the normative orientation the
least in dealing with the moral dilemmas in Joe's story (37%). Table 5.2.5 shows the
numbers of individuals who mentioned orientations for Joe's dilemma according to
age, culture and gender.
Since the crosstabs analyses revealed no unacceptably low expected frequencies, a
Figure 5.2.3 Percent Usage of Orientations for Joe's Dilemma
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Table 5.2.5 The Number of Individuals Who Mentioned Orientations for Joe's Dilemma
Normative Egoistic Utilitarian Ideal Fairness
7 years Korean boys 4 5 4 0 1
girls 6 8 5 1 4
children 10 13 9 5
British boys 1 6 2 0 1
Girls 5 5 1 0 0
Children 6 11 3 0 1
Overall 16 24 12 1 6
10 years Korean boys 4 7 1 1 4
girls 3 6 5 3 4
children 7 13 6 4 8
British boys 3 4 6 0 2
Girls 5 4 3 0 3
Children 8 8 9 0 5
Overall 15 21 15 4 13
13 years Korean boys 2 1 4 6 8
girls 1 2 6 4 7
children 3 3 10 10 15
British boys 2 3 6 4 6
Girls 2 2 3 5 5
Children 4 5 9 9 11
Overall 7 8 19 19 26
16 years Korean boys 1 1 3 7 8
girls 3 3 7 6 8
children 4 4 10 13 16
British boys 2 2 5 7 6
Girls 3 2 2 7 7
Children 5 4 7 14 13
Overall 9 8 17 27 29
hierarchicalloglinear analysis was used in order to examine the use of orientations for
this dilemma as it was used for Heinz's and Officer Brown's dilemmas. When the
use of each orientation was analysed, the final models in the use of the normative, the
egoistic, and the ideal orientations each indicated only an effect of age. The model
was a reasonable fit; likelihood ratio X2 (24, N = 128) = 11.48, P = .98 for the use of
the normative orientation; likelihood ratio X2 (24, N = 128) = 12.56, P = .97 for the
use of the egoistic orientation; likelihood ratio X2 (24, N = 128) = 12.49, P = .97 for
the ideal orientation. According to post-hoc comparisons, younger children (the 7
and 10 year-old groups) distinctly used the normative (likelihood X2 (1, N = 128) =
7.67, P < .01), and the egoistic orientations (likelihood X2 (1, N = 128) = 27.33, P
< .001) more than older children (the 13 and 16 year-old groups) whereas a tendency
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Table 5.2.6 Differences in the Use of Moral Orientations for Joe's Dilemma
Orientations Age Differences Cultural Differences Gender Differences
Nonnative Decrease with Age none none
Egoistic Decrease with Age none none
Utilitarian Steady across Age Korean Girls < Korean Boys & British Girls
Ideal Increase with Age none none
Fairness Increase with Age Koreans> the British none
to increase with age occurred in the use of the ideal orientation (likelihood X2 (3, N =
128) = 68.15, p < .001).
With respect to the use of the utilitarian orientation, a hier'archical loglinear analysis
generated a final model showing an interaction between culture and gender in the use
ofthe orientation. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2 (24, N = 128)
= 12.85, p = .97. A post-hoc comparison indicated a strong tendency among the
Korean girls to use the utilitarian orientation as compared with the British girls
(likelihood X2 (1, N = 64) = 12.67, p < .001) and Korean boys (likelihood X2 (1, N =
64) = 7.80, P < .01). Interestingly, amongst British children, boys used the
orientation more than girls (likelihood X2 (1, N = 64) = 6.47, P < .05).
Concerning the use of the fairness orientation, the analysis identified a minimal model
including an age influence and a cultural influence on the use ofthe orientation. The
model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2 (22, N = 128) = 13.03, p = .93.
Eliminating either influence produced a significant increase in deviance: age,
likelihood ratio X2 (3, N= 128) = 49.40, p < .001, culture, likelihood ratio X2 (1, N=
128) = 6.34, p < .05. As shown in Table 5.2.5, the use of the orientation increased
with age especially at the ages of 10 and 13, and Korean children generally used the
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orientation more than British children regardless of age and gender. Table 5.2.6
describes general differences in the use of moral orientations for Joe's dilemma.
5.2.4 The Patterns of Orientations in the Three Dilemmas as a Whole
The three dilemmas appeared to draw forth from the children different patterns of
moral reasoning about the characters and events in them. The children's
spontaneous use of the five orientations were analysed by the numbers of mentions by
children of different ages, cultures, and gender. The numbers of individuals who
mentioned the orientations for the, three dilemmas are shown in Table 5.2.7. Each
orientation to morality was considered separately and differences across the three
dilemmas are presented as follows.
The children evenly expressed their moral reasoning for the three dilemmas by using
the 5 orientations in the range of 61% to 94% (Figure 5.2.4). Amongst the
orientations, the normative (94%) and the utilitarian orientations (94%) were used the
Figure 5.2.4 Percent Usage of Orientations for the Three Dilemmas as a Whole
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Table 5.2.7 The Number of Individuals Who Mentioned Orientations
for the Three Dilemmas as a Whole
Normative Egoistic Utilitarian Ideal Fairness
7 years Korean boys 7 6 8 0 1
girls 7 7 7 1 4
children 14 13 15 5
British boys 8 8 6 0 1
Girls 7 7 6 1 1
Children 15 15 12 1 2
Overall 29 28 27 2 7
10 years Korean boys 7 8 8 4 7
girls 8 7 8 7 5
children 15 15 16 11 12
British boys 7 8 8 4 2
Girls 7 7 8 1 4
Children 14 15 16 5 6
Overall 29 30 32 16 18
13 years Korean boys 8 6 7 7 8
girls 8 7 8 7 8
children 16 13 15 14 16
British boys 8 5 8 7 6
Girls 5 7 8 8 5
Children 13 12 16 15 11
Overall 29 25 31 29 27
16 years Korean boys 8 2 7 8 8
girls 8 5 8 8 8
children 16 7 15 16 16
British boys 8 2 7 8 7
Girls 8 2 8 8 8
Children 16 4 15 16 15
Overall 32 11 30 32 31
most, followed by the egoistic orientation (73%) and then the fairness orientation
(65%). The children mentioned the ideal orientation the least (62%). In spite of an
approximately equal level of the usage of orientations for the three dilemmas as a
whole, the children showed differences in the amount of use of the orientations across
dilemmas when the dilemmas were considered separately. The children seldom used
some orientations for certain dilemmas. For instance, only 14 out of 128 (11%) of
children referred to the egoistic orientation for Officer Brown's dilemma. Moreover,
the fairness orientation was used the least for Heinz's dilemma; only 6% (8 out of
128) of children quoted it. These differences indicated that the usage of orientations
could fluctuate according to the contents of dilemmas.
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A hierarchicalloglinear analysis with backward elimination yielded a minimal model
for the use of each orientation. With respect to the egoistic, the utilitarian, and the
ideal orientations, each final model included only an effect of age. The model was a
reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2 (24, N = 128) = 22.65, P = .97 for the use of the
egoistic orientation; likelihood ratio X2 (24, N = 128) = 9.49, p = .97 for the use of the
utilitarian orientation; likelihood ratio X2 (24, N = 128) = 14.81, P = .92. However,
in the use of the utilitarian orientation, the existence of an age difference was not
acceptable because expected frequencies less than 5 were 50% (see Table 5.2.7).
Concerning the egoistic orientation, a post-hoc comparison showed that the younger
children used the orientations more than the oldest children (likelihood X2 (1, N =
128) = 30.87, p < .001) whereas the use of the ideal orientation increased with age
(likelihood X2 (3, N = 128) = 91.11, P < .001).
In the use of the normative orientation, the statistical analyses revealed no age
difference when considering the three dilemmas as a whole. This is probably due to
the fact that the age tendency in Joe's dilemma is opposed to those in Heinz's and
Officer Brown's dilemmas. Older children were more likely to use the orientation
than younger children regarding Heinz's and Officer Brown's dilemmas whereas
younger children mentioned it more than older children in Joe's dilemma. The
preponderance of older children over younger children in the use of the orientation
contradicted the findings of Walker (1989). Walker's study indicated that the
normative orientation was common in childhood and decreased with age as shown in
Joe's dilemma. This contradiction will be discussed later.
Concerning the use of the fairness orientation, the analysis generated a final model
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including an age influence and a cultural influence on the use of the orientation. The
model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2 (22, N = 128) = 14.81, p = .87.
Removing either influence resulted in a less adequate fit; that is, in both cases the data
deviated significantly from the model: age, likelihood ratio X2 (3, N = 128) = 51.87, p
< .001, culture, likelihood ratio X2 (1, N = 128) = 7.82, p < .01. The use of the
orientation increased with age regardless of culture and gender, and Korean children
generally tended to use the orientation more than British children. It seems that this
cultural difference is mainly due to the cultural differences demonstrated in Joe's
dilemma. In addition, the same pattern of culturally variable to Officer Brown's
dilemmas (likelihood ratio X2 (1, N = 128) = 3.57, p < .05) seems to strengthen the
overall cultural difference.
In summary, age differences occurred in all the orientations although the patterns were
varied from one to another. Generally, the use of the ideal, and the fairness
orientations increased with age whereas the use of the egoistic orientation decreased.
These age tendencies coincided with the findings of other studies (Tappan et al., 1987;
Walker, 1989). The various patterns of age differences suggested a general tendency
in children to favour certain moral orientations at a certain age. That is, children
favour the egoistic orientation for their moral reasoning in the early years and
gradually use the ideal and the fairness orientations more often as they get older.
However, it should be noted that the 7 year-old Korean children unexpectedly used
the egoistic orientation as little as 16 year-old Korean children in Heinz's dilemma.
Concerning the use of the normative and the utilitarian orientations, the present study
found no substantial age tendency in contrast to the findings in other studies (Tappan
et al., 1987; Walker, 1989). As for cultural differences in the use of the orientations
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Table 5.2.8 Differences in the Use of Moral Orientations
for the Three Dilemmas as a Whole
Orientations Age Differences Cultural Differences
Normative Steady across Age none
Egoistic Decrease with Age none
Utilitarian Steady across Age none
Ideal Increase with Age none
Fairness Increase with Age Koreans> British
Gender Differences
none
none
none
none
none
for the three dilemmas as a whole, the present study shows a difference only in the
use of the fairness orientation. Some cultural differences were found only in several
sub-groups concerning certain dilemmas. The present study shows an effect of
gender not by itself but in combination with other effects of age, culture, or both
regarding certain orientations in each dilemma. Table 5.2.8 shows general
differences in the use of the orientations for the three dilemmas as a whole.
According to all the findings, children's use of moral orientations varied across age,
culture and gender. Moreover, it seems that the content of the dilemmas was also
related to children's choices of moral orientations. A discussion on the basis of
these findings will be presented in the next chapter.
5.3 CHILDREN'S CHOSEN ISSUES FOR DILEMMAS
During the interview, the children were asked to choose one of the two moral issues,
which each dilemma contained. For instance, concerning the Heinz's dilemma,
children had to choose either the life issue (i.e. Heinz should steal the drug) or the law
issue (i.e. Heinz should not steal the drug) as the first step and then explain the
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reasons for their moral choice. Some of the empirical studies (e.g. Nisan &
Kohlberg, 1982; Snarey et al., 1984) pointed out cultural differences in the chosen
Issues. Thus it was necessary to examine the differences in children's chosen issues
according to their background in order to ascertain similarities and differences in the
development of moral reasoning. The present study examined the differences in the
chosen issues according to age, culture and gender. As a result, some differences
were found in the three dilemmas. Table 5.3.1 indicates how many children chose
which issue for each dilemma.
Concerning Heinz's dilemma, even though a final model generated an interaction
between age, gender and cultural factors, the expected frequencies less than 5 were
more than 25%. It means that the interaction cannot be significant. However, the
chi-square test showed cultural differences in combination with age differences,
gender differences, or both. Children at the age of 7 were more likely to choose the
law issue (i.e., Heinz should not steal the drug) over the life issue (i.e., Heinz should
steal the drug) regardless of their culture and gender. At the age of 10, girls tended
to choose the law issue over the life issue while boys chose the life issue over the law
issue (likelihood X2 (1, N = 32) = 6.37, 2 < .05). Among the older age group,
Korean girls still showed a tendency to adhere to the law issue while most Korean
boys as well as British children chose the life issue. Consequently, the adherence of
Korean girls to the law issue resulted in gender differences in the Korean group
(likelihood X2 (1, N = 64) = 6.35,2 < .05) as well as cultural differences among older
girls (likelihood X2 (1, N = 32) = 7.2, P < .01). These findings imply that children at
a young age tend to consider obeying the law more important than saving a life; this
trend reversed as the children got older. However, Korean girls even at older ages
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Table 5.3.1 The Number of Individuals for Chosen Issues for Dilemmas
Heinz's Dilemma Officer Brown's Dilemma Joe's Dilemma
Life Law Morality Punishment Contract Authority
7 years Korean boys 3 5 2 6 6 2
girl 2 6 3 5 5 3
children 5 11 5 11 11 5
British boys 2 6 3 5 6 2
girls 0 8 4 4 7 I
children 2 14 7 9 13 3
overall 7 25 12 20 24 8
10 years Korean boys 5 3 4 4 3 5
girl 2 6 4 4 4 4
children 7 9 8 8 7 9
British boys 6 2 6 2 6 2
girls 2 6 6 2 6 2
children 8 8 12 4 12 4
overall 15 17 20 12 19 13
13 years Korean boys 7 1 4 4 6 2
girls 3 5 2 6 8 0
children 10 6 6 10 14 2
British boys 5 3 4 4 6 2
girls 6 2 7 1 8 0
children 11 5 11 5 14 2
overall 21 11 17 15 28 4
16 years Korean boys 6 2 3 5 7 1
girls 4 4 2 6 8 0
children 10 6 5 11 15 1
British boys 6 2 5 3 7 1
girls 8 0 5 3 8 0
children 14 2 10 6 15 1
overall 24 8 15 17 30 2
Total Korean boys 21 11 13 19 22 10
girls 11 21 11 21 25 7
children 32 32 24 40 47 17
British boys 19 13 18 14 25 7
Girls 16 16 22 10 29 3
Children 35 29 40 24 54 10
overall 67 61 64 64 101 27
still chose the law issue over the life issue. It seemed that Korean girls had a
stronger tendency to adhere to social rules than the others.
With respect to Officer Brown's dilemma, cultural differences in chosen issues were
found. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2 (24, N = 128) = 22.65, P
= .97. Korean children were more likely to choose the punishment issue (i.e. the
judge should give Heinz a sentence for stealing) over the morality and conscience
issue (i.e. the judge should let Heinz go free) while the British children showed the
opposite pattern (likelihood X2 (1, N = 128) = 8.08, P < .005). The cultural
V. Results 142
difference in chosen issues was salient among older girls (likelihood X2 (1, N = 32) =
8.37, p < .005) to the same degree it was concerning Heinz's dilemma. The results
of chosen issues concerning Officer Brown's dilemma indicate that Korean children,
especially girls, are more likely to be strict about breaking the law than the British
children.
Concerning Joe's dilemma, the statistical analysis identified a final model showing an
age effect. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2 (24, N = 128) = 22.65,
2 = .97. The 10 year-old children were more likely to choose the authority issue (i.e.,
Joe shoul give the money to his fahter) than those in the other age groups. However,
children in all age groups tended to choose the contract issue (i.e. Joe should not give
his father the money) over the authority issue.
The results showed that the children chose different issues according to their
background attributes. Cultural and/or gender differences tended to be more
apparent during late childhood to adolescence than in early and mid childhood. It
seems that children in late childhood and adolescence are under greater influence of
their social environment than those at younger ages in terms of overall decision-
making. Furthermore, it can be assumed that children's chosen issues are related
with their use of the moral orientations since most reasons that the children gave fell
into the five moral orientations. Thus, the findings on the chosen issues, especially
the cultural influence on chosen issues, will be discussed in connection with
children's use of moral orientations in the next chapter.
5.4 UNSCORABLE RESPONSES
Some empirical studies (Boyes & Walker, 1988; Lei & Cheng, 1984, as cited in
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Snarey, 1985; Ma, 1988b, 1992; Shweder et al., 1990) claim that there are some
features of moral reasoning that Kohlberg could not capture and hence that
Kohlberg's theory is not sufficient to assess the moral development in some cultures,
especially from stage 3 to the last stage. In line with the claims of the above studies,
the present study found some responses which were unscorable with Kohlberg's
manual although it was possible to assess children's moral stage and use of the
orientations through analysing scorable responses.
First of all, Korean children at the age of 7 showed unscorable responses. Kohlberg
made criteria judgments for young children based on the assumption that they make a
moral decision in order to avoid punishment or seek reward and to obey the superior
power of authorities. As Kohlberg claimed, most 7 year old British children, in their
moral reasoning, used the elements Kohlberg defined, such as avoiding punishment or
seeking reward (e.g. Heinz should not steal the drug, otherwise he will be locked up)
or blaming or approving (e.g. He should not steal it because it is against the law).
However, 7 year old Korean children were more likely than British children of the
same age to take into account the emotional aspect of a certain person, although the
emotional concern seemed to be fixed on one person, rather than the physical
consequences when a moral decision was made. For instance, a 7 year-old child
responded to Officer Brown's dilemma as below;
"The judge should let Heinz go free because Heinz will be upset ifhe is caught."
There is a similar response from another 7 year old child to Joe's dilemma;
"Joe should give his father the money, otherwise the father will be sad."
They gave no further explanation for their moral choice except simply expressing
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their sympathy for one of the characters in the dilemmas. Thus, this sympathy is
defined as "the restricted-simple sympathy" in the present study. This type of
reasoning partially supports Kohlberg's claim that children at stage I do not relate
two points of view and hence have a rigid perspective that considers only one
person's view. However, unlike Kohlberg's claim, many Korean children referred to
emotional aspects as well as physical consequences to explain their judgment. This
implies that Korean children make moral decisions based on something that Kohlberg
missed, such as the restricted-simple sympathy even at a young age.
Children in older groups also showed unscorable responses. Some older children,
the 16 year olds in particular, tried to solve conflict by means of a compromise
agreement. This tendency was more apparent among Koreans rather than the British.
Below is an example of the responses;
"Joe should refuse to give his father the money... the most responsible thing to do is... it
is okay for Joe to keep the money, it was not wrong. But it would be better for Joe to
kindly explain the situation to the father and to make an agreement with his father to
give the father the rest of the money. Then the father adds some more money
borrowed from his friend to the rest of money Joe gave and could go fishing as well.
So both of them will be satisfied."
Although most Korean children at the age of 16 argued that Joe should refuse to give
his money to his father, many of them tried to find a way that would satisfy both the
father and the son (e.g. compromise) in the end rather than take sides with either of
them.
They also showed an attempt to find a compromise in Officer Brown's dilemma:
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"Officer Brown should persuade Heinz to confess his crime himself instead of reporting
him because it is the best way for both of them. If he reported Heinz, he would feel
sorry for Heinz, and ifhe (Officer Brown) didn't, it means that he neglected his duty so
he would feel bad as well."
The responses showing that reconciliation between persons through compromising is
the best way to resolve conflict indicate Koreans' general tendency to value unity and
harmony with others.
Some responses containing the concept of filial piety were also unscorable. The
following is an example:
Q: "What is the most important thing a son should be concerned about In his
relationship to his father?" and "Why?"
A: "To respect and to obey him even if he does not treat his son well. That is what a
son should do, the fulfilment of filial piety. Because he is his father, he bore and
brought him up. The relationship between father and son is something unique. It is
more complicated than the simple relationship between two persons... But he doesn't
need to obey unreasonable demands of the father. That is not filial piety. But the son
should still respect his father and do his best for his father."
The above response demonstrates not only the showing of respect for the father based
on the unique relationship between father and son, but also disobedience to
unreasonable demands of the father. Based on the response, filial piety seems
somewhat different from the element of the obedience to authority (i.e. A son should
respect, honour or obey his father because he is head of the household) in Kohlberg's
system even though it seems to contain such an element. Besides, the element of
reciprocity or positive rewards (i.e, A son should show appreciation, gratitude, or
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respect for everything his father has done for him) also seems insufficient to correlate
with the above response since he said that "A son should respect and obey his father
even if the father does not treat him well." Thus, Koreans' reasoning using the
fulfilment of filial piety seemed to be deeper than the criteria judgment usmg
reciprocity between two individuals or obedience to authority.
The Korean children at older age were more likely to give unscorable responses based
on the concept peculiar to Koreans, "chung. "
"Even though he doesn't love her, he should steal the drug. It is said that husband and
wife live together based on chung rather than love. They (Heinz and his wife) might
also have chung between them since they have been together for a long time." (A
response ofa 16 year-old child to Heinz's dilemma)
The above response implies that chung plays a great part in moral judgment and
sometimes overwhelms rational thought among Koreans.
The responses of Korean children showing collectivism are also unable to be scored.
The examples are below.
"Heinz should not steal the drug because he should not harm others in a community in
order to achieve his purpose. He should try other legal ways."
" People should obey the law otherwise it could harm others... Why should we not
harm or disturb others? Because we are in a society. We must consider our society
before an individual's welfare."
The responses indicate that, in Korean society which emphasizes the importance of
collectivism, individuals are sometimes asked to relinquish their rights in order for
society to function. This type of response can often be found in collectivistic non-
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Western society (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).
Korean children at the age of 16 show some interesting but unscorable responses in
relation to conscience concerning Heinz's dilemma.
"He should not steal the drug. If she knew later on that her husband stole the drug for
her, she might thank him but it would weigh her down."
"He should not steal because if she realized the fact, she would take a tum for worse."
"The most responsible thing to do is to do his best in nursing his wife instead of stealing
so as to let her die with peace of mind.. This is probably what she wants him to do."
Based on the responses, although they could not elaborate on their idea further, it
seems that the children somehow valued dying with a pure conscience more than
extending life with a contaminated conscience.
To summarise, the present study found that some Koreans' responses to dilemmas
were unscorable with Kohlberg's manual. These unscorable responses mainly
pertained to the concepts of the restricted-simple sympathy, compromise agreement as
a mean to solve conflict, filial piety, chung, collectivism, and pure conscience. The
findings will be fully discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER SIX
DISCUSSION
In the present study, Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning was mainly examined in
terms of moral stages and moral orientations and children's chosen issues for
dilemmas. The present study also dealt with some unscorable responses. The
findings will be discussed below.
6.1 MORAL STAGE
Kohlberg claimed that the sequential development of moral stages with age at least up
to stage 4 was universal across culture and gender. Based on Kohlberg's claim of
universality, a comparative study between British and Korean children was conducted.
The findings generally showed the applicability of Kohlberg's moral stages to both
Korean and British children up to stage 3/4.
First of all, the present study showed the development of moral stages with age,
regardless of children's cultural background and gender. The tendency of moral
stages to increase with age strengthened Kohlberg's claim on the universal sequence
of moral stages in line with other studies carried out in Korea as well as in other
cultural settings (e.g. Cho, 1990; Colby et al., 1983; Lee, 1981; Nisan & Kohlberg,
1982; Snarey et al., 1985).
Regarding culture, Nisan and Kohlberg (1982) pointed out a possibility of difference
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in the rate and endpoint of moral stages in spite of the universal sequence of moral
stages. Cultural variations in moral stages were also found in other studies (e.g.
Edwards, 1975; 1978; 1982; Tietjen & Walker, 1985). These studies indicated in
common that individuals from a small-scale traditional society showed a slower.rate
in the development of moral stages compared with those from a large-scale
modernized society. Moreover, with respect to the endpoint, it seems that the former
was not able to exceed beyond stage 3 whereas the latter reached up to stage 4/5.
Korean society has rapidly modernized in a few .decades but is still considered a
traditional, authoritarian and conforming non-Western society (Song et al., 1987).
Based on these characteristics, it was proposed that Koreans might show differences
from the British in the rate of moral stages. Unfortunately, it was impossible to
examine the differences in the end point of moral stages in the present study since the
present study involved children only up to 16 years old. Concerning the rate of the
development of moral stages, however, the present study showed no difference
between Koreans and the British. Furthermore, the children in the present study
showed moral stages at a similar or more advanced level than those in other studies
(Colby et al., 1983; Nisan &Kohlberg, 1982; Snarey et al., 1985) when the mean and
range of the children's moral stages at each age were compared. Table 6.1.1 shows
this in detail. Finding no difference in moral stages between Korean and British
children may be due to the participants in the present study being drawn from an
urban population. Park and Johnson (1984) found more rapid development in urban
Korean children than rural Koreans. Thus previous observations of cultural variation
in the rate of moral development may be more a matter of sampling differences within
the societies than general differences between the societies.
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Table 6.1.1 Mean and Range of Moral Stages across Cultures
note: Studies with * are from Snarey et al. (1985)
On the other hand, Ma (1988b) claims that Kohlberg's last three stages (i.e. stages 4
to 6) might have a cultural component and hence suggests that these three stages
could be adapted through integrating the perspectives of a particular culture so as to
measure the moral stages of individuals in that culture more appropriately. In spite
of the plausibility of Ma's claim, based on the findings of the present study,
Kohlberg's moral stages, at least up to stage 4, seem to be applicable to Koreans.
However, it should be noted that the applicability of Kohlberg's moral stages to
Koreans does not mean that certain perspectives peculiar to Koreans have no
influence at all on their moral reasoning. Such cultural influence on moral reasoning
could be revealed clearly when moral orientations rather than- moral- stages-are .
examined.
As far as gender differences in moral stages are concerned, many researchers (e.g.
TABLE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
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Snarey et al., 1985; Walker, 1989; Walker & Moran, 1991) reported no gender
difference as opposed to Gilligan's claim (1982) that males are more likely to be
mature than females in Kohlberg's moral stages. Furthermore, the studies of Gregg
et al. (1994), Kang (1994), Lee (1981), Park (1983) and Thoma (1986) showed-a
tendency for males to lag behind females during adolescence when comparing their
moral stages. Cohn (1991) pointed out that girls are more mature than boys not only
in terms of moral development but also in terms of other areas including ego
development, aggression, and empathy during childhood and early- and mid-
adolescence. Cohn explained the overall gender differences, including the
differences in moral reasoning, with mainly two factors; gender differences in
biological maturation and gender differences in socialization experiences. The
former explanation is derived from the assumption that psychological maturity
accompanies physiological maturity. In general, girls are physiologically precocious
in comparison with boys. With regard to the latter explanation, Lever's findings
(1978) on gender differences in social activity support the explanation. According to
the observation of spontaneous play of 183 fifth-grade children, boys tended to play in
large groups with little opportunity for discussion or conversation whereas girls
played in small groups, often dyads, in which they mimicked basic human
relationships. The pattern of girls' play was more likely to accelerate. the
development of personality, including moral reasoning, than the pattern of boys' play.
As a result, girls appear to be more mature than boys in the development of moral
reasoning during childhood and adolescence.
However, the present study showed no significant gender difference in either the
Korean or the British children. This coincided with some studies carried out in
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Korea (e.g. Ahn, 1987; Chung, 1987; Lee, 1985). Also, Walker (1984) reviewed
gender differences in 31 studies, involving a total of 2,879 participants who ranged in
age from about 5 to 17 years, and found that gender differences in moral reasoning in
childhood and early adolescence were infrequent; only 5 out of 41 samples-showed
gender differences and all the differences revealed more mature development for
females. Because only a few samples showed gender differences, Walker tended to
disregard the differences. Thus it could be concluded that gender differences in
moral stages are apparently rare although gender differences in favour of females
during the early life-span were observed in several studies. However these
discordant findings among studies suggest that further research on gender differences
in moral stages during childhood and adolescence needs to be conducted.
To summarize, the present study showed the development of moral stages with age as
many other studies did. Both Korean and British children revealed a similar rate in
the development of moral stages with age, as opposed to studies that have compared a
modernized large-scale society and a traditional small-scale society. While Korean
society keeps its own traditions and norms, it is as much a modernized large-scale
society as is British society. The scale and modernization of the society may
diminish cultural differences in moral stages. Neither culture nor gender difference
in the development of moral stage was shown, so the present study does not support
either the findings that females are more mature than males or the claim of Gilligan
(1982) that Kohlberg's moral stages is biased towards males. Overall the findings
do not challenge the applicability of the developmental sequence of Kohlbergian
moral stages, at least up to stage 3/4, to Koreans as well as to the British.
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6.2 MORAL ORIENTATION
Kohlberg was certainly more interested in the sequence of moral stages and less in
elaborating moral orientations so that most of his studies concentrated on examining
the moral stages without taking into account the moral orientations. Following
questions about gender bias in Kohlberg's moral orientations (Gilligan, 1982) and
cultural differences in moral reasoning (Dien, 1982), moral orientations have been
examined in various ways (e.g. Tappan et aI., 1987; Walker, 1989; Walker et aI., 1987;
Walker & Moran, 1991). However, studies on moral orientations still seem
insufficient. Thus, the use of moral orientations was examined in the present study.
The present study was carried out in order to ascertain whether children's choice of
moral orientations varied across their background taking into account age, culture and
gender and the content of dilemmas on the basis of other empirical studies.
6.2.1 Age Tendencies
As far as age was concerned, Tappan et al. (1987) carefully reviewed empirical
studies and pointed out a significant relationship between age and moral orientations.
According to the findings, older people tended not only to reach higher moral stages
but also to use the ideal and the fairness orientations more than younger people.
Conversely, the normative, the egoistic and the utilitarian orientations were more
common in younger people, who were probably at lower stages. Walker (1989)
reported similar age tendencies in moral orientation. Walker also found that the
latter 3 orientations - the normative, the egoistic and the utilitarian orientations - were
common in childhood and decreased with age, whereas the former orientations
increased with age.
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With respect to the egoistic, the ideal and the fairness orientations, the present study
clearly showed age tendencies similar to those found by Walker. Concerning the
egoistic orientation, younger children tended to use the orientation more than older
children and the oldest children clearly used it the1east.. The.use.of.theideal and
the fairness orientations generally increased with age. The findings partially support
the findings of Tappan et al. (1987) and Walker (1989) that individuals tend to orient
towards the ideal and the fairness consequences as they get more developmentally
advanced in moral reasoning.
When the age tendency in each dilemma was examined separately in the present study,
,- ,
the amount of the use of each orientation was not consistent across dilemmas. Only
a few children, even in the younger age groups, mentioned the egoistic orientation for
Officer Brown's dilemma. It was even rarer in the responses of older children.
Regarding the use of the fairness orientation, a few children mentioned the orientation
in Heinz's dilemma. The various number of children who mentioned orientations
across dilemmas imply the possibility of a variation of age tendency in using the
orientation across the content of dilemmas. In general, children seem to favour
particular orientations at certain ages. However, they are not likely to adhere to the
orientations irrespective of the dilemma. Rather it seems that they allow flexibility
in selecting moral orientations across the content. Concerning flexibility in age
tendency to use the orientations it also should be noted that 7 year old Korean
children but not British children exceptionally referred to the egoistic orientation as
seldom as the oldest children with respect to Heinz's dilemma. The exception that 7
year old Korean children rarely used the egoistic orientation for Heinz's dilemma
indicates that the children's background such as culture and gender as well as the
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content of dilemmas should be taken into account in order to explain flexibility in age
tendency.
In the present study, age tendencies in the normative and the utilitarian orientations
were somewhat different from those in other studies. Earlier studies (e.g. Tappan et
al., 1987; Walker, 1989) reported that the use of the normative and the utilitarian
orientations decreased with age. However, these studies did not examine the use of
the utilitarian orientation on its own but in combination with the egoistic orientation
(e.g. Tappan et al., 1987; Walker, 1986a, 1989; Walker & Moran, 1991). Unlike
previous empirical studies, the present study was carried out to examine the utilitarian
orientation separately from the egoistic orientation so as to understand more precise
age tendencies. When the use of the utilitarian orientation in the three dilemmas was
examined respectively, age tendency was found in combination with either gender or
cultural differences concerning Heinz's and Officer Brown's dilemmas. In Heinz's
dilemma, younger boys were more likely to refer to the orientation than older boys.
Regarding Officer Brown's dilemma, only Korean girls showed an age tendency
where younger girls used the orientation more than older girls. Concerning the
normative orientation, the decline with age shown in other studies was observed only
in Joe's dilemma. Both the age tendencies in Heinz's and Officer Brown's
dilemmas were opposed to that of Joe's dilemma. That is, older children were more
likely to orient towards the normative concern in Heinz's and Officer Brown's
dilemmas. Although age tendencies were found in certain dilemmas, neither the
normative orientation nor the utilitarian orientation showed substantial age tendency
when the three dilemmas were taken into account altogether. Most children in each
age group referred to both these orientations in at least one dilemma. It means that
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children tend to maintain the use of each orientation at a similar level across age
although the usage differs across the content of dilemmas. Based on these findings,
it seems difficult to determine any particular age tendency in the use of the normative
or the utilitarian orientations unlike other studies that have shown a decreasing age
tendency.
The discrepancies between the present study and previous studies could be due to an
error in measurement in the present study. However, as far as the use of the
nonnative orientation was concerned, the present study shows that a strong tendency
to increase with age (p < .001 for Heinz's dilemma and p < .01 for Officer Brown's
dilemma respectively) occurred regardless of children's cultural background and
gender. Thus the tendency to increase with age at least in the use of the nonnative
orientation seemed too explicit to be attributed to an error of measure. Concerning
the utilitarian orientation, other studies reporting a decline with age did not examine
the orientation separately from the egoistic orientation. This indicates the possibility
that the strong tendency for the use of the egoistic orientation to decrease with age
could be screening the actual age tendency for the use of the utilitarian orientation to
maintain a similar level of the use across age.
However, interesting findings were indicated when the use of the five orientations in
each age group was considered at the same time. Although it is uncertain whether
the use of the nonnative and the utilitarian orientations decreases after adolescence
since adults were not involved as participants in the present study, the present study
indicates that the use of the normative and the utilitarian orientations did not decrease
with age at least up to the age of 16. This finding is opposed to the claims of other
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studies (e.g. Tappan et aI., 1987; Walker, 1986a, 1989; & Walker & Moran, 1991).
However, younger children apparently used the normative, the egoistic, and the
utilitarian orientations more than the ideal and the fairness orientations. That is,
children seemed to adhere to the former three orientations at the early ages. The
adherence was attenuated with age and, at the age of 16, children used all orientations
for their moral reasoning except the egoistic orientation. This could mean that
children develop the concept of ideal concerns and fairness later than the other
concepts. Consequently, the use of moral orientations seems diversified rather than
transferred from one to another orientation as children get older. This age tendency,
in a way, seems to be consonant with the claim by domain-specificity theorists (e.g.
Turiel & Smetana, 1984; Turiel & Davidson, 1986) on moral development that
individuals seem to consider a broader range of components for their social judgments
and to regulate the components as their social interaction increases with age. On the
other hand, as far as children up to the age of 16 are concerned, the findings of the
present study partially support other studies on age tendency in the use of moral
orientations (e.g. Tappan et aI., 1987; Walker, 1986a, 1989; & Walker & Moran,
1991). Additionally, variations of age tendency within an orientation across
dilemmas and cultural and gender groups seemed to support the claim that the use of
moral orientations might differ across not only children's background but also the
content of dilemma.
6.2.2 Cultural and Gender Differences
When Tappan et aI. (1987) analysed early empirical studies, cultural variations in the
use of moral orientations were found. For instance, the use of the ideal and the
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fairness orientations was more likely to occur in a society emphasising cooperation,
sharing and equality, such as an Israeli kibbutz, compared with other societies.
According to other studies (Tietjen & Walker, 1985; Walker, 1986a, 1989; Walker &
Moran, 1991), it was also suggested that moral orientations seemed to be used
differently across cultures depending on its environment such as what kind of values
and norms and social relations the society emphasizes. Korean society also strongly
maintains their own culture which is different from Western cultures (Song et aI.,
1987). Thus, it was proposed that the usage of orientations would be clearly
different between Koreans and the British. However, in contrast to the hypothesis,
only a few cultural differences were found in the present study and some of them
related to other variables such as gender and age.
Unexpectedly, the present study shows that Koreans used the fairness orientation
more than the British in Officer Brown's (see section 4.2.4 in Chapter v.) as well as
Joe's dilemmas. The preponderance of Koreans to the British in the use of the
fairness orientation is possibly explained through an emphasized value peculiar to
Koreans, namely "the rewards of virtue and the punishment of vice," which means
that virtue should be rewarded while vice should be punished (see section 3.4.2 in
Chapter III for details). In the present study, Korean children tended to reveal the
concept of the punishment ofvice when regarding Officer Brown's dilemma while the
concept of the reward of virtue seemed to appear in responses to Joe's dilemma. In
Officer Brown's dilemma, many Korean children said that Heinz should be punished
in some way for his misdeed even though the circumstance and the motivation were
taken into account. The children also justified the judge sending Heinz to prison in
terms of maintaining equity in the society. These responses seem to reflect the
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internalized concept of children that the punishment of vice is fair. The concept of
the reward of virtue might be inferred through children's responses concerning Joe's
dilemma. For instance, children said that the father should be rewarded for the
upbringing of the son on the one hand, and on the other hand, that the son should also
receive compensation for working hard. Such responses reveal the children's belief
that the upbringing of offspring as well as hard work are virtues worthy of reward.
Furthermore, the fact that most Korean folk tales clearly show the concept of the
rewards of virtue and the punishment of vice (Lee & Chang, 1986) reflects the
importance of this concept for Koreans. Korean children are exposed to such folk
tales from an early age so that it might be natural for themto internalize the concept
of the rewards of virtue and the punishment of vice and to give moral reasoning based
on the concept.
Concerning the utilitarian orientation, the present study reveals variant cultural
differences between Korean and British children across the content of dilemmas.
Walker and Moran (1991) pointed out a tendency for the Chinese to orient towards
utilitarian consequences more than Canadians in Walker's previous study (1989).
This tendency of the Chinese was also shown in other studies. Dien (1982) claimed
that differences in traditional values and norms between Chinese and Western
societies brought on differences in moral reasoning between the two cultures. In
order to resolve human conflict, Westerners seemed to emphasize individual choice,
commitment and responsibility whereas reconciliation and collective decision making,
concepts of utilitarianism, tended to prevail among Chinese. Additionally, in the
study of Lei and Cheng (1984, as cited in Snarey, 1985), many Chinese were found to
give their moral reasoning in terms of Chinese traditional values. Korea adjoins
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China so that Koreans and Chinese have shared their traditional perspectives such as
Confucianism for many years. Based on that, it was proposed that Koreans would
often use the utilitarian orientation in their moral reasoning. However the present
study did not confirm this. A strong tendency of the Chinese to orient towards
utilitarian consequences has been proven in many studies, whereas the present study
shows such a cultural difference only in Joe's dilemma, moreover, in combination
with gender differences. In other words, only Korean girls used the utilitarian
orientation more often than British girls whereas Korean boys showed no difference
from British boys. Also, Korean girls mentioned the orientation more than Korean
boys. When the responses of the Korean girls were analysed, many of them referred
to the matter of "hurting one's feeling." Since a gender difference was found only in
Joe's dilemmas showing a conflict between family members, the concept of "being a
wise mother and good wife," the ideal type of woman in Korea, could explain this
gender difference between Korean boys and girls. This traditional concept reflects
Koreans' tendency to expect different roles between males and females at least in
family matters. Based on this concept, in Korea, girls are probably asked from
childhood to consider the feelings of other family members more than boys in order to
maintain family harmony. Thus Korean girls' greater use of the utilitarian
orientation in Joe's dilemma may reflect the Korean girls' tendency to place greater
value on reconciliation and collective decision-making as far as interpersonal
relationships within the family are concerned. The gender difference observed in the
Korean group partially supports Gilligan's claim (1982) that girls typically use the
responsibility orientation (i.e. the egoistic, the utilitarian and the ideal orientations)
whereas boys use the right orientation (i.e. the normative and the fairness orientations).
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However, in constrast to Gillian's claim, the younger children showed a gender
difference that the boys used the utilitarian orientation more than girls concerning
Hienz's dilemma. Furthermore, except these variant gender differences in the use of
the utilitarian orientation, no gender difference was found in the present study. Thus,
the present study suggests that gender differences in the use of orientations could be
understood in relation to the content of dilemmas, the cultural background of the
participants and, probably, their age.
Cultural differences were also found in the use of the normative orientation only
concerning Heinz's dilemma. However, this will be mentioned in the next section in
connection with cultural differences in children's chosen issues.
In brief, the findings indicate that some concepts peculiar to Koreans seem to affect
Korean children's use of moral orientation and hence lead to differences between
Korean and British children and gender differences between Korean boys and girls.
One is the concept of the reward of virtue and the punishment of vice. This
traditional concept has a stronger influences on Korean children's orientation toward
fairness in comparison with British children, especially in Officer Brown's and Joe's
dilemmas. The other concept is the emphasis on being a wise mother and good wife.
It seems that Korean girls used the utilitarian orientation more than Korean boys and
British children on the basis of this concept but this is only found in Joe's dilemma
that presents a conflict between family members. Thus it could be concluded that
some concepts peculiar to a certain culture affect the use of moral orientations.
However, it should also be noted that the influence of the concepts on the use of the
orientations varies according to the content of dilemmas.
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6.2.3 Influence of the Content of Dilemmas
Some researchers (e.g. Walker, 1989; Walker & Moran, 1991) examined differences
in the use of moral orientations between hypothetical and real-life dilemmas in order
to figure out the differences in the use of orientations across the types of dilemmas.
Among them, Walker (1989), using Gilligan's categorization of Kohlberg's
orientations, found that in real-life situations personal-relationship dilemmas tended to
elicit the responsibility orientation more than dilemmas of impersonal matters, such as
one involving an issue primarily intrinsic to self or one involving institution,
regardless of individuals' gender. In addition, when real-life dilemmas and
Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas were compared, the right orientation was used
more in the hypothetical dilemmas whereas real-life dilemmas drew out the
responsibility orientation. Walker's study indicates that the use of Kohlberg's
orientations may differ between real life and hypothetical dilemmas. However, it has
not been examined prior to this study whether the use of orientations might vary
across contents within hypothetical dilemmas. The present study found differences
in the use of the orientations across dilemmas. For instance, children seldom used
the fairness orientation in Heinz's dilemma whereas they mentioned it the most in
Joe's dilemma. With respect to the egoistic orientation, the children mentioned it in
Heinz's dilemma almost 5 times more than in Officer Brown's dilemma.
Furthermore, differences in the use of the orientations according to children's
background also varied across the content of dilemmas. These differences indicate
that the children could use different orientations for their moral reasoning according
to the content of dilemmas.
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6.2.4 Summary
The findings of the present study indicate that there are differences in the use of
orientations according to individuals' background such as age, culture, and gender.
Concerning the age tendency, the use of the ideal and the fairness orientations
increased with age while the use of the normative and the utilitarian orientations
maintained similar levels across age. Only the use of the egoistic orientation
decreased with age. The findings of the present study also imply the influence of the
concepts peculiar to Koreans on the use of the orientations through showing cultural
differences in the use of the utilitarian and the fairness orientations. The finding that
the Korean children used the fairness orientation more than the British children was
explained with Koreans' traditional concept of the reward of virtue and the
punishment of vice. Cultural differences in the use of the utilitarian orientation
occurred only in the case of girls. Korean girls used the utilitarian orientation more
than Korean boys and British children. This probably reflects different social
expectations for boys and girls in Korean society. However, these general
differences only appeared in some dilemmas. In addition, children showed
differences in the use of some orientations across dilemmas. Thus it seems that the
content of dilemmas is also an influential factor in children's use ofthe orientations.
6.3 CHOSEN ISSUE
With respect to children's chosen issues for each dilemma, cultural differences were
also found in Heinz's and Officer Brown's dilemmas. In Officer Brown's dilemma,
cultural differences among older children were observed in terms of chosen issues.
At the age of 7, children in both cultural groups are more likely to choose the
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punishment issue than the morality and conscience issue. However, after the age of
7, Koreans, and especially girls, still chose the punishment issue more than the
morality and conscience issue, whereas British girls chose the latter issue more
frequently. That is, the Koreans were more likely to argue that the judge should give
Heinz a prison sentence rather than to let him go free. Moreover, many Koreans
who chose the punishment issue explained their choice in terms of the importance of
individual citizens obeying the law and public officials - i.e., the judge and the police
officer - doing their duty. These findings imply that the Koreans tended to adhere to
the concept of law-abiding and fulfilment of one's duty. Concerning the concept of
law-abiding, the children's responses to Heinz's dilemmashowed that Korean girls
seemed to adhere to the concept more strongly than Korean boys. Korean girls,
regardless of their age, chose the law issue more than the life issue while those in the
other groups, including the Korean boys, shifted from the law issue to the life issue as
they got older. The Korean girls who chose the law issue tended to give the reason
for their choice on the basis of the concept of obeying the law. That is, they argued
that, although his wife was dying, in order to keep the law Heinz should not steal the
drug. When they mentioned law-abiding, many Korean girls did quote the saying,
"even a vicious law is still a law to be obeyed." This gender difference in Heinz's
dilemma seems to show that the emphasis of Korean society on abiding the law
affects the moral reasoning of girls more strongly than that of boys. Furthermore,
Korean girls were more likely to refer to the normative orientation than the British
girls regarding Heinz's dilemma which reveals the tendency of Korean girls to orient
towards normative order. This seems to strengthen the findings on the Korean girls'
adherence to social rules including the law.
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These overall findings probably reflect the characteristics of Korean society which
stresses the importance of conformity to social rules. In fact, the importance of
keeping rules, especially the law, is promoted through mass-media as well as within a
unified school curriculum over the country. Song et al. (1987) also pointed out that
Korean society emphasizes the importance of authority, conformity and duty and uses
them as public justification for adhering to all rules. In addition, the difference
between Korean boys and girls in Heinz's dilemma implies that at least in Korean
society girls are more likely to conform to the demands of society than boys.
Surprisingly, there was ncsignificant difference in chosen issue concerning Joe's
dilemma. Although the Koreans chose the authority issue slightly more than the
British, many Koreans chose the contract issue rather than the authority issue as did
the British. That is, the children in both cultures argued that keeping contract
between individuals took precedence over children's absolute obedience to their
parents. The preponderance of the contract issue to the authority issue among
Koreans indicates that the Koreans did not advocate only the father in Joe's dilemma.
Rather, they considered the son's right to be equivalent to the father's. This could
imply that filial piety is attenuated among Korean children in these days although
filial piety is thought to be a traditional concept that oriental people, including
Koreans, greatly emphasized (Dien, 1982; Lei & Cheng, 1984, as cited in Snarey,
1985; Song et al., 1987).
However, when asked the questions "What is the most important thing a son should
be concerned about in his relationship to his father?" and "Why?" many Korean
children in all age groups still mentioned the concept of "filial piety."
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These are some responses of children at the age of 7, 13 and 16 respectively.
"The most important thing is listening to the parents and massaging their shoulder when
they were tired because that is filial piety. We all should fulfil filial piety. Because
the parents bore us and brought us up. (7 year old)"
"To respect and to be polite to the father. Because the father is the person who let the
son be today...but the son does not need to be absolutely obedient if the father asked to
do something wrong. I don't think that is the filial piety, but you have to respect and to
be polite to him. (13 year old)"
"He should fulfil filial piety. Because, if he is an human being, he should be amenable
to reason of human being and the filial piety is the reason. (16 year old)"
Although the responses indicated that the concept of filial piety is still regarded as one
of the most important virtues among Koreans, Korean adolescents, within recent
decade, seem to have changed in the way they perceive the concepts of filial piety
such as the erosion of the authority of the parents and absolute obedience of the
children, as Kim (1992) pointed out. This change in the concept of filial piety seems
to be due to a recent tendency of parents to be more tolerant of and less strict with
their children owing to the decrease in the number of children in a family and the
change of the family system to a child-centred nuclear family (Adolescent White
Paper, 1992).
In short, there were differences in chosen issues between the Korean and the British
children concerning Heinz's and Officer Brown's dilemmas. The Koreans,
especially girls were more likely to choose the issues relevant to obeying the law and
fulfilling one's duty. This reflects that Korean children, especially girls, hence
internalized the characteristics of Korean society that emphasize conformity to
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societal rules. Concerning Joe's dilemma, Koreans still regard filial piety as an
important virtue. However, the finding that they chose the contract issue rather than
the authority issue implies a change in the concept of filial piety among Korean
children.
6.4 UNSCORABLE RESPONSES
Some empirical studies conducted in non-Western cultures (Boyes & Walker, 1988;
Lei & Cheng, 1984, as cited in Snarey, 1985; Ma, 1988b, 1992; Shweder et al., 1990)
found some features of moral reasoning that Kohlberg could not capture and hence
lead to question the sufficiency of Kohlberg' s system to assess the moral development
in some cultures. For instance, Lei and Cheng (1984, as cited in Snarey, 1985) and
Ma (1988b) also claim that Kohlberg's theory is not sufficient to assess moral
reasoning in Oriental cultural settings since Kohlberg seemed to overlook oriental
perspectives on moral judgment, such as filial piety and collective thinking. The
present study also found some responses unscorable with Kohlberg's system.
First of all, some responses of 7 year old Korean children were unable to be scored.
According to Kohlberg, young children tend to make a moral decision in order to
avoid punishment or seek reward and to obey the superior power of authorities.
However, 7 year old Korean children were likely to take into account the emotional
aspect, defined as "the restricted-simple sympathy." This implies that Korean
children could make moral decisions based on something that Kohlberg missed such
as the restricted-simple sympathy even at a young age (i.e. preconventional level)
although other empirical studies (e.g. Ma, 1988b) pointed out that the first three stages
of Kohlberg's system could be culturally universal.
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However, Korean children in the older group, in comparison with those in the younger
group showed more various unscorable responses. These responses contained the
concept of compromise agreement, filial piety, chung, collectivism, and pure
conscience.
Referring to a compromise agreement as a mean to solve is a type of unscorable
resoponses that older Korean children, 16 year olds in particular, used. This
tendency was salient among Koreans in comparison to the British. The responses
showing that interpersonal reconciliation through compromise is the best way to
resolve conflict implies that Koreans value unity and harmony with others. Tietjen
& Walker (1985), in their study in Papua New Guinea, found a similar concept,
"marawa wawe, " which is best translated as a state of being in harmony or amity
with others. According to their findings, the people in Papua New Guinea tend to
make moral judgment based on marawa wawe. Such judgments were usually scored
at stage 3, with the element of social ideal/harmony and the norm of affiliation in
Kohlberg's system. However, Tietjen & Walker argued that Kohlberg's system is
insufficient to score some traditional concept in non-Western cultures and suggested
that the moral concept, marawa wawe, can be used at several different cognitive-
developmental levels just as the Western concept of 'justice" on which Kohlberg's
system is based, can be used at different levels. Unfortunately, the present study did
not involve adults as participants so that it is difficult to ascertain how to develop the
concept of unity and harmony with others from adolescence to adulthood. However,
the present study suggests that the emphasis on this concept seems to emerge during
adolescence.
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Some responses containing the concept of filial piety, which was mentioned earlier in
section 6.3 in Chapter VI, Chosen Issues, were also unable to be scored. Lei and
Cheng (1984, as cited in Snarey, 1985) already pointed out that the criteria judgments
represented by Kohlberg did not properly grasp the concept of filial piety of Chinese
and hence it was undervalued. In line with the claim of Lei and Cheng, the present
study found difficulties in matching some responses mentioning filial piety with
Kohlberg's criteria judgments. Thus, the concept of filial piety seemed to be a
concept peculiar to Oriental people and it is difficult to be scored with Kohlberg's
system.
The present study found chung as another concept that affect Korean children's moral
reasoning. It seems to be natural that chung affects the Korean children's moral
reasoning since chung is one of the most important concepts in order to understand
psychological aspects of Koreans (Choi & Choi, 1990a) as mentioned earlier (section
3.4.2 in Chapter III). However, the fact that only the oldest children referred to
chung for their moral resoning implies that the children, at least before mid-
adolescent, could not clearly apply the concept of chung in their moral reasoning
although they might be vaguely aware of the concept.
Collectivism is a representative concept of non-Western society that Kohlberg did not
take into account in his system (Dien, 1982; Ma, 1988b; Snarey et al., 1985; Tietjen &
Walker, 1985). Choi & Choi (1990b) claimed that the concept of "we," one of the
most important components of interpersonal relationship among Koreans, showed the
existence of collectivism among Koreans. That is, Koreans as well as non-
Westerners, probably tend to make moral judgment based on collectivism. In the
VI. Discussion 170
present study, a sense of collectivism among Koreans was clearly captured in the 16
year old children's moral judgment of Heinz's dilemma. Thus, it seems reasonable
to say that Korean society, like other non-Western societies, is a collectivism-based
culture and collectivism affects the moral judgment of Koreans.
The present study showed another type of unscorable responses of 16 year old Korean
children in relation to conscience concerning Heinz's dilemma. Although they could
not elaborate their idea further, they valued dying with a pure conscience more than
extending life with a contaminated conscience. Similar responses were found in the
comparative study ofmoral reasoning between Japanese and Americans (Iwasa, 1992).
According to the study, 10 out of 15 Japanese adults at postconventional level of
Kohlberg's stages chose the law issue rather than the life issue (i.e. Heinz should not
steal the drug) unlike Americans at the same level. When looking into the responses,
the majority of Japanese at postconventionallevel said that the most important thing
was not just to make the wife's life longer by any means, but to live gracefully with
human dignity. Based on these responses Iwasa argues that the Japanese seemed not
to choose the law issue as opposed to the life issue but chose "a short life with honour
and dignity" rather than "prolongation of life by illegal means." Overall findings on
similar responses found in Koreans and Japanese indicate that both Korean and
Japanese people are more likely to value "pure conscience" or "a life with honour and
dignity" than "a life itself' and that this is another concept that Kohlberg missed.
Furthermore, this concept seems to emerge during adolescence and, presumably, to
deepen afterwards through late adolescence and adulthood. However, it is
impossible to examine whether Koreans maintain the concept and how they develop it
during adulthood since the present study did not involve adults as participants.
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In short, some responses which were unscorable with Kohlberg's manual were found
through analysing Koreans' responses to dilemmas. These findings of the present
study in combination with those of other empirical studies imply that not only the
concept ofjustice but also some other concepts such as chung. collectivism, and filial
piety are used for moral judgment in some non-Western cultures and that Kohlberg
missed or misunderstood these concepts. Furthermore, the present study also found
unscorable responses even in the 7 year old group but only among Koreans. That is,
their moral judgment was based not only on physical consequences, as Kohlberg
claims, but also they restricted sympathy to only one person in the dilemma. These
unscorable responses are probably due to the influence of the unique Korean culture.
Therefore, unlike claims by other studies that Kohlberg's lower moral stages but not
higher stages could be universal (e.g. Ma, 1992; Snarey, 1985), the findings show a
possibility that individuals not only at higher stages but also at lower stages could
make moral judgment based on some concepts that were different from those used in
Kohlberg's system.
6.5 CONCLUSION
The present study shows some significant findings on children's moral stages, use of
orientations, chosen issues and unscorable responses. The findings partially support
Kohlberg's theory of moral development and, at the same time, found some cultural
differences in the development, which imply the insufficiency of Kohlberg's theory.
Concerning the moral stages, that the children in the present study developed moral
stages with age regardless of gender and cultural background coincided with those in
other empirical studies (e.g. Colby et al., 1983; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Snarey et al.,
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1985). This implies that Kohlberg's moral stages are applicable to not only Western
societies but also large-scale modernized societies even though they have different
traditions and norms from each other.
Concerning the use of moral orientations, there are also some significant findings.
First of all, various differences in the use of the orientations according to the content
of dilemmas were found in the present study. Kohlberg posited that individuals were
relatively consistent in their moral stages across varying contents of dilemmas.
However, he passed over the possibility of differences in the use of moral orientations
across the contents. In addition, differences in the use of the orientations across the
content of Kohlberg's dilemmas had not been examined until now although a few
studies indicated differences in the use of the orientations between Kohlberg's
hypothetical dilemmas and real-life dilemmas. The present study earnestly analysed
the use of the orientations in each dilemma, and hence pointed out that the content of
dilemmas as well as individuals' age, cultural background, and gender could affect the
use of the orientations. Secondly, the present study examined the use of the egoistic
orientation separately from that of the utilitarian orientation for the first time. So far,
empirical studies considered the use of the egoistic orientation to be included in the
use of the utilitarian orientation so that they examined the egoistic orientation in
combination with the utilitarian orientation. This indicated a decrease in the use of
the combined orientation with age. However, the present study found that the age
tendencies of the two orientations were different from each other. The use of the
egoistic orientation apparently decreased with age while the utilitarian orientation
showed no substantial age difference. Thus it is suggested that age tendency in these
two orientations should be examined separately. Thirdly, in the present study the age
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tendency in the use of the orientations is viewed in a somewhat different way.
Walker's study (1989) showed that the use of the normative, the egoistic and the
utilitarian orientations decreased with age whereas the use of the ideal and the fairness
orientations increased with age. It could be interpreted that children seem to have a
tendency to transfer their moral orientations from the normative, the egoistic, and the
utilitarian orientations to the ideal and the fairness orientations with age. However
children in the present study showed such decrease only in using the egoistic
orientation but not in using the normative and the utilitarian orientations. With
regard to the age tendency to increase, similar patterns were observed as found in
other studies. That is, younger children tended to concentrate on the normative, the
egoistic, and the utilitarian orientations in order to underpin their moral reasoning
while older children used the ideal and the fairness orientations in addition to the
normative and the utilitarian orientations. The older children rarely mentioned the
egoistic orientations. These general age tendencies in the use of the orientations
indicate that children seem to take into account more various moral orientations as
they get older. In other words, it seems that children added newly developed
orientations to the orientations which were already used for the moral reasoning as
they get older. Thus the present study suggests that the use of moral orientations
tends to be diversified with age rather than swopped from one to another orientation.
This suggestion is somewhat consonant with the claims of the domain-specificity
theorists (e.g. Turiel & Smetana, 1984; Turiel & Davidson, 1986).
Apart from the age tendency, cultural differences in the use of the normative, the
fairness and the utilitarian orientations were found. Korean children used the
fairness orientation more than the British children. Concerning the normative and
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the utilitarian orientations, the cultural differences were combined with gender
differences. That is, Korean girls mentioned the utilitarian orientation more than the
British children and Korean boys. Korean girls also referred to the normative
orientation more than the British girls.
Moreover, children also revealed cultural differences in their chosen issues. Korean
children, especially girls, tended to choose the law and the punishment issues over the
life and the morality and conscience issues in Heinz's and Officer Brown's dilemmas.
These cultural differences seem to indicate that characteristics of society affect
children's moral choice and their reasoning underlying the choice.
Concerning unscorable responses, Korean children in all the age groups gave some
unscorable responses although older children were more likely to show the unscorable
responses than younger children. It seems that the concepts peculiar to Koreans such
as filial piety, 'chung', collectivism, compromise agreement to solve a conflict, and
having a pure conscience influence the moral judgment of children, especially when
they are older, and hence generate unscorable responses since Kohlberg missed or
misunderstood the concepts.
However, the present study has some limitations. . First of all, the size of the sample
was small. Although a total of 128 children were interviewed, the age range was
wide. The children were divided into four age groups in addition to two cultural
groups and two gender groups. This means that actually only 8 boys and 8 girls
were in one age group within the same cultural group. Secondly, participants were
drawn only from middle class families in an urban area. Having such a small size of
sub-group, combined with its socio-economic status limited to middle class in an
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urban area, difficulties in applying the findings overall to Korean and British children
remain,
Bearing these limitations in mind, it could be concluded that Kohlberg's system of
moral development is generally applicable but insufficient to assess individuals
especially in non-Western cultures based on overall findings of the present study. In
order to confirm or refute the findings above, a second study was carried out to assess
children's development of moral reasoning with fables as an alternative method.
CHAPTER SEVEN
FABLES AS AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD
OF ASSESSING MORAL REASONING
The empirical findings presented in the earlier chapters showed variation in children's
moral reasoning according to the content of dilemmas as well as children's
background when Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas were used to evaluate moral
reasoning in various cultural settings. Moreover, some limitations in the use of
Kohlberg's dilemmas suggest that it would be useful to seek alternative assessments
of children's moral reasoning. Hence, a further study has been planned to use
children's responses to fables as an alternative method of assessing moral reasoning in
order to supplement the findings of the study using Kohlberg's dilemmas. This
chapter will present the justification for using fables as an alternative method and the
characteristics of fables, followed by several studies on children's understanding of
fables and their morals, and lastly an outline of the further study.
7.1 CONTRIBUTIONS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF KOHLBERG'S
DILEMMAS
Gibbs, Basinger, and Fuller (1992) pointed out at least two contributions that the use
of Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas made to moral reasoning assessment. First, the
process of abstract moral consideration can be facilitated through concrete situational
details provided in the dilemma - e.g. a dying wife, a desperate husband, a life-saving
176
VII. Fables as an Alternative Method 177
drug, a selfish druggist. Individuals are more likely to give reasoning about moral
values such as human life, affiliation, property, and the laws of society as they attend
to the relevant details of the dilemma. Second, moral dilemmas promote the
likelihood of eliciting moral reflection from individuals without interference from
preconceptions. In other words, the moral dilemmas render the production of
reasoning more likely thus making it amenable to being assigned to categories.
Actually several researchers (e.g. Lei & Cheng, 1984, see Snarey, 1985; Snarey et al.,
1985; Tietjen & Walker, 1985) have indicated that the use of the moral dilemma
prompted most people in a wide range of cultures to describe reasoning that was
amenable to Kohlberg's predefined categories. In line with the above studies, most
children in the present study understood the dilemmas and their moral reasoning
matched to Kohlberg's criteria judgments, which enabled their moral stages to be
assessed.
However, Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas have been criticised as artificial,
inappropriate, or irrelevant to children (Anderson, 1980; Damon, 1977), females
(Skoe & Diessner, 1994; Gilligan, 1982), and individuals in certain cultures (Boyes &
Walker, 1988; Shweder et al., 1990). For instance, Anderson (1980) argued that
Kohlberg's dilemmas were irrelevant to children because they were basically a set of
abstract, largely adult moral dilemmas. Furthermore, Davidson, et al. (1983) found
that the young children (the 6 years olds) distinguished between moral and
conventional events more sharply on familiar than on unfamiliar issues and this
difference between familiar and unfamiliar issues attenuated with age. This finding
implies that moral development proceeds from a reliance on specific personal
experiences to an ability to abstract or generalize to unfamiliar events. Thus, on the
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basis of the findings of the two studies (Anderson, 1980; Davidson, et al., 1983), it
could be assumed that it is difficult to precisely assess children's moral reasoning,
especially at their young ages, through using Kohlberg's moral dilemmas. On the
other hand, some studies (e.g. Boyes and Walker, 1988; Shweder et al., 1990) pointed
out that there might be other moral issues or concepts which Kohlberg's approach
missed, misunderstood or misconstrued because of the irrelevant content of the
dilemmas in certain cultures. The limitations of Kohlberg's approach due to cultural
variation were actually found in the early studies of Nisan and Kohlberg (1982) and
Edwards (1975). Additionally, the findings of the present study shows not only
differences in the use of moral orientations between the two cultural settings (i.e.
Korea and Britain) but also differences according to the content of dilemmas in
accordance with Walker's findings (1989). In addition, the findings that some
responses of Korean children to dilemmas are unable to be scored with Kohlberg's
system imply that Kohlberg did not grasp some concepts peculiar to Koreans that
affect their moral reasoning.
Based on the findings, it seems that Kohlberg's system is applicable but insufficient to
assess Korean children's moral reasoning. In order to ascertain and to supplement
the findings, the second study in the present research was planned to assess the
children's moral reasoning by an alternative method. In so far as only children, not
adults, are engaged in the present study, the present study attempted to seek an
alternative method in terms of the two aspects; one is that the stories should-be able to
draw moral judgment from children and the other is that the content should be more
appropriate and relevant to children. Fables seem to satisfy the above aspects since
they are well-known in children's literature as well as containing morals. The
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following section describes In detail the justification for selecting fables as an
alternative method.
7.2 FABLES AS AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF ASSESSING
CHILDREN'S MORAL REASONING
The present study selects fables as an alternative method of assessing children's moral
reasoning. Fables are brief narratives and have world-wide repute as didactic stories.
This world-wide reputation of fables implies that their morals are generally accepted
in almost every culture. The fact that a number of versions of fables are published
especially for children across various cultures indicates that fables are particularly
regarded as literature for children. In addition, Chia (1993) and Dorfman (1988,
1989, as cited in Chia, 1993) reported that even more than 80% of children as young
as 7 years old seem to be able to identify morals in fables. Thus, where children are
concerned, the use of fables for assessing their moral reasoning seems potentially
useful because of the familiarity of fables, the acceptability of their morals to children,
and the ability of children, even at a young age, to identify morals in fables.
In Korea, where the present study was carried out, a large amount of didactic stories
like fables and folk tales are particularly widespread. The stories are introduced to
children in the form of books, cartoons, and children's TV programmes. Thus
Korean children seem to be fully exposed to "reading," "listening," and "watching"
the didactic stories even before school age. Furthermore, they are taught some
didactic stories and the embedded morals at school. It seems that children are
generally encouraged to experience didactic stories and to draw morals from them.
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One of the most available volumes of didactic stories to children in Korea is Aesop's
fable. Not only are a number of Aesop's fables books published but also some of the
fables appear in primary text books in order to teach children the embedded morals.
Korean children are therefore quite familiar with Aesop's fables and have little
difficulty in understanding the fables and their morals. Thus it is plausible to use
fables as an alternative method of assessing Korean children's moral reasoning. In
fact, some researchers have already attempted to assess moral reasoning by means of
fables (e.g. Daniels et al., 1995; Johnston, 1988). Here, the characteristics of fables
are presented, followed by a review of empirical studies on the understanding of
fables and their morals.
7.2.1 Characteristics and History of Fables
Reinstein (1983) states that fables are regarded not only as classics of children's
literature but also as an important source of popular culture in America. Such a
conception of fables seems not only applicable to Americans but also to people in
other cultures, including the Korean and British cultures.
Lenaghan (1967), in his introduction to Caxton's Aesop, defines the characteristics of
fables as follows.
1) It is fiction in the sense that it did not really happen.
2) It is literacy entertainment.
3) It is poetic fiction with double or allegorical significance.
4) It is a moral tale, usually with animal characters.
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Huck, Hepler, and Hickman (1993) describe the characteristics of fables in more
detail. According to them, fables are brief, didactic tales mostly having no more
than two or three characters who perform simple and straightforward actions that
result in a single climax. The central characters are usually animals, or occasionally
the elements, that talk and behave as human beings. These characters represent
various aspects of human nature - for instance, the lion stands for kingliness, the fox
for cunning, the sheep for innocence and so forth. The moral in fables is either
implicit or explicit in accordance with their aim to instruct.
Although fables are currently thought of as literature for children, this is not how they
originated, especially with respect to Aesop's fables which can be considered
representative of fables in general. The change in the status of fables occurred as
follows; Aesop, who it is believed was a Greek slave circa 600 BC originally
designed fables to criticise politics in a repressive era. It is widely believed that he
collected and retold a large number of didactic tales through his talent for storytelling
and shrewd observation of human nature. On the other hand, because of an
enormous amount of work and the existence of similar fables to Aesop's in China and
India, his actual existence is doubted and his works are thought to be the product of
several story tellers (e.g. Muggeridge, 1973). Nevertheless, over the years the fables
have been recommended and supported as children's reading by a number of notable
writers such as Francis Bacon and John Locke. Since Aesop's fables were first
edited specifically for children to read in 1692, numerous versions of the fables for
children, illustrated and elaborated have been published (Reinstein, 1983).
Eventually, they became part of specialist children's literature not only in Western
countries but also Oriental countries (Anno, 1991).
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Considering the aims of the present study, the most notable characteristic of fables is
to convey the human and cultural values of a society in short story form. Most
stories in Aesop's fables also present a fairly consistent world view and a prescription
for right and wrong behaviours. For instance, the lessons that self-protection and
hard work are important and that evil is punished while goodness is rewarded are
repeatedly expressed in his fables. These lessons seem to be acceptable in almost
every culture since a number of versions of fables have been published across various
cultures. In connection with the above characteristics of fables, empirical studies on
understanding fables and their morals and influential factors on that understanding
will be reviewed in the following section.
7.2.2 Empirical Studies on Children's Understanding of Fables and Their
Morals
There are few but some useful studies on the understanding of fables or using fables
in order to research various areas of human development which employ a variety of
approaches. For instance, Reinstein (1983) studied cultural influences on
appreciating fables and Lewis (1993) pointed out the influence of a reader's
experience on drawing morals from fables. Abrahamsen and Sprouse (1995) used
fables in order to study language deficits, and difficulties in understanding figurative
language, particularly in children with learning disabilities. Relevant to moral
development, there are some studies using fables to research belief in a just world
(Chia, 1993, 1995; Dorfman & Brewer, 1994), the aspects of moral judgment on the
basis of Piaget's moral development (Pillar, 1983), the relationship between
children's cognitive and moral development (Lambrou, 1988) and Gilligan's moral
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orientations (Johnston, 1988; Daniels et al., 1995). Some researchers have studied
the connection between fables and morals. Empirical studies on understanding
fables and their morals are reviewed below.
Dorfman and Brewer (1994) postulated that individuals are able to understand the
moral of fable that the author intended to convey in a fable by means of reflecting the
outcome of the central action in the fable on the basis of a belief in a "just world."
Just world belief is seen as developing early in the moral development process and in
playing a central role in the organisation of human experience. Piaget (1965/1932)
originally describes the concept of "immanent justice," the.young child's belief that
"a fault automatically brings about its own punishment." This concept is shaped and
modified to the notion of a 'Just world" belief by Lerner (1980). This is defined as
the social expectation that individuals who perform good deeds will be rewarded
while wrongdoers will be punished. For example, with respect to "the Shepherd and
the Wolf," the boy's immoral action (dishonesty) resulted in the negative outcome
(loss of his sheep). Through this relationship between the action and the outcome,
the individual can infer that the author believes lying to be morally wrong. If the
boy had lost his sheep in spite of being honest, most readers might perceive it to be
unfair and have difficulties in deriving a moral from the fable. That is, individuals
are more likely to derive the moral from the fables if their reasoning is based on belief
in a "just world."
In order to test the just world belief that underlies the understanding of fables,
Dorfman and Brewer asked 60 undergraduate students to point out the morals
underlying traditional Aesop's fables and three types of modified fables devised for
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the experiment. The traditional fables included "The Ass Carrying Salt," "The Boy
Who Cried Wolf," "The Goose and the Golden Eggs" and so on. The three types of
modified fables were neutral-action fables (neutral actions paired with positive or
negative outcomes), no-outcome fables, and reversed-outcome fables (positive moral
actions paired with negative outcomes and negative actions with positive outcomes).
For the experiment, two coders rated 207 fables in terms of how explicitly the moral
is stated and selected eight of them, which were rated as clearly didactic.
The results revealed that there was no difficulty for participants in drawing the moral
from the traditional fables regardless of the degree of familiarity of the fables to them.
A comparison of the traditional fables with the modified fables showed that the
former received· the highest points in the assessment of clarity and fairness.
Additionally, the individuals not only agreed with the instruction of the traditional
fables the most but also preferred the traditional fables to any other modified fables.
These findings indicate that most adults tend to capture the intentionally embedded
moral in the fables according to the just world belief.
Jose's work (1990) also supports the findings of Dorfman and Brewer with respect to
the just world belief through examining the understanding of short stories. Although
fables were not used, the structure of the stories was similar to, and even more
complicated than, that of the fables in Dorfman and Brewer's study. Three factors;
motive (good or bad motive), outcome (positive/negative) and causality
(causal/noncausal) were combined to create eight types of stories. For instance, in
one type, a character with a bad motive receives a negative outcome which was
noncausally related to the previous motive. When children in grades 1, 3, and 5, as
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well as college students, were asked to rate the fairness of stories, participants of all
ages agreed that the positive outcome in the good motive stories and a negative
outcome for a bad motive were fairer than the reversed combinations, i.e. negative
outcomes following the good motives and positive outcomes for bad motives.
However, Jose and Brewer (1984), in their earlier study, pointed out a developmental
trend concerning preference for outcomes. The children in the second grade, the
youngest children in the sample, depended almost entirely on outcome information in
judging the degree of their liking for the story. The fourth graders tended to combine
character information with outcome information to de~ermine their liking for the
ending of the story but the influence of the outcome is still dominant. The sixth
graders clearly showed the ability to integrate the nature of character and that of
outcome in a pattern reflecting the just world belief. In sum, these results indicate
that young children like positive outcomes regardless of whether the characters are
good or bad. With increasing age, children are more likely to prefer positive endings
for good characters and negative endings for bad characters. However, aside from
their preference for outcomes, children as young as those in grade 1 or 2 still
recognized the stories providing positive outcomes for good deeds and the negative
outcomes for bad deeds as the fairest stories.
In Chia's (1993) study with Chinese and Malay children, aged 7, 9, and 11 years, in
Singapore, most children could identify the "moral" in fables and in just world stories
in which human beings are the characters. However, the children showed
developmental trends in outcome preference and judgements of outcome fairness. In
line with the findings of Jose and Brewer (1984), the study reveals a moderate
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tendency for younger children to prefer positive outcomes with less concern for the
nature of characters. Children's preference for positive outcomes for good
characters and for negative outcomes for bad characters gradually increased with age.
With respect to outcome fairness, more of the older children reflected the just world
belief compared with younger children. These age differences were only significant
for the fables. In accordance with the findings of Jose (1990), no significant age
difference is reported for the human just world stories.
According to the findings of the empirical studies, the claim that individuals seem to
derive morals from fables not only on the basis of their belief in a just world but also
factors such as the fable's outcome. Children were postulated to have difficulties in
understanding a moral presented in reversed-outcome fables (i.e. negative outcomes
for good deeds and positive outcomes for bad deeds) because of the inconsistency of
these fables with the just world belief. Contrary to this expectation, approximately
half of the children did produce morals from the fables although the morals were
sometimes not intended by the writer (Dorfman and Brewer, 1994; Chia, 1993). For
example, an 11 year old child extracted the moral; "Even though you have treated
your friends badly they will still help you" from the fable, "The Shepherd Boy and a
Wolf," with the reversed outcome. Moreover, this tendency shows no significant
decrease with age, again counter to the hypothesis (Chia, 1993). These findings
challenged the claim that individuals' understanding of fables is only derived from
their belief in ajust world. In order to provide an account of how morals are derived
from reversed-outcome fables, Dorfman and Brewer (1994) suggest that some
individuals use only the fable's outcome to detect the moral instead of using the just
world belief. For example, concerning the fable, "The Ants and the Grasshopper,"
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the diligent ants have positive outcomes while the lazy grasshopper receives negative
outcomes. Thus the individuals can deduce from the outcome that diligence is
morally good while laziness is not. At the same time they could produce another
point from the fable as its outcome is reversed. Apart from the issue of the just
world belief, the universality of children's understanding of fables and their morals
was indicated by the congruent findings of the cross-cultural study of Chia (1993)
with those of other studies conducted in the Western countries. Furthermore, these
empirical studies demonstrate that many children, even at 7 years, as well as adults,
are capable of understanding morals embodied in fables, although this understanding
continues to develop during childhood.
The claim that 7 year old children are able to identify and to generate morals in fables
(Chia, 1993; Dorfman, 1988, 1989, as cited in Chia, 1993) challenged an early finding
of Piaget's. In a study on children's understanding of metaphors, Piaget (1959)
examined children's understanding of proverbs, which can be conceived of as
metaphors. Most children at the age of 9 to 11 in his experiment did not understand
the proverbs although they thought they had understood them and gave the illusion of
understanding. By analysing their explanations, Piaget figured out so-called
"syncretism"; children tend to fuse the two sentences idiosyncratically, applying the
whole before understanding the parts.
An 8 year old girl showed almost pure syncretistic reasoning as below.
She connects the proverb: "When the eat's away the mice can play," with the following
phrase: "Some people get very excited but never do anything." She, who would
understand the meaning of each of these sentences if they were separate, yet declares
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that they mean "the same thing. " - "Why do these sentences mean the same thing?" -
Because the words are about the same - What is meant by 'some people' ... etc? - "It
means that some people get very excited, but afterwards they do nothing, they are too
tired There are some people who get excited It's like when cats run after hens or
chicks. They come and rest in the shade and go to sleep. There are lots ofpeople
who run about a great deal, who get too excited Then afterwards they are worn out,
and go to bed. "
Based on the findings, Piaget linked children's ability to understand proverbs with
formal operations and metalinguistic skills which develop late in the linguistic
repertoire. He suggests that children as young as 7 years old might not able to
understand the morals in fables since they have not yet reached the formal operational
stage, which is contrary to the findings of Chia (1993) and Dorfman (1988, 1989, as
cited in Chia, 1993).
Furthermore, according to vanous findings, it could be concluded that there is a
marked improvement in the ability of children ages 9 to 14 years to understand and
explain figurative language, including idioms (Ackerman, 1982; Cacciari & Levorato,
1989; Gibbs, 1987; Lodge and Leach, 1975; & Prinz, 1983); similes (Gardner, Winner,
Bechhofer, & Wolf, 1978; & Malgady, 1977); metaphors (Demorest, Silberstein,
Gardner, & Winner, 1983; Nippold, Leonard, & Kail, 1984; Winner, Rosenstiel, &
Gardner, 1976); and proverbs (Douglas & Peel, 1979; Resnick, 1982; Richardson &
Church, 1959) although some rudimentary understanding of metaphor may occur
even in the preschool years (Vosniadou & Ortony, 1983; Vosniadou, Ortony,
Reynolds, & Wilson, 1984). However, it should be noted that the above studies,
including Piaget's, on figurative language have not used fables, unlike Chia's and
VII. Fables as an Alternative Method 189
Dorfman's studies, so that it is impossible to make an exact comparison between the
studies. The findings of Abrahamsen and Sprouse (1995) imply difficulties in
comparing findings from studies which have used different materials. They found
out that children tended to generate morals in some fables more easily than in other
fables in the study of fable comprehension by children with and without learning
disabilities. They suggest that the differences in generating morals across fables
could be due to various factors including vocabulary, the degree of the fable's
adherence to story grammar, inclusion of one primary actor versus a relationship
between actors, and the children's familiarity with the relationships portrayed in the
fables. Thus, in the light of their study, those factors could also account for the age
variation in children's understanding of figurative language across studies.
Cultural influence is another issue in studying the understanding of fables and their
morals. There are several studies showing cultural influences on individuals'
responses to fables. Reinstein (1983), by means of surveying the attitudes of college
students in America, found variation in individuals' acceptance of fables according to
their social background. This finding seems to disagree with the general assumption
that fables provide an effective method for teaching morals that are valued in a culture
because the fables are well-accepted by everyone. Reinstein compared two groups
of students in terms of their views of fables. The students in one group attended a
four-year state college in New England while those in the other group were enrolled at
a two-year community college, a branch of the City University of New York. When
the backgrounds of the two groups were compared, most students in the former group
were young, single, white and middle to lower-middle class while those in the latter
group were mainly older (30-60 years old), married and rearing children, black or
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Hispanic, and working class or on welfare.
According to Reinstein, many of the respondents from middle class backgrounds
believed that fables are inappropriate for young children's reading because an
"unpleasant cynicism" pervaded in the fables. That is, the fables generally describe
the world as a dangerous place, full of exploiters, bullies, and false friends. The
students were found to believe that such cynicism could deprive small children of a
sense of safety and destroy their trust in loving adults who would protect them from
danger. Nonetheless, they considered that fables make intellectual exercises for
children of 10 or older. On the other hand, Reinstein found that the respondents with
lower incomes showed different views. They shared Aesop's view of the world as a
dangerous place, full of 'wickedand cruel creatures like the fox and the lion characters,
and saw their children as weak creatures, like mouse and sheep, who must lie low, use
their wits when in danger, and work hard the rest of the time. Thus they considered
that Aesop's fables gave pragmatic lessons that they felt their children would need to
cope with life, and acknowledged the fables as ideal books to read to children of about
4 or 5 years old, before they were allowed to leave the house alone to play or walk to
school. The differences between the two groups indicate that individuals can value
the same fable differently according to their background.
In addition to having different attitudes towards fables, individuals may obtain
different morals from the same fable. Lewis (1993), through a case study of a boy, a
fourth grader, found that individuals could draw different morals from the same fable
depending on their own experiences. "The Pelican and the Crane," a fable by A.
Lobel (1980, in Lewis, 1993) expresses the moral, "when one is a social failure, the
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reasons are clear." However, the boy discovered the moral, "give people a chance,"
when he was asked to detect the hidden moral in the fable. The boy's response to
the fable seemed to stem from his experience with his mother. This finding would
suggest that a shared culture may be important for interpretation of a fable but there
will be individual differences as well. Similarly, Vipond and Hunt (1984) highlight
the importance of social and cultural background in understanding stories. They
point out that stories are devised to make points which are socially and culturally
salient to the extent that sometimes people from other cultures find the stories difficult
to understand or even "pointless." According to the studies, cultural influence on
understanding fables and their morals seems to be unavoidable.
Some researchers have studied children's responses to fables in connection with their
moral development as described by Kohlberg and initiated by Piaget. Pillar (1983)
analysed children's responses to fables in order to demonstrate the existence of the
sequential stages of moral development, as Kohlberg claimed (see Chapter II for
details). The study involved 60 children, aged 7, 9, and 11 years as participants and
their responses to the fables were assessed on 4 moral dimensions; intentionality,
relativism, punishment and independence of sanctions. It was hypothesized that
children would show developmental trends within each of the 4 moral dimensions.
As regards intentionality, young children would judge an act according to its actual
physical consequences, whereas older children would judge the act in terms of its
intention; with regard to relativism, young children would be characterized as viewing
an act as either totally right or wrong, and as thinking everyone views it in the same
way, while older children would be aware of possible diversity in views of right and
wrong; as for punishment, young children would advocate severe and painful
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punishment for misdeeds whereas older children would prefer milder punishments
leading to reforming the offender; with respect to independence of sanctions, young
children would consider an act bad if it yielded punishment, while older children
would do so because it violated a rule or did harm to others. As expected, significant
relationships between age and maturity of responses were found for all of the
dimensions. These findings clearly demonstrate a developmental pattern in
children's responses to the fables across age which is consonant with Piaget's and
Kohlberg's moral developmental theories.
Despite having a small s~ple, Lambrou (1988) supported the findings of Pillar
through a similarly designed study. However the study also indicated that the level
ofunderstanding of morals differs according to the content of fables. With respect to
four moral dimensions, intentionality, relativism, punishment, and independence of
sanctions, children showed more mature responses to the fables whose moral was "do
not be foolish" than the other two fables, containing the moral, "do help others" and
"do not lie" respectively. The fables showing the moral, "do not lie" obtained the
lowest mature responses. On the basis of the findings, Lambrou suggests the
possibility of differences in developmental trends in the way that children acquire
certain concepts such as "do not be foolish," "do help others," and "do not lie."
The above two studies concern the relationship between understanding fables and the
stage of moral development that the individual has achieved. They do not take into
account moral orientation, which has been shown in the first experiment of the present
study to show cultural and developmental variation. However, Johnston (1988)
investigated how adolescents' moral orientations were related to their solutions to
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dilemmas in fables. Gilligan (1982) argued that Kohlberg mainly focused on a
justice/rights orientation, which is mainly presented by males although there is
another orientation, a care/responsibility orientation, which is more likely to be
referred to by females (see Chapter II and III for details). On the basis of Gilligan's
two moral orientations, 60 adolescents, aged 11 and 15 years, were interviewed so as
to ascertain the differences in the usage of moral orientations between boys and girls
in combination with the influence of the content of fables on the use of orientations.
It was found that all of the boys and girls represented the two orientations in some
way. This indicates that most children have some knowledge of both orientations by
11 years of age. However, they tend to favour one orientation over the other when
they attempt to find a solution for a moral dilemma. Generally, boys tend to prefer
the rights orientation to the care orientation whereas girls show the opposite. Also, it
was found that the usage of orientations was related to the content of the fables.
Over half of the children in the sample used the rights orientation for one fable and
the care orientation for the other one. This implies that individuals employ
orientations differently depending on the content of moral dilemmas rather than
persist in using only one orientation. These findings parallel the early findings of the
present study (see Chapter VI).
However, Daniels et a1. (1995), in their study replicated the study of Johnston (1988),
argued against Johnston's claim on gender differences. The purpose of the study of
Daniel et a1. was to investigate possible differences in the use of moral orientations
between male and female youths whose cultural background was very different from
the participants in the studies of Johnston (1988) and Gilligan (1982). Thus they
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applied Gilligan's moral orientations in examining moral decisions and the reasons
for them with youths of Hawaiian ancestry. As participants, 80 children and
adolescents, aged 10 to 18 years were selected from state schools located in one of the
less-developed islands in Hawaii. Ten boys and 10 girls were selected from each of
5th, 7th, 9th, and 11th grade levels. Unlike the claims of Gilligan (1982) and
Johnston (1988), the results indicate that the Hawaiian boys and girls did not
significantly differ in terms of the use of care and justice orientations for their moral
decisions although they used the same two fables that Johnston used in his study as
the material. In fact, the boys tended to use the care orientation rather than the
justice orientation for their spontaneous and best solutions. . Daniels et al. attributed
the predominance of the care orientations in Hawaiian boys and girls to the cultural
context in which these youths are socialized. That is, Hawaiian culture,
characterized as emphasizing the importance of kindness, being agreeable and patient,
and seeking harmony with others and one's environment could influence the
Hawaiian youths' use of moral orientations. The findings indicate a possibility of
cultural influence on the use of moral orientations rather than gender differences.
Also, they reported differences in the use of the orientations according to the content
of fables. The participants were more likely to use the justice orientation for the
fable which is much more aggressive and threatening than the other fable. Thus, the
overall findings of the Daniels et al.'s study imply that cultural background and the
content of fables could affect the use of moral orientations.
Up to now, empirical studies on understanding fables and their morals have been
reviewed in this section. Some studies (Chia, 1993; Dorfman & Brewer, 1994; Jose,
1990) reported that even children as young as 7 years old are capable of
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understanding fables and of identifying morals from fables while other studies
claimed a great improvement in the ability of children aged between 9 to 14 years.
Also, there is evidence of differences in understanding fables and their morals across
various cultural, social backgrounds, or both (Daniels et al., 1995; Lewis, 1993;
Reinstein, 1983; Vipond & Hunt, 1984). Pillar (1983) and Lambrou (1988) show
developmental patterns in children's responses to fables in relation to the stage of
moral development, that originated in Piaget's work and were described by Kohlberg.
Lambrou also suggests that moral concepts such as "do not be foolish," "do help
others," and "do not lie" would be acquired at different points in the course of
development. With respect to gender differences in the use of moral orientations, the
findings are still controversial. Johnston (1988) found an influence of the content of
fables and gender differences in the use of moral orientations to solve dilemmas in
fables while Daniels et al. (1995) who replicated the study of Johnston reported that
there is no gender difference.
Taking account of the empirical studies examining moral reasoning with fables it is
demonstrated that the understanding of fables has developmental patterns as does
moral reasoning and that certain responses to fables seem to relate to the development
of moral reasoning. These empirical findings on fables in combination with a
reputation of Aesop's fables as a didactic story in almost every culture validate the
utility of using fables as a method for examining children's moral reasoning.
However, it should be noted that some factors such as the content of fables and
cultural influence could cause variation in the understanding of fables and their
morals.
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Also, several points should be considered in using the fables. First of all, because
characters in fables are mainly animals, individuals may be less likely to identify with
the characters than human characters. This may mean children do not identify fully
and therefore do not display their complete moral reasoning. On the other hand,
Walker (1989) found that individuals tend to use the rights orientation (the normative
and the fairness orientations) more than the care orientation (the utilitarian and the
ideal orientations) when they are asked to solve impersonal dilemmas whereas for
personal matters, they showed the reversed tendency. These differences between the
types of dilemmas were elicited from almost all the age groups of the sample the
range of which is between 5 to 13 years. Thus, iffables are generally perceived as
"impersonal," it is possible that individuals may be more likely to rely on their
rationality (i.e. the rights orientation) rather than the care orientation in order to make
a moral decision for the fables. While bearing in mind the limitations of using fables,
a further study has been planned to use fables as a method to explore moral reasoning
in order to corroborate the findings presented in the earlier chapters.
7.3 OUTLINE OF THE SECOND STUDY
The first experiment of the present study examined Kohlberg's theory of moral
reasoning through interviewing Korean and British children about Kohlberg's
hypothetical dilemmas. The results showed significant developmental trends in both
moral stages and orientations, cultural and gender differences in several sub-groups
with respect to moral orientations and the differences in the use of moral orientations
according to the content of dilemmas. Also the study found some of the Korean
children's responses were unable to be matched to Kohlberg's criteria judgments.
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Based on these findings, the second study is aimed at exploring two aspects in
particular; the applicability and insufficiency of Kohlberg' s theory of moral reasoning
to Korean children. The main question of the study is whether Kohlberg's theory of
moral reasoning as it was applied to his hypothetical dilemmas might also apply to
children's responses to fables. Do children show developmental trends and gender
differences in their understanding of fables and the morals embedded in them? Do
Korean children still show the same patterns of moral reasoning in responding to
fables as appeared in their responses to Kohlberg's dilemmas? Does the content of
fables affect children's understanding of fables and the use of moral orientations?
The research questions are described in detail in the next chapter.
The second study involves only Korean children as participants. As mentioned
earlier the empirical studies which were carried out in different cultures have already
indicated the general developmental trends in the responses to fables and their morals
(e.g. Chia, 1993: Dorfman & Brewer, 1994; Pillar, 1983). The findings of Chia
(1993) and Dorfman and Brewer (1994) support universal patterns of the
understanding of fables. Moreover, Pillar (1983) found developmental trends in
children's responses to fables in accordance with Kohlberg's sequential moral stages.
These findings suggest further investigation is needed on the general patterns of the
responses to fables in other cultures rather than Western cultures where most of the
studies were undertaken, in order to ascertain the universality of the general patterns.
Thus the second study focused on Korean children's understanding of fables and the
morals embedded in them which reflects their moral reasoning. In order to
correspond with the age range of participants in the first study, children aged 7, 10, 13
and 16 years participated in the second study.
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A set of questions concerning fables was compiled on the basis of the questionnaire
used in Chia's study (1993). Chia concentrated on examining belief in a "just
world" through children's judgment of the characters and events in fables. However,
the present study focuses on overall patterns of moral reasoning described by
Kohlberg rather than examining belief in a 'just world." Thus, new questions asking
children the reasons for their judgment on the characters and events in fables were
added to the original questions used in Chia's study. Moreover, in order to examine
developmental trends in the understanding of fables and their morals, the present
study was extended to the participants up to 16 years of age while Chia studied
children only up to 11 years old. The details of participants, the instrument and
procedure are described in the next chapter.
CHAPTER EIGHT
METHODOLOGY
8.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Several questions on the relation between children's understanding of fables and their
morals and children's background (age, gender, and academic level) and the content
of stories were proposed mainly concerning 4 parts; children's moral stages, their
usage of moral orientations, unscorable responses with Kohlberg's system, and
abilities to identify morals embedded in fables. The questions are as follows.
1. Development through moral stages;
i) Do children show an increase through the moral stages with age?
ii) Is there any gender difference in children's progression through the moral
stages?
iii) Is there any difference in children's progression through the moral stage
according to their academic level?
iv) Is there any interaction among these variables (age, gender and academic
level), which affects the development of moral stages?
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2. Usage of moral orientations
i) Does the usage of moral orientations differ according to age?
ii) Is there any difference between boys and girls in the usage ofmoral
orientations?
iii) Is there any difference in children's usage of moral orientations according
to their academic level?
iv) Is there any interaction among these variables (age, gender, and academic
level), which affects children's usage ofmoral orientations?
3. Unscorable responses
Are there any responses that are unscorable with Kohlberg's system due to
cultural uniqueness?
4. Ability to identify morals
i) Does children's ability to identify morals embedded in fables vary with
age?
ii) Is there any difference between boys and girls in their ability to identify
morals?
iii) Is there any differences in children's ability to identify morals according
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to their academic level?
iv) Is there any interaction among these variables (age, gender, and academic
level), which affects children's ability to identify morals?
8.2 PARTICIPANTS
A total of 160 Korean children participated in the present study. Equal numbers of
boys and girls (i.e. 20 for each gender group) were from each age group of7, 10, 13,
and 16 years old.
All the children had similar social economic background in order to minimize any
effect of SES on the understanding of fables and their morals. Children's SES were
assessed by means of their own statement of the educational level and the occupations
of their parents. All parents of the participants had been educated at least for 12
years and to university level, and most were engaged in "white collar" occupations.
The method of controlling for SES coincides with the method used in the first study.
Unlike in the first study (In the first study, only the children whose academic level
was either average or just above average were selected.), the academic level of the
children was taken into account in order to examine the relation between academic
level and the understanding of fables and morals. Children were divided into two
groups -the "above half' group and the "below half' group based on the academic
rank arranged through school examinations. However, it should be noted that the
children were not equally divided into the groups in terms of the amount. The
numbers of children in each sub-group are described in Table 8.2.1.
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Table 8.2.1 Subgroups of Participants
Age 7 (40) 10 (40) 13 (40) 16 (40) Total (160)
Gender Boys (20) Boys (20) Boys (20) Boys (20) Boys (80)
Academic level Above Below Abo. Bel. Abo. Bel. Abo. Bel. Abo. Bel.
(14) (6) (14) (6) (11) (9) (II) (9) °(50) (30) .
Gender Girls (20) Girls (20) Girls (20) Girls (20) Girls (80)
Academic level Above Below Abo. Bel. Abo. Bel. Abo. Bel. Abo. Bel.
(9) (11) (9) (11) (10) (10) (12) (8) (40) (40)
( ) = numbers ofparticipants
8.3 INSTRUMENT
Three fables from Aesop's fables were used for the experiment. The fables were
"The Ass Carrying Salt," "The Goose and the Golden Eggs," and "The Farmer and
the Vulture." The fables were selected according to the two criteria described in the
studies of Chia (1993) and Dorfman and Brewer (1994). They are a developmental
criterion and a rating criterion. In order to satisfy the developmental criterion, fables
which appeared the most frequently in books were selected through analysing the
contents of 14 fable books. The books analysed in the present study were drawn
from the National Library and popular book stores. According to the age guidelines
indicated on the books, the books were especially designed for young children aged 5
to 7 years old. Amongst approximately 130 fables, very few fables appeared in most
of the books. Thus the fables that appeared in at least seven books (that is, half of
the books) were selected. Those were only 24 fables. Also, six of them which
were featured in the primary school textbooks were eliminated in order to avoid the
influence of schooling on grasping the morals of the fables. Finally 18 fables, which
satisfied the rating criterion were selected.
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Regarding the rating criterion, three independent coders were asked to rate the fables
as to whether the tables had clear didactic points. They were also asked to assess
whether they thought the fables were suitable especially for young children aged 7
years. All the coders had obtained Master degree in child studies and practised in
the field of child education in Korea. They rated the fables on a three-point scale for
clarity of point. The fables rating a score of 1 were deemed to have a clear moral
message. A score of 2 was for the fables having a discernible, but not completely
clear, didactic point. A score of 3 indicated that the fables had no clear didactic
point or moral message. Seven of the 18 fables were given a score of 1 by all the
three coders, indicating that these fables have clear didactic points. These fables
were also thought to be suitable for 7 years old children.
Amongst them, three fables were randomly selected as the final set of materials for
the experiment and these fables were "The Ass Carrying Salt," "The Goose and the
Golden Eggs," and "The Farmer and the Vulture." These were taken from two
children books of "Aesop's fables (1993, 1996)" written in Korean language.
Each story contains 8-9 standardized questions to probe children's ability to generate
morals from fables and their judgment and reasons for their judgment concerning
story content such as characters and events. The base set of questions in the present
study were a modified version of the questions used in the study by Chia (1993). In
Chia's study, three yes/no questions, an open-ended question and a number of
questions were used in relation to children's understanding and evaluation of the
fables. The present study copied two yes/no questions and seven to eight open-
ended questions (see Appendix B). Children were required to answer two yes/no
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questions to ascertain whether they had ever heard the fable and whether the fable had
a moral. If they answered "Yes" to the latter question, they were asked an open-
ended question about what they thought the moral was. Depending on the number of
characters in the fable, the children were also asked either six or seven questions
relating to their preference for fable itself, the outcome and characters of the fable.
In addition to the scale questions in Chia's study, the present study went one step
further and asked children the reasons for their decision through providing open-
ended questions. Also, the present study also added two questions. One question
asked how important the children thought the moral was and the other asked how
would they like to change the content of fable if they could.
8.4 PROCEDURE
8.4.1 Administration
Administration was the same as that of the first study. Oral interviews were
conducted with all the children in the schools they were attending. All the
interviews were administered individually, tape-recorded, and transcribed afterwards
for scoring. It took approximately 30 minutes for an interview. Although the
questions for the interview were standardized, not every interview rigidly followed
the question set. Some alternations were allowed in asking questions in
consideration of circumstances.
8.4.2 Scoring and coding
8.4.2.1 Scoring and Codingfor Moral Stages and Orientations
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The procedure of scoring the children's responses to fables in the present study traced
that of Walker et al. (1Y87) and Walker & Moran (1991). In order to score the real-
life dilemmas they used Colby and Kohlberg's manual (1987) after a slight adaptation
since the manual is keyed to particular dilemmas and issues.
Because of the lack of explicit criterion judgment for the responses to fables, the
scoring was carried out relying more on general stage structure definitions for each
criterion judgment than on particular (i.e., dilemma specific) critical indicators.
Thus, scores were assigned for every moral judgment that matched a stage structure
definition for a criterion judgment in the manual, regardless of the dilemma and issue.
For instance, a child responded to the Ass's story that "whoever neglected their duties
should be punished in some way, otherwise everyone starts neglecting their duties and
it causes chaos." This response can be scored stage 3 using the punishment issue,
the law norms and the good group consequences element according to the criterion
judgment in Officer Brown's dilemma, #CJ 14. There is another response to the
Ass's story; "Ass should listen to the owner, just as we listen to our teachers, because
he is the boss." The above response could match the criterion judgment in Joe's
dilemma, # CJ 1, stage 1 using the authority issue, the authority norm, the obeying
element.
According to the manual, the weight of issue scores is different in computing the
moral stages. Scores for chosen issues are given greater weight than those for non-
chosen issues. However, in the present study, there is no distinction between chosen
issues and nonchosen issues and all the responses were given the scores of chosen
issues since the fables do not contain dilemmas and hence there is no need to choose
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an Issue. The rest of the scoring procedure for moral stage and orientation coincides
with that of the first study which followed the manual (see section 4.4.2 in Chapter
IV).
8.4.2.2 Codingfor Morals Identificationfor Fables
Children were asked whether they thought that the each fable has a moral and if so to
state what the moral was. The morals given by the children were categorised
according to the coding system based on Dorfman's study (1989, as cited in Chia's
study, 1993). In the present study, a new category called "mixed responses" was
added for children who gave more than two morals which were categorised into
different classes respectively. The definitions and coding criteria were described as
follows. The examples were taken from the responses to the story of "Ass Carrying
Salt" in the present study.
Prototypical Responses
Abstract Responses
Responses that were categorised as abstract are identical with or approximate to the
moral of a fable which is indicated in a printed text.
Example: Do not shirk your duty.
Concrete Responses
Concrete responses are different from abstract responses only in that reference is
made to a concrete agent, a concrete action or both.
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Example: Do not try to make your burden lighter like the Ass.
Non-prototypical Responses
Overgeneralisation
Because of overgeneralizing the action resulting in the fable outcome, these responses
are so general that they could apply not only to the relevant fable but also to any
number of stories containing similar actions. They may or may not be morally
significant.
Example: Do not be greedy
Undergeneralisation
These responses are often too specific and as a result, fail to generalize the action
resulting in the outcome. They may not be morally significant.
Example: The ass cannot always carry light things
Event Summaries
Event summaries describe all or some part of the action, events or characters in the
story. Consequently, there is no moral import.
Example: The ass carried heavier burden at the end.
Anomalous Responses
Anomalous responses are uninterpretable or have no obvious relation to the story
content. In the present study, the responses which are probably morally significant
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but far from the morals indicted in the printed text are included in this category.
Example: Do not step into water recklessly.
Mixed Responses
The mixed responses involve those that can fall into more than two categories for a
fable.
Example: Do not try to take the easiest way or apply one method to
everything.
All the responses were assigned to one of the above categories.
8.5 A Reliability Test of the Present Study
An interrater reliability test was conducted for the present study. As in the first study
(see section 4.5.2 in Chapter IV), the second rater who has Korean as mother tongue
Figure 8.5.1 The Correlation between the Two Raters in terms of Children's WASs
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Table 8.5.1 The Agreement between the Two Raters
for Children's use of Moral Orientations
Children 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
First Rater u u f f f e n f e u n u n e n e
Second Rater u u f f e n f e e n u n e n e
n = The Normative Orientation e = Egoistic u = Utilitarian i = Ideal f=Faimess
The emboldened letters denote disagreement between the raters.
Table 8.5.2 The Agreement between the Two Raters for Children's Ability to Identify Morals
Children 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
First Rater U e C U 0 U 0 0 a a c U a 0 a a a a a 0 a a a a c a
Second
Rater
u e e U 0 U 0 0 a a u U a c a a a a a 0 a a a a c a 0
a = Abstract moral c = Concrete 0 = Overgenerlization u = Undergeneralization
e = Event summary n = Anomalous m=Mixed
The emboldened letters denote disagreement between the raters.
and holds a Master degree in psychology scored 20 interviews in order to examine
reliability of the first rater scoring children's moral stage, orientations and abilities to
identify morals embedded in fables. In order to strengthen the reliability, almost
same numbers of interviews were randomly selected from each stage. Concerning
moral stages, there was 75% perfect agreement between the two raters, with showing
a high reliability for WASs (r = .98). Figure 8.5.1 describes the correlation between
the raters scoring children's moral stages.
Concerning moral orientations, 20 moral orientations, one from each interview scored
by the second rater were selected at random as did in the first study. Since Cohen's
kappa was used for the reliability test, agreement between the two raters was high,
= .875. Table 8.5.1 indicates the children's use of moral orientations scored by the
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two raters. Agreement between the two raters sconng the children's ability to
identify morals was also computed using Cohen's kappa with 27 morals that children
stated, one moral from each interview. In order to strengthen the reliability test,
more or less equal numbers of morals were randomly selected from each age group
and each fables. That is, six to seven morals from each age group and nine morals
from each fable were selected. Table 8.5.2 shows the agreement between the two
raters concerning scoring the morals that the children stated. As a result, k = .79,
thus the agreement between the raters was high.
CHAPTER NINE
RESULTS
Korean children's spontaneous responses to fables were analysed in order to examine
children's understanding of fables and their morals in connection with Kohlberg's
moral reasoning. In other words, children's moral stages, use of moral orientations,
and ability to draw morals embedded in fables were compared across their
background such as age, gender and academic level. As to the moral stages and
orientations, this chapter describes the results obtained from statistical analyses
following the form of Chapter V, presenting the results of the first study. Also, this
chapter, like Chapter V, deals with the unscorable responses of the children. In brief,
the statistical analyses of children's moral stages, use of moral orientations, ability to
draw morals embedded in fables, and responses unscorable with Kohlberg's system
will be presented here followed by a discussion chapter.
9.1 MORAL STAGE
Differences in moral stages (WASs) of children in different groups according to their
age, gender and academic level were statistically examined. According to Table
9.1.1, the range of means and standard deviations of WASs (moral stages) of the
participants in the present study are similar to those of the first study.
Also, it seems that there are only age differences in moral stages but not gender
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Table 9.1.1 Meansand Standard Deviations forWASs and Moral Stages
Age Gender Academic level Mean S.D. N
7 Boys Above 166.64 [1/2] 35.69 14
Below 163.83 [112] 28.78 6
Children 165.80 [112] 33.03 20
Girls Above 172.56 [112] 38.09 9
Below 168.70 [112] 30.71 10
Children 170.53 [112] 33.47 19
Overall 168.10 [112] 32.90 39
10 Boys Above 227.93 [2] 18.70 14
Below 227.67 [2] 16.55 6
Children 227.85 [2] 17.64 20
Girls Above 219.44 [2] 29.75 9
Below 235.09 [2(3)] 25.03 11
Children 228.05 [2] 27.68 20
Overall 227.95 [2] 22. 40
91
13 Boys Above 260.45 [2/3] 25.07 11
Below 268.33 [2/3] 33.24 9
Children 264.00 [2/3] 28.50 20
Girls Above 286.30 [3(2)] 21.82 10
Below 267.20 [2/3] 28.44 10
Children 276.75 (3(2)] 26.55 20
Overall 270.38 [213] 27.94 40
16 Boys Above 307.09 [3] 18.99 11
Below 312.11 [3] 15.41 9
Children 307.09 [3] 17.21 20
Girls Above 311.75 [3] 18.53 12
Below 314.25 [3] 20.78 8
Children 312.55 [3] 18.96 20
Overall 311.05 [3] 17.95 40
] indicates mean of moral stages.
difference nor academic achievement level difference, as in the first study. In order
to ascertain whether there are differences in children's moral stages, the way to
examine the children's moral stage was the same as that used in the first study;
ANOVA was used to examine mean differences in WASs in combination with Scheffe
test, a post-hoc test, at p < .05 since it was presumed that WASs showed more precise
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Table 9.1.2 Analysis of Variance; Differences in WASs
F DF Significant
Within & residual 144
Age 201.99 3 .00
Gender 1.44 1 .23
Academic level .02 1 .88
Age by Gender .52 3 .75
Age by Academic level .38 3 .67
Gender by Academic level .18 1 .67
Age by Gender by Academic level 1.08 3 .36
moral scores of individuals (see 5.4.2). The range of WASs, from 100 to 361, is
equivalent to the range of moral stages from stage 1 to. 3(4). As expected, the
statistical analyses showed that only age differences in moral stages are significant,
F(3, 158) = 201.99, P < .001. Neither gender nor academic level affects the
differences in moral stages in this sample. Also, no interaction among variables was
indicated (see Table 9.1.2). That is, the children showed a strong tendency to
increase their moral stages with age regardless of their gender or academic level.
According to the post-hoc tests, all the differences among the age groups were
significant (p < .05). Therefore, the present study strongly supports the claim of
moral development with age.
9.2 MORAL ORIENTATION
In the first study, it was found that children varied in their use of the moral
orientations in various patterns according to their background such as age, culture,
and gender, and the content of the story. In order to ascertain whether the above
findings, especially in terms of the influence of age, gender and the content of the
story, can apply to other situations, the present study examined children's use of the
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orientations for fables. It should be noted that cultural differences in the use of
moral orientations between Koreans and the British that were revealed in the first
study were not examined in this study but the differences of academic level in
Koreans examined since the present study concerns only Korean children. However,
the present study examined whether children's academic level could affect their use of
moral orientations, which the first study did not take into account.
Like the first study, the present study uses a hierarchical loglinear analyses with
backward elimination unless crosstabs analyses of the two-way associations revealed
unsatisfactorily low expected frequencies, i.e. expected frequencies less than 1 or
more than 20% expected frequencies less than 5 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). In
addition, chi-square was used as a post-hoc test, if necessary. These statistical
methods enable to identify factors and interactions among factors, which affect the
use of moral orientations. There were no specific hypotheses about how the use of
moral orientations would vary. The analyses were conducted to explore whether any
consistent patterns between the first and the present studies existed.
9.2.1 The Patterns of Orientations in Fable I, The Ass's Story
The children's responses to the Ass's story were analysed in terms of the usage of five
moral orientations. The orientations were considered separately in order to compare
whether the children used the orientations in different ways according to their age,
gender, and academic level.
First of all, the children mentioned the orientations In different frequency. As
indicated in Figure 9.2.1, the normative orientation (49%) was mentioned much more
often than the other orientations. The other orientations were referred to in the range
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Figure 9.2.1 Percent Usage of Orientations for the Ass's Story
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of 10% to 23%. The numbers of individuals mentioning each orientation for the
Ass's story is presented in Table 9.2.1.
As far as the normative, the egoistic, the ideal, and the fairness orientations were
concerned, hierarchical loglinear analyses yield a final model for the use of each
orientation showing only an effect of age regardless of culture and gender. The
model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2 (24, N= 160) = 20.73, p = .65 for the
use of the normative orientation; likelihood ratio X2 (24, N = 160) = 15.34, p = .91 for
the use of the egoistic orientation; likelihood ratio X2 (24, N = 160) = 17.35, p = .83
for the use of the ideal orientation; likelihood ratio X2 (24, N = 160) = 14.76, P = .93
for the use of the fairness orientation.
Concerning the normative orientation, a post-hoc comparison revealed that 7 year old
children mentioned the orientation less than the children in the other age groups
(likelihood X2 (3, N = 159) = 13.35, p < .005). The children aged 10, 13, and 16
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Table 9.2.1 The Number of Individuals Who Mentioned Orientations for the Ass's Story
Normative Egoistic Utilitarian Ideal Fairness
7 years Boys Above (14) 4 3 3 0 1
Below (6) 0 1 1 0 0
Children (20) 4 4 4 0 1
Girls Above (9) 2 2 0 0 0
Below (11) 4 4 0 0 0
Children (20) 6 6 0 0 0
Overall (40) 10 10 4 0 1
10 years Boys Above (14) 9 8 2 1 1
Below (6) 4 4 1 1 0
Children (20) 13 12 3 2 I
Girls Above (9) 4 4 4 0 0
Below (II) 5 7 I I 0
Children (20) 9 II 5 1 0
Overall (40) 22 23 8 3 1
13 years Boys Above (II) 7 I 2 2 3
Below (9) 5 2 1 2 2
Children (20) 12 3 3 4 5
Girls Above (10) 6 0 3 2 I
Below (10) 6 0 I 2 I
Children (20) 12 0 4 4 2
Overall (40) 24 3 7 8 7
16 years Boys Above (II) 8 0 0 0 4
Below (9) 7 0 I 2 2
Children (20) 15 0 I 2 6
Girls Above (12) 6 0 9 3 3
Below (8) 2 0 3 0 2
Children (20) 8 0 12 3 5
Overall (40) 23 0 13 5 11
( ) indicates a total number of children in each sub-group.
years used the orientation more or less at the similar level to one another. In
particular, they tended to emphasize the virtues of working hard and fulfilment of
duties. Similarly, the older children were more likely than the younger children to
use the ideal, and the fairness orientations. The older children (aged 13 and 16
years) referred to both the ideal (likelihood ratio X2 (1, N= 160) = 7.43, P < .01) and
the fairness orientations (likelihood ratio X2 (1, N= 160) = 16.55, P < .001) more than
the younger children (aged 7 and 10 years). That is, the older children justified
giving punishment to a wrongdoer in terms of reforming their wrongdoing (the ideal
orientation) or a kind of compensation for the wrongdoing (the fairness orientation).
On the other hand, they justified the ass's negligence of its duty through identifying
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themselves with the ass which might be tired of always carrying heavy loads. This
role-taking response also implies that the children have a tendency to orient toward
fairness.
As opposed to the use of the other three orientations, the egoistic orientation was
favoured by the younger children (7 and 10 years old) more than the older children
(13 and 16 years old) (likelihood ratio X2 (1, N = 160) = 36.58, p < .001). For
instance, the younger children were more likely to give reasons for working hard in
terms of avoiding punishment. Unlike the younger children, the older children rarely
mentioned it. Amongst the younger children, 10 year old children unexpectedly
used the egoistic orientation more than the 7 year old children.
Concerning the utilitarian orientation, the statistical analysis identified a minimal
model including an effect of academic level and interaction between age and gender.
The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2 (14, N = 160) = 11.07, p = .68.
Eliminating either effect produced a significant increase in deviance: academic level,
likelihood ratio X2 (1, N = 160) = 4.11, p < .05; age X gender, likelihood ratio X2 (3, N
= 160) = 18.25, p < .001. With respect to the interaction between age and gender,
girls at the age of 16 considered advantages and disadvantages of an act for
individuals or groups distinctly more than the children in any other groups (Fisher's
exact two-tailed test, p < .001, N = 160: The expected frequencies less than 5 are over
20% so that Fisher's exact two-tailed test was used). For instance, a 16 year-old girl
stated that we should not shirk work otherwise it could damage the functions of
society. In the use of the utilitarian orientation children also showed academic level
differences. The children in the above average academic level group tended to
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Table 9.2.2 Differences in the Use of Moral Orientations for the Ass's Story
Orientations Age Differences Gender Differences Academic Level Differences
Normative Youngest < The Others none none
Egoistic Younger> Older none none
Utilitarian Boys < Girls at the Age of 16 Above> Below
Ideal Younger < Older none none
Fairness Younger < Older none none
mention the utilitarian orientation more than those In the below average group
(likelihood ratio X2 (1, N= 160) = 4.11, P < .05).
In summary, age seemed the most influential factor in the use of most orientations.
The older children used the normative, the ideal, and the fairness orientations more
than the younger children while the latter were more likely to consider egoistic
consequences than the former. Regarding the utilitarian orientation, 16 year-old girls
mentioned the orientation more than the other children. Also, children in the above
average academic group referred to the utilitarian orientation more than those in the
other group. Table 9.2.2 summarizes the differences in the use of the orientations
according to age, gender and academic achievement level concerning the Ass's story.
9.2.2 The Patterns of Orientations in Fable II, The Golden Eggs' Story
Differences in children's usage of each moral orientation for the Golden Eggs' story
were examined according to their age, gender, and academic level. The usage of the
orientations varied in the range from 13% to 36% (Figure 9.2.2). As with the Ass's
story, the normative orientation was favoured the most for children's moral reasoning.
That is, many children showed normative concern, for example by mentioning that the
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Figure 9.2.2 Percent Usage of Orientations for the Golden Eggs' Story
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farmer was so greedy that he should be blamed and deserved punishment. However
the gap between the use of the normative orientation and the other orientations was
not as wide as that in the Ass's Story. Table 9.2.3 describes the number of
individuals who mentioned orientations for this story.
According to the statistical analyses, there are vanous differences in the use of
orientations across age, gender and academic level for the Golden Eggs' story. With
respect to the normative orientation, the hierarchicalloglinear analysis yielded a final
model for the use of the orientation showing only an effect of age regardless of
culture and gender. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2 (24, N =
160) = 16.00, P = .89. The youngest children mentioned the orientation the least
whereas the oldest children used it the most (likelihood ratio X2 (3, N = 160) = 16.56,
P < .001).
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Table 9.2.3 The Number of Individuals Who Mentioned Orientations
for the Golden Eggs' Story
Normative Egoistic Utilitarian Ideal Fairness
7 years Boys Above (14) 2 4 4 0 0
Below (6) 2 2 2 0 0
Children (20) 4 6 6 0 0
Girls Above (9) 0 8 1 0 0
Below (11) 1 3 2 0 0
Children (20) I 11 3 0 0
Overall (40) 5 17 9 0 0
10 years Boys Above (14) 6 2 4 1 0
Below (6) 2 2 1 2 2
Children (20) 8 4 5 3 2
Girls Above (9) 4 4 3 2 0
Below (11) 4 2 3 2 2
Children (20) 8 6 6 4 2
Overall (40) 16 10 11 7 4
13 years Boys Above (11) 4 0 3 0 7
Below (9) 4 2 3 2 0
Children (20) 8 2 6 2 7
Girls Above (10) 4 0 I 1 2
Below (10) 2 0 2 1 1
Children (20) 6 0 3 2 3
Overall (40) 14 2 9 4 10
16 years Boys Above (11) 5 0 0 2 3
Below (9) 4 0 1 4 0
Children (20) 9 0 I 6 3
Girls Above (12) 7 0 4 5 4
Below (8) 5 0 4 2 1
Children (20) 12 0 8 7 5
Overall (40) 21 0 9 13 8
( ) indicates a total number of children in each sub-group.
Concerning the egoistic orientation, the statistical analysis generated a minimal model
including the effect of age and the interaction between gender and academic level.
The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2 (9, N = 160) = 8.70, P = .46.
Eliminating either effect produced a significant increase in deviance: age, likelihood
ratio X2 (3, N = 160) = 45.85, P < .001; gender x academic level, likelihood ratio X2 (1,
N = 160) = 11.90, P < .001. According to a post-hoc test, younger children
obviously used the egoistic orientation more than older children (likelihood ratio X2
(1, N = 160) = 38.02, p < .001). For instance, a 7 year-old child stated that you lose
your friends if you are greedy. Furthermore, the post-hoc test showed that the girls
IX. Results 221
in the above average academic level group used this orientation more than those in the
below average academic level group (likelihood ratio X2 (1, N = 80) = 5.78, p < .05).
In the use of the utilitarian orientation, a hierarchical loglinear analysis identified a
final model only indicating an interaction between age and gender. The model was a
reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2 (16, N = 160) = 11.55, p = .77. According to
Fisher's exact two-tailed test, a post-hoc test, at the age of 16, girls were more likely
to use the orientation than the boys through mentioning that an individual's
greediness could get a group into trouble (p < .05, N = 40).
Concerning the ideal orientation, the statistical analysis generated a minimal model
including an effect of age and an interaction between gender and academic level.
The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2 (18, N = 160) = 4.20, P = 1.
Eliminating either effect produced a significant increase in deviance: age, likelihood
ratio X2 (3, N = 160) = 21.48, p < .001; gender X academic level, likelihood ratio X2 (1,
N = 160) = 5.25, P < .05. Although not many children referred to the orientation, the
children in the oldest group certainly tended to use the orientation, which is related
with maintaining social harmony or the dignity of life, more than the children in the
other age groups. Especially, no one in the youngest group mentioned the ideal
orientation (likelihood ratio X2 (3, N = 160) = 21.48, p < .001). Concerning the
interaction between gender and academic level, only the boys in the below average
group tended to refer to the orientation more than those in the other groups (Fisher's
exact two-tailed test p < .05, N = 80). However, when each age group was examined,
there was almost no difference between the two academic groups in all of the four age
groups. Thus it is doubtful whether the academic level difference in the use of the
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ideal orientation really exists among the boys.
With respect to the fairness orientation, a hierarchical loglinear analysis indicated
only an interaction between age and academic level as a final model. The model was
a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2 (16, N = 160) = 13.12, p = .66. That is, the
children in the above average academic group showed an age tendency whereas there
seems to be no substantial change across age in the below average academic level
group (likelihood ratio X2 (3, N = 160) = 16.51, p < .001). A post-hoc test revealed
that, only in the above average academic group, the older children were more likely
than the younger children to refer to fairness (likelihood ratio X2 (1, N = 90) = 26.56,
P < .001). Furthermore, differences in -academic level in the use of fairness
orientation were found in the 10 year olds and the older groups (the 13 and 16 year
old group) respectively although the use of the orientation generally increased with
age. At the age of 10, the children in the below academic level group used the
orientation more than those in the other group (Fisher's exact two-tailed test p < .05,
N = 40) while the older group showed the opposite direction of the academic level
differences (likelihood ratio X2 (1, N = 80) = 12.175, P < .001).
Table 9.2.4 summarizes differences in the use of the fairness orientation according to
age, gender and academic level. The age differences in this story were similar to
those in the Ass's story. However the tendency for the use of the fairness orientation
to increase with age, which the whole group showed in the Ass's story, was found
only in the above average academic group. The 16 year old girls used the utilitarian
orientation more than the others in this story as well as in the Ass's story. Lastly,
some sub-groups showed interactions between academic differences and age and/or
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Table 9.2.4 Differences in the Use of Moral Orientations for the Golden Eggs' Story
Orientations Age Differences
Normative Increase with Age
Gender
Differences
none
Academic Level Differences
none
Egoistic Decrease with Age Girls in the Above Group> the Others
Utilitarian Boys < Girls at the Age of 16, none
Ideal Increase with Age Boys in the Below Group> the Others
Fairness Younger < Older
in the Above
Average
Academic Group
none the Above < the Below At the Age of 10
the Above> the Below in the Older Group
gender differences in the use of the egoistic, the ideal, and the fairness orientations.
9.2.3 The Patterns of Orientations in Fable III, The Vulture's Story
The frequncy of mentioning the moral orientations for the Vulture's story varies as
shown in Figure 9.2.3. Unlike the usage of orientations in the previous two stories,
Figure 9.2.3 Percent Usage of Orientations for the Vulture's Story
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Table 9.2.5 The Number of Individuals Who Mentioned Orientations for the Vulture's Story
Normative Egoistic Utilitarian Ideal Fairness
7 years Boys Above (14) 1 7 4 1 1
Below (6) 1 2 1 0 I
Children (20) 2 9 5 I 2
Girls Above (9) 2 3 I I 3
Below (11) 2 5 I 0 2
Children (20) 4 8 2 I 5
Overall (40) 6 17 7 2 7
10 years Boys Above (14) I 4 5 5 14
Below (6) 0 1 4 1 6
Children (20) I 5 9 6 20
Girls Above (9) 0 0 I 4 9
Below (II) 1 3 6 3 7
Children (20) I 3 7 7 16
Overall (40) 2 8 16 13 36
13 years Boys Above (11) 0 0 0 3 10
Below (9) 2 0 2 2 8
Children (20) 2 0 2 5 18
Girls Above (10) I 0 2 4 5
Below (10) 3 I 2 2 10
Children (20) 4 1 4 6 15
Overall (40) 6 1 6 11 33
16 years Boys Above (II) 1 0 I 5 9
Below (9) 1 0 I 4 8
Children (20) 2 0 2 9 17
Girls Above (12) I 0 6 10 10
Below (8) 2 0 1 4 4
Children (20) 3 0 7 14 14
Overall (40) 5 0 9 23 31
children used the fairness orientation distinctly more than the other orientations. The
percentage of the use of the fairness orientation reached 67% while the other
orientations were referred to within the range from 11 to 31%. Table 9.2.5 presents
the numbers of individuals who mentioned orientations for this story.
When the differences in the use of orientations according to children's background
were examined, various patterns of differences were shown in the use of all the
orientations except the normative orientation. The statistical analysis showed no
difference in the use of the normative orientation across age, gender and academic
level.
IX. Results 225
With respect to the use of the egoistic orientation, the statistical analysis yielded a
final model including the effect of age and the interaction between gender and
academic level. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2 (18, N = 160) =
6.00, p = 1.00. Eliminating either effect produced a significant increase in deviance:
age, likelihood ratio X2 (3, N = 160) = 38.08, p < .001; gender x academic level,
likelihood ratio X2 (1, N = 160) = 5.56, P < .05. The egoistic orientation - e.g. we
should help others in order to get a return or to avoid punishment - was used most
frequently at the age of 7, and rapidly dropped afterwards. Thus the 13 and the 16
year old children rarely mentioned the egoistic orientation. Also, the girls in the
above average academic level group used the orientation less than those in the other
group.
In the use of the utilitarian orientation, a hierarchicalloglinear analysis indicated only
the interaction between age and academic level as a final model. The model was a
reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2 (16, N = 160) = 16.90, p = .39. The age difference
was found to be significant only in the below average academic level group.
According to a post-hoc test, in the below average level group, the 10 year old
children used the orientation more than the other children (Fisher's exact two-tailed
test p < .001, N = 70). The 10 year old children in the above average academic level
group also used the orientation relatively less than those in the below average level
group (likelihood ratio X2 (1, N = 40) = 4.40, p < .05).
With respect to the ideal orientation, the hierarchical loglinear analysis identified a
final model for the use of the orientation showing only an effect of age regardless of
culture and gender. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2 (24, N =
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160) = 18.40, p = .78. The use of the ideal orientation, for instance, stating that we
should help others for conscience's sake, increased with age, especially at the age of
10 and 16 (likelihood ratio X2 (3, N = 160) = 29.21, P < .001).
Concerning the use of the fairness orientation, the statistical analysis yielded a final
model including two types of interaction between age and gender, and between age
and academic level. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2 (8, N = 160)
= 10.96, p = .20. Eliminating either effect produced a significant increase in
deviance: age x gender, likelihood ratio X2 (3, N = 160) = 8.27, p < .05; age x
academic level, likelihood ratio X2 (3, N = 160) = 12.16, p < .01. A post-hoc test
showed that, although the use of the fairness orientation rapidly increased at the age
of 10 and maintained the same level of the use up to the age of 16. At the ages of 10,
13 and 16, the boys' use of the orientation increased more rapidly than that of the girls
(likelihood ratio X2 (1, N = 120) = 6.23, p < .05). Also, at the age of 10, the children
at the above average academic level used the orientation more than those at the below
average academic level (Fisher's exact two-tailed test p < .05, N = 40).
Table 9.2.6 Differences in the Use of Moral Orientations for the Vulture's Story
Orientations
Normative
Egoistic
Age Differences
none
Decrease with Age
Gender Differences Academic Level Differences
none none
Girls in the Above Group < the Others
Utilitarian
Ideal
Fairness
the 10 Year Old Group> the
Others in the Below Average
Academic Group
Increase with Age
Increase with Age but Boys> Girls,
at the Ages of 10, 13, and 16
none
none
the Above < the Below
at the Age of 10
none
the Above> the Below
at the Age of 10
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In sum, the children showed similar patterns of age differences in the use of the
egoistic, the ideal, and the fairness orientations as in the other two stories but no age
difference in the use of the normative orientation. Various interactions between age,
gender and academic level were observed in the use of the egoistic, the utilitarian and
the fairness orientations (see Table 9.2.6).
9.2.4 The Patterns of Orientations in the Three Fables as a Whole
This section shows the children's use of moral orientations when the three stories
were considered as a whole. The children expressed their moral reasoning for the
three stories through using the moral orientations in the 'range from 39 to 72 %
(Figure 9.2.4).
Compared with the percentage of use of orientations in the first study, the children in
the present study did not use the orientations as much as in the first study especially
Figure 9.2.4 Percent Usage of Orientations for the Three stories as a Whole
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the egoistic, the utilitarian, and the ideal orientations. In the present study, the
children used the normative orientation (71%) the most and then the fairness
orientation (69%). The egoistic, the utilitarian, and the ideal orientations were
referred to by 39%, 45%, and 41% of the children respectively. When the stories
were considered separately, the children showed some differences in the amount of
the use of certain orientations across stories. For instance, only a few children
referred to the fairness orientation for the Ass's and the Golden Eggs' stories while
almost 67% of the children used the orientation for the Vulture's story. The first
study also indicated different numbers of children across the stories with respect to
the use of moral orientations and suggested the fluctuation of the usage of moral
orientations according to the content of stories. Not only the content of the stories but
also the background factors such as age, gender, academic level seemed to influence
the use of moral orientations. The number of individuals who mentioned
orientations for the three stories as a whole in each sub-group are described in Table
9.2.7.
With respect to the normative and the egoistic orientations, hierarchical loglinear
analyses yield a final model for the use of each orientation showing only an effect of
age regardless of culture and gender. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood
ratio X2 (24, N = 160) = 13.51, p = .96 for the use of the normative orientation;
likelihood ratio X2 (24, N = 160) = 15.06, p = .92 for the use of the egoistic
orientation. In general, the use of the normative orientation (likelihood ratio X2 (3, N
= 160) = 23.22, p < .001) increased with age whereas the use of the egoistic
orientation decreased with age (likelihood ratio X2 (3, N = 160) = 97, p < .001).
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Table 9.2.7 The Number of Individuals Who Mentioned Orientations
for the Stories as a Whole
Normative Egoistic Utilitarian Ideal Fairness
7 years Boys Above (14) 6 9 6 1 2
Below (6) 2 4 3 0 1
Children (20) 8 13 9 1 3
Girls Above (9) 4 8 2 1 3
Below (11) 5 7 2 0 2
Children (20) 9 15 4 1 5
Overall (40) 17 23 13 2 8
10 years Boys Above (14) 12 10 8 7 14
Below (6) 5 5 4 3 6
Children (20) 17 15 12 10 20
Girls Above (9) 6 8 5 5 9
Below (11) 7 8 8 4 7
Children (20) 13 16 13 9 16
Overall (40) 30 31 25 19 36
13 years Boys Above (11) 8 1 4 4 10
Below (9) 6 2 4 5 8
Children (20) 14 3 8 9 18
Girls Above (10) 8 0 4 4 5
Below (10) 8 1 4 3 10
Children (20) 16 1 8 7 15
Overall (40) 30 4 16 16 33
16 years Boys Above (11) 10 0 1 7 9
Below (9) 8 0 2 6 9
Children (20) 18 0 3 13 18
Girls Above (12) 10 0 11 12 10
Below (8) 8 0 4 4 6
Children (20) 18 0 15 16 16
Overall (40) 36 0 18 29 34
Concerning the use of the utilitarian orientation, a hierarchical loglinear analysis
indicated only an interaction between age and gender as a final model. The model
was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2 (16, N = 160) = 14.45, p = .56. The age
tendency was observed in connection with gender differences as shown in the Ass's
and the Golden Eggs' stories. At the age of 16, only a few boys used the orientation
whereas the 16 year old girls tended to mention the orientation more than the other
children. Consequently, the girls used the orientation much more than the boys at
the age of 16 (likelihood ratio X2 (1, N= 40) = 15.65, p < .00l).
In the use of the ideal orientation, the statistical analysis yielded a final model
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Table 9.2.8 Differences in the Use of Moral Orientations for the Stories as a Whole
Orientations
Normative
Egoistic
Age Differences
Increase with age
Decrease with age
Gender Differences
none
none
Academic
Differences
none
none
Level
Utilitarian Boys < Girls at the Age of 16 none
Ideal Increase with age Girls in the Above Group> the Others
Fairness Increase with age none The Above Group at the
Age of 10 > the Others
including an effect of age and an interaction between gender and academic level.
The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2 (18, N = 160) = 10.92, P = .90.
Eliminating either effect produced a significant increase in deviance: age, likelihood
ratio X2 (3, N = 160) = 44.75, P < .001; gender x academic level, likelihood ratio X2 (1,
N= 160) = 5.31, p < .05. That is, the children's use of the ideal orientation increased
with age and the girls at the above average academic group were more likely than the
boys at the same academic level to use the orientation.
Concerning the fairness orientation, the statistical analysis yielded a final model
indicating an interaction between age and academic level. The model was a
reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2 (16, N = 160) = 20.10, P = .22. Although the use
of the fairness orientation rapidly increased at the age of 10 and maintained the same
level of the use afterwards, at the age of 10, the children in the above average
academic level group used the orientation more than those in the other academic
groups (likelihood ratio X2 (3, N = 160) = 11.94, p < .01).
In summary, the children mentioned orientations III different amounts across the
stories. It seems that the content of the story influences the children's use of moral
IX Results 231
orientations. However, age tendencies of the children's usage of orientations were
consistent, regardless of the content of the stories. The older children referred to the
normative, the ideal, and the fairness orientations more than the younger children
while the use of the egoistic orientation decreased with age. Regarding the
utilitarian orientation, the girls at the age of 16 used the orientation more than the
others. Some sub-groups showed academic level differences in the use of ideal and
fairness orientations when the three stories were considered as a whole.
9.3 UNSCORABLE RESPONSES
The children in the present study using fables made some responses which were
unable to be matched to Kohlberg's system. In line with the claim of other studies
(e.g. Boyes & Walker, 1988; Dien, 1982; Iwasa, 1992; Ma, 1988b, 1992; Shweder et
al., 1990; Snarey, 1985; Tietjen & Walker, 1985) that Kohlberg's theory of moral
judgment has limitations since he missed or misunderstood some concepts peculiar to
non-Western cultures, the unscorable responses in the present study also imply that
there are some concepts which affect Koreans' moral reasoning that Kohlberg did not
grasp well. Some of these unscorable concepts of Korean children such as "pure
conscience" and "reconciliation," which the first study using Kohlberg's dilemma
found, could not' be revealed in the present study using fables, probably because the
content of fables was insufficient to let the children express those concepts.
However, the present study showed some unscorable concepts such as restricted-
simple sympathy, chung and collectivism, which the first study has already found.
Furthermore, the present study found other unscorable responses such as "the respect
for all living things," which was not found in the first study. The examples of
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unscorable responses are presented below.
There are examples of the 7 year old Korean children's responses on the basis of the
restricted-simple sympathy.
"The fanner was bad. Because he killed the poor goose." [a response to the Golden
Eggs' story]
"He (the fanner) should not kill the goose because dying is sad." [the Golden Eggs'
story]
"We should help others because it is sad ifsomeone died." [the Vulture's story]
The exmaples below are the responses based on physical consequences;
"We should protect animals because we need meat...and we will be bored if there is no
animal."
"He should help the vulture otherwise it would scratch him with its claws."
These examples indicate that 7 year old Korean children tended to focus not only on
the physical consequences but also emotional consequences - i.e. the restricted-simple
sympathy - in order to make a moral decision in the study using dilemmas. The
responses based on the restricted-simple sympathy were not able to be scored with
Kohlberg's system since he did consider only the physical consequences for young
children's moral reasoning.
Another type of unscorable responses is the responses concerning the respect for life,
even that of animals. It seems that children at the age of 13 begin to reveal the
concept of the respect for life and those at the age of 16 clearly express the concept.
There are examples of the responses to the Golden Eggs' and the Vulture's stories
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showing the concept of the respect for life.
"I don't like the farmer. He is bad because he killed the innocent goose just for his
greediness." (age 13)
"He was good because he saved a life. You shouldn't kill any living thing without
good reason." (age 13)
"The farmer was good. He didn't just pass by the dying vulture but tried his best to
save its life. We should value life although it is the mere life of an animal." (age 16)
The concept on chung, which appears at older age, is also unable to be scored with
Kohlberg's manual. The concept on chung could be identified though analysing
children's reasons for "helping others."
"We should help each other because that is what people should do in a society to make
the society be full of chung (through helping others)."
"If someone minded only his own business and did not care for others, there is no chung
in a society and the society becomes dreary. He shouldn't do that." .
The above example shows the responses of 16 year old children mentioning chung.
Based on these findings, it seems that the concept of chung, which Kohlberg missed,
affects the moral judgment of Korean children.
The collectivism-based cultures are characterized by the fact that the tranquillity of
community sometimes takes precedence over the rights of individuals, and hence that
the individuals are asked to relinquish some freedom and identity in order for society
to function (Ma, 1988b; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In the present study, Korean
children especially at the age of 16 revealed the characteristics of collectivism through
giving moral reasons for "not disturbing or harming others" and it is impossible to
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score these responses with Kohlberg's system.
"Working hard is important because others work hard too. If I didn't work hard, it
does others working hard harm. I should fulfil my duty even though I don't like it
especially when I'm in a group."
"You shouldn't disturb others with odd behaviour but keep pace with others. Because
you are in a group. You can't live completely by yourself"
On the basis of these responses, it seems reasonable to say that Korean society is a
collectivism-based culture like many other non-Western cultures.
In sum, overall findings that unscorable responses among Koreans generated from
some concept peculiar to Koreans such as "collectivism," "chung," and "respect for
all living things" indicate that Kohlberg's system is insufficient to assess Koreans'
moral judgment. The fact that moral judgment based on the restricted-simple
sympathy of young Korean children at the stage 1 or 2 is also unscorable implies that
Kohlberg's system is insufficient even for young Korean children since Kohlberg de-
emphasized sympathy in his moral stages. Except for the restricted-simple sympathy,
most unscorable responses of Koreans appeared during adolescence. This indicates
that the influence of concepts peculiar to Koreans on their moral reasoning is greater
during adolescence than childhood and hence the insufficiency of Kohlberg's system
is greater for adolescents.
9.4 ABILITY TO IDENTIFY AND GENERATE MORALS IN FABLES
The children were asked whether they thought that each fable has a moral and if they
did, to state what the moral was. Based on their responses (whether they thought the
fables have morals and which types of morals they stated) the children's ability to
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identify and to generate morals was assessed. In order to assess the ability to
generate morals, the children were divided into seven categories - abstract responses,
concrete responses, overgeneralisation, undergeneralisation, event summaries,
anomalous responses, and mixed responses - according to the morals that they gave.
Amongst them, the first two - abstract and concrete responses - were regarded
prototypical responses while the others were non-prototypical responses (see section
7.4.2.2 in Chapter VII for details).
Table 9.4.1 describes the numbers of children who could identify morals (i.e. those
who drew any types of morals) and those who could not (i.e. those who thought there
were no morals in the fables) and also shows age differences in children's ability to
identify morals for the fables. When the children were asked whether each story had
a moral, older children tended to give affirmative responses more than the 7 year old
children. At the age of 7, 67.5%, 60%, and 72% of the children gave affirmative
responses for the Ass's, the Golden Eggs', and the Vulture's stories respectively while
the children in the other age groups stated morals for the fables within the range from
96 to 99%. The percentage of children who identified morals are comparable with
those in Chia's (1993) and Dorfman's studies (1988, 1989, re-cited in Chia, 1993)
although the fables used in the present study were different from those in the other
studies. In Chia's study 91%, 89%, and 100% of Chinese and Malay children
identified morals for fables at the ages of 7, 9, and 11 years respectively while
Dorfman reported that 80% identified a moral at age 7,69% at age 9, and 73% at age
11. These findilngs show that Korean children seemed to lag slightly behind those in
Chia's and Dorfman's studies at the age of 7 regarding the ability to identify morals.
However, most of the children over 10 in the present study could identify morals in
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Table 9.4.1 The Number of Children Who Identify and Generate Morals
for the Three Fables
Fable I; the Ass's Story
Age 7 10 13 16 Total
Academic Level Abo Bel Abo Bel Abo Bel Abo Bel Abo Bel
Gender B G B G BG B G B G B G B G B G B G B G
No Morals 2 1 3 7 0 0 1 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 4 7
Abstract I I 0 1 12 6 3 7 9 7 8 7 10 9 8 7 32231922
Concrete 5 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 I 0 1 1 0 5 3 I 1
Over-generalised 0 I 1 3 1 3 2 2 I 2 I 2 0 I 0 0 2 7 4 7
Under-generalised 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 I 0 2
Event summary 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 I 0
Anomalous I 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 I 1 1 1
Mixed 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Total 14 9 6 11 14 9 6 11 11 10 9 10 11 12 9 8 5040 3040
Abo: Above Bel: Below B: Boys G: Girls
Fable Il; the Golden Eggs' Story
Age 7 10 13 16 Total
Academic Level Abo Bel Abo Bel Abo Bel Abo Bel Abo Bel
Gender B G B G B G B G B G B G B G B G B G B G
No Morals 3 4 2 7 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 6 4 8
Abstract 4 4 3 3 13 5 4 11 7 8 7 9 9 9 7 7 3326 2130
Concrete 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 2 1 1
Over-generalised 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 4 3 0 1
Under-generalised 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 I 0
Event summary 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0
Anomalous 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 2 1 0
Mixed 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0
Total 14 9 6 11 14 9 6 11 11 10 9 10 11 12 9 8 5040 3040
Abo: Above Bel: Below B: Boys G: Girls
Fable III; the Vulture's Story
Age 7 10 13 16 Total
Academic Level Abo Bel Abo Bel Abo Bel Abo Bel Abo Bel
Gender B G B G B G B G B G B G B G B G B G B G
No Morals 2 2 1 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 2 6
Abstract 1 2 1 1 12 8 5 8 6 7 6 10 7 9 7 7 2626 1926
Concrete 4 3 2 1 2 1 1 3 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 6 6 5 4
Over-generalised 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 5 I 2 2
Under-generalised 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
Event summary 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 1
Anomalous 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 5 0 1 1
Mixed 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 3 0 0
Total 14 9 6 11 14 9 6 11 1110 9 10 11 12 9 8 5040 3040
Abo: Above Bel: Below B: Boys G: Girls
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the fables, which indicates that the children in the present study were not different
from those in Chia's study and even surpassed those in Dorfman's study in terms of
identifying morals at the age of 10.
When the types of morals that children gave were examined, it seems that there are
also age differences (Table 9.4.1). The children over 10 years old generated abstract
morals, which were regarded as the most mature responses, much more than the 7
year old children. Conversely the 7 year old children drew non-prototypical morals
(over-generalised to anomalous morals) more than the 10 year olds. Regarding the
concrete morals, the youngest children generally tended to yield them more than those
in older age groups and the mentioning of concrete morals decreased with age. The
tendency for concrete morals to decrease with age was also revealed in the study of
Jose et al. (1992, as cited in Chia, 1993) (10%, 13%, and 3% for 7,9, and 11 year old
children respectively) while, in Chia's study (1993), the 11 year old children (8%)
stated concrete morals slightly more than the children at the ages of 7 and 9 (3% and
3.5% respectively).
Interestingly, Table 9.4.1 shows that 7 year old children were more likely to generate
abstract morals for the Golden Eggs' story than for the other stories. It seemed that
the fable itself affected young children's ability to draw morals. This will be
discussed in detail in the next chapter.
It was also assumed that children's familiarity with the fables could affect their ability.
Thus the children's familiarity ratings was illuminated (Table 9.4.2). The children
seemed quite familiar with the Ass's (89%) and the Golden Eggs' stories (86%), but
not with the Vulture's story (41%). Although the fable was rated as one of the most
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Table 9.4.2 The Number of Children Who Had Heard the Stories Before
Age The Ass's Story The Golden Eggs' Story The Vulture's Story
7 30 23 10
10 34 35 16
13 39 40 21
16 39 40 19
Total 142 (88.75%) 138 (86.25%) 66 (41.25%)
frequently appearing fables in books, the amount of children who had heard the
Vulture's story was less than half. However, when the numbers of children who
drew prototypical morals from the three stories were compared, the numbers for the
Vulture's story (74%), which was the least familiar, was little different from those for
the Ass's (66%) and for the Golden Eggs' stories (72.5%). The number of children
who thought each fable had a moral also showed almost no difference among the
fables (91% for the Ass's, 86% for the Golden Eggs', and 92.5% for the Vulture's
stories).
The claim that familiarity with the fables had nothing to do with generating morals in
the fables became more definite through examining the 7 year old children's
responses. Only a quarter of the children had heard the Vulture's story while 75% of
the children had heard the Ass's story. However, the number of children who
thought the fable had a moral and generated a prototypical moral was slightly larger
for the Vulture's story (72.5% and 37.5% respectively) than for the Ass's story
(67.5% and 22.5% respectively). These descriptions on children's familiarity with
fables indicate that children's ability to identify morals could not be affected by
familiarity with particular fables.
Based on these overall sketches, differences in children's ability to identify and to
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generate morals in the each fable were statistically examined mainly according to
their age, gender and academic level. The children's familiarity with the fables was
also taken into account as an influential factor. The hierarchical loglinear analyses
using backward elimination in combination with chi-square were used as a statistical
analysis. For the statistical analyses, the children were divided into two age groups -
the 7 year old group and the older group - since it seemed that there was no difference
among the 10, the 13 and the 16 year old groups. Also, the children's responses
were appertained to one of the three groups; the no moral group, the prototypical
moral group, and the non-prototypical moral group.
Concerning the Ass's story, the statistical analysis yielded a final model for the
children's ability to identify and generate morals showing an effect of age and an
influence of the familiarity with the fable. The model was a reasonable fit:
likelihood ratio X2 (37, N = 160) = 43.62, P = .21. Eliminating either effect
produced a significant increase in deviance: age, likelihood ratio X2 (2, N = 160) =
52.73, P < .001; familiarity, likelihood ratio X2 (2, N = 160) = 13.57, P < .005. That
is, the 7 year old children were more likely than the older children to draw either no
moral or non-prototypical morals from the Ass's story. Also, the children who had
heard the story before generated prototypical morals more than those who had not.
However, it could not be said that the familiarity is an influential factor because the
expected frequencies less than 5 are over 20%.
In the Golden Eggs' story, the interaction among age, gender and academic level was
generated as a minimal model. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio X2
(22, N= 160) = 17.74, p = .72. That is, except the boys whose academic levels were
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below the average, the children showed an age tendency (likelihood ratio X2 (2, N =
160) = 6.80, p < .05). The chi-square as a post-hoc test revealed that, like in the
Ass's story, the older children gave prototypical responses more than the 7 year old
children (likelihood ratio X2 (2, N= 130) = 41.72, p < .001).
With respect to the Vulture's story, the statistical analysis identified the age effect and
difference in academic level as a final model. The model was a reasonable fit:
likelihood ratio X2 (29, N = 160) = 20.81, p = .87. Eliminating either effect
produced a significant increase in deviance: age, likelihood ratio X2 (2, N = 160) =
41.72, P < .001; academic level, likelihood ratio X2 (2, N = 160) = 6.49, p < .05. The
age difference was similar to those in the other two stories. Concerning the
academic difference, there was no significant difference in drawing prototypical
responses between the children in both groups. The difference is that the children at
the above average academic level tended to generate non-prototypical responses
rather than to draw no moral from the story whereas the children at the below average
academic level showed the opposite pattern. However, the difference mainly
stemmed from the youngest group.
In brief, the above findings of the present study indicate clear age differences between
7 year old children and children 10 years and above. It seemed that the children's
ability to draw morals from the fables had not been fully developed at the age of 7.
However, after the age of 10, most children had reached the mature level with the
fables regardless of their gender, academic level and familiarity. That is, older
children had less difficulties in identifying morals and generated a mature type of
morals more than the 7 year old children. Furthermore, a difference in academic
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level was observed only in the Vulture's story. Concerning the familiarity, it seems
that children's familiarity with fables genre rather than the familiarity with particular
fables affected their ability to identify morals if it could be assumed that the older
children had heard more fables than younger children.
9.5 SUMMARY
To summarize, Korean children's spontaneous responses to fables were statistically
analysed in order to examine whether children's moral stages, use of moral
orientations, and ability to draw morals are related with background factors such as
age, gender, and academic level. The results showed a developmental tendency in
all the three aspects; children's moral stages, use of orientations, and ability to draw
morals. Various gender or academic level differences in the use of the moral
orientations were found across stories. Furthermore, the content of stories seems to
relate to the children's use of the orientations and ability to draw a moral. Also,
showing unscorable responses with Kohlberg's system indicated the insufficiency of
Kohlberg's system for Korean children although the general findings on children's
moral stage and use of the orientations showed that the system is applicable.
CHAPTER TEN
DISCUSSION
Only Korean children participated in the present study using fables and the
differences in moral reasoning across age, gender and academic level were examined
through analysing their spontaneous responses in connection with their judgments and
reasons concerning the characters, events and conclusions in fables. Also, children's
unscorable responses with Kohlberg's system and their ability to identify and to
generate morals from the fables were explored in this study. The findings are
discussed below.
10.1 MORAL STAGE
Regarding age differences, first of all, the present study showed a clear tendency of
moral stage to increase with age as did the first study and other empirical studies (e.g.
Edwards, 1975; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Tietjen & Walker, 1985; Turiel et al., 1978).
In the present study, the children's moral stages developed with age regardless oftheir
gender and academic level. Findings that moral stages increased with age supports
Kohlberg's claim of the sequential development of moral stages across age at least up
to stage 4.
No gender difference in moral stages was found in the present study in line with other
studies that have found no gender difference in the development ofmoral stages (e.g.
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Ahn, 1987; Chung, 1987; Lee, 1985; Snarey et al., 1985; Walker, 1984; Walker, 1989;
Walker & Moran, 1991). Thus the present study does not support Gilligan's claim
(1982) that Kohlberg's moral stages seem to be biased in favour of males, obtained
through interviewing abortion counsellees (see section 3.1 in Chapter III for details),
nor the claim that girls are generally more mature than boys in the development of
moral stages, probably due to overall precociousness of females during childhood and
early- and mid-adolescence (e.g. Cohn, 1991; Kang, 1994; Lee, 1981; Park, 1983;
Thoma, 1986 - see section 6.1 in Chapter VI for details).
The present study examined academic level differences in moral reasoning, which had
not been conducted in the first study using Kohlberg's dilemmas. Several studies
have already examined the relationships between the level of academic achievement
and moral stages on the basis that educational background could accelerate moral
development. For instance, Narvaez (1993) examined the relationships between
moral judgment and academic achievement through administrating DIT to 122
adolescents aged 14 or 15 years. Academically high achievers scored significantly
higher on moral judgment than their peers in line with other studies (e.g. Keen, 1990;
Lee, 1985: Tan-Willman & Gutteridge, 1981; Won, 1987). However it should be
noted that not every high achiever did reach a high moral stage; quite a number of
them attained average or even low scores in moral judgment. Concerning those who
were at average to below average academic level, no one obtained a high score of
moral judgment while many of the academically higher achievers did. Based on the
findings, Narvaez argues that intellectual accomplishment is necessary but not
sufficient for reaching a high stage of moral judgment if the academic achievement
implies intellectual aptitude.
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Edwards (1978) also examined the correlation between moral judgment stages and the
level of academic achievement (as measured by standardized achievement tests) with
Kenyan secondary school or university students; ranging in age from 16 to the early
twenties. Only secondary school students showed a positive relationship between
moral stages and the level of academic achievement measured by their test scores of
the three tests in English, Math and Science. In spite of a positive relationship, the
relationship was not statistically significant.
The present study showed no correlation between the level of academic achievement
and moral stages. There are several possible ways to interpret the findings. On the
one hand, the results might be interpreted as showing there is no relationship between
the two factors. On the other hand, the actual differences in the level of academic
achievement between the two groups in the present study might not be significant
enough to influence moral stages. Narvaez (1993) found a positive correlation
between children's scores on moral judgment and academic ranks through minutely
ranking the children from top to bottom according to their academic achievement
scores in order to examine correlation between the two factors. However, the
children in the present study were simply divided into two groups - the above average
and the below average academic level groups - and differences between the two
groups in terms of the mean of moral stages were examined. Additionally, there is a
possibility that the children whose academic levels were slightly above or below the
average rather than those who were at the top or the bottom of academic achievement
level might be in the majority since the participants were not strictly confined to those
who were at the top or the bottom of the academic level. This could also be one of
the reasons why no relationship between the academic level and moral stages was
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found. Thus, the fact that the children in the present study were simply divided into
two groups according to the level of academic achievement could result in showing
no relationship between the academic level and moral stages. Also, the present
study has a much wider age range and fewer children in each age group than the study
by Narvaez. The former examined total 160 children, 40 children from each 7, 10,
13, and 16 year old group, while the latter examined 122 children aged 14 or 15 years.
The differences in sampling between the two studies imply two possible explanations
of the different results obtained concerning academic level differences in moral stages.
One is that children's academic achievement level might have influence on their
moral stages only at certain age, i.e. the age of 14 or 15 but not in general, across the
ages of 7 to 16. The other is that the sample size of the present study (40 children is
each age group) might not be large enough to detect the academic level differences in
moral stages of each age group. Thus the present study suggests that further
research should have a larger sample and group children more specifically according
to their academic level in order to examine the correlation between the academic level
and the development of moral stages.
According to the findings, the present study showed the tendency for moral stages to
increase with age but showed no gender or academic level differences in the moral
stages and hence strongly supports the sequential development of moral stages with
age at least up to stage 4.
10.2 MORAL ORIENTATION
The present study examined the differences in the use of each orientation according to
children's background such as age, gender, and academic level, and the content of
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fables. The findings are discussed below.
10.2.1 Influence of the Content of Fables
When the three fables in this study were considered as a whole, the children tended to
express their moral reasoning through evenly using the five orientations for the
present study. However the children seemed to prefer using some orientations to the
others for certain fables. In the Vulture's story, the children referred to the fairness
orientation more than the others. Even many of the 7 year old children mentioned
the fairness orientation for the Vulture's story, but they rarely used this orientation for
the other stories. The children mentioned the normative drientation in the Vulture's
story relatively less than in the Ass's and Golden Eggs' stories. These differences in
the use of the orientations according to the fables imply that the content of fables
itself could influence children's decision on using the moral orientations.
10.2.2 Age Tendencies
According to the findings, children's background as well as the content of fables was
also influential in their use of the orientations. The present study showed that the
children's use of the ideal and the fairness orientations tended to increase with age
while the use of the egoistic orientation decreased, coinciding with the findings of the
first study and other empirical studies (e.g. Tappan et al., 1987; Walker, 1989). Thus
it seems that individuals tend to orient toward ideal consequences and fairness and to
make light of the egoistic consequences as they become more developmentally
advanced in moral reasoning.
Although there were general age tendencies of the egoistic, the ideal, and the fairness
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orientations across the fables, the present study shows the variation of the age
tendency according to the content of fables. For instance, concerning the Golden
Eggs' story, not only the younger children but also the older children whose academic
levels were below average rarely mentioned the fairness orientation. Thus the
children whose academic levels were below the average showed no age tendency in
the use of the fairness orientation in the Golden Eggs' story. Except for this, the
tendency for the use of the fairness orientation to increase with age was found
concerning every fable. The exception of general age tendency indicates that
children's background could produce variations of age tendencies in the use of moral
orientations in connection with the content of fables.
Regarding the utilitarian orientation, previous empirical studies (Tappan et al., 1987;
Walker, 1989) reported that younger individuals were more likely to use the
orientation. However, they examined the use of the utilitarian orientation in
combination with the use of the egoistic orientation and described the tendency of the
use of the combined orientations as the tendency of the use of the utilitarian
orientation. Unlike in previous studies, the present study examined the use of the
utilitarian orientation separately from the use of the egoistic orientation in order to
determine the age tendency of the use of each orientation rather than the age tendency
of the combined orientations. When the use of the utilitarian orientation was
examined as an independent orientation, the present study showed no genuine age
difference. The age differences in the use of the utilitarian orientation varied in
connection with academic level or gender differences across the content of fables. A
tendency showing that 10 year old children used the orientation more than the others
was also observed in the Vulture's story, although only in the below average academic
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group. Regarding the Ass's and the Golden Eggs' stories, girls at the age of 16 used
the orientation more than boys. Especially in the Ass's story, the 16 year old girls
used the orientation more than not only 16 year old boys but also the children in the
other age groups. Finding various age differences only in several sub-groups seems
to imply that there was no genuine age development in the use of the orientation,
regardless of gender, culture and academic level. Thus, the findings of other
empirical studies, which revealed that the use of the utilitarian orientation decreased
with age, could be due to the strong age tendency of the egoistic orientation which
possibly screened the actual tendency of the use of the utilitarian orientation. The
variations in the use of the utilitarian orientation will be discussed later in terms of
gender or academic level differences.
Concerning the normative orientation, the present study showed the general tendency
for the use of the orientation to increase with age. When all of the three fables were
examined separately, no age difference was found in the Vulture's story, and the Ass's
and the Golden Eggs' stories showed the tendency for the use of the normative
orientation to increase with age. It could rather be said that the use of the normative
orientation generally increased with age although there were variations of the age
tendency according to the content of fables. This will be fully discussed in
connection with the findings of the first study using Kohlberg's dilemmas in the next
chapter, the final discussion.
When the five orientations were compared with one another in terms of the number of
children who used the orientations, young children clearly used the normative, the
egoistic, and the utilitarian orientations more than the ideal and the fairness
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orientations. In other words, children in their early childhood tended to focus on the
use of the former three orientations because their concept of ideal consequences and
fairness might not have been sufficiently developed. As they got older, however, the
children tended to use all the orientations for their moral reasoning except for the
egoistic orientation which was regarded as the least mature response. It seemed that
they considered all the orientations for their moral reasoning and selected the most
appropriate orientation, according to the situations. Consequently, the use of the
orientations seems to diversify with age rather than simply transferred from one
orientation to the other. As mentioned in the first study, this age tendency, in a way,
seems to be in line with the claim made by the domain-specificity theorists (e.g.
Turiel & Smetana, 1984; Turiel & Davidson, 1986) on moral development. They
claimed that individuals seem to consider a broader range of components for their
social judgments and to regulate the components as their social interaction increased
with age. On the other hand, as far as children's use of the egoistic, the ideal and the
fairness orientations are concerned, the findings of the present study partially support
the other studies with regard to age tendency in the use of moral orientations (e.g.
Tappan et al., 1987; Walker, 1986a, 1989; & Walker & Moran, 1991). Additionally,
the variations of age tendency within an orientation across dilemmas and academic
level and gender groups seemed to support the claim that the use of moral orientations
might differ across not only children's background but also the content of dilemma.
10.2.3 Gender Differences
With respect to the utilitarian orientation, Korean girls at the age of 16 used the
orientation more than boys in the present study. That is, the Korean girls, especially
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the 16 year old girls showed great concern for the welfare of others. There is a
typical response ofthe 16 year old girls for the Golden Eggs' story as below.
"I do not like the farmer because he is selfish. He just killed an innocent goose
for his greediness. If he keeps acting like this to others, it eventually brings
about bad results not only for others but also himself. He should not offend
others. There is no good for himself as well as others. He should be
concerned about others' welfare as much as his."
Concerning the Ass's and Golden Eggs' stories, many girls showed more or less the
same responses as the above. They said that people should not be selfish nor offend
others but be considerate in order to have good consequences for themselves as well
as others. It seems that girls at an older age seemed to show their concern for
welfare and happiness not only to those who have a close relationship with
themselves but also to others in their community.
In vulture's story, both the boys and girls showed an age tendency of the use of the·
fairness orientation to increase with age. However, 10 to 16 year old boys tended to
use the orientation slightly more than the girls. That is, the boys were more likely
than the girls to give reasons why they liked the story, the characters and/or the
conclusion of the story through stating that the farmer was rewarded for his good
deeds and that was fair enough.
According to these gender differences, Gilligan's claim (1982) that girls typically use
the responsibility orientation (the egoistic, the utilitarian, and the ideal orientations)
while boys use the right orientation (the normative and the fairness orientations)
seems applicable to Korean children. However, the findings could only partially
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support the claim since the gender differences were found only concerning the use of
the utilitarian and the fairness orientations.
In brief, concernmg gender differences in the use of moral orientations, Korean
children showed differences in the use of the utilitarian and the fairness orientations.
These findings partially support the claim of Gilligan on gender differences.
However, these gender differences should be understood in connection with cultural
uniqueness rather than a universal tendency. Some concepts peculiar to the Koreans
seem to affect the Korean's use of the moral orientations, and hence to generate
gender differences between Koreans boys and girls in terms of the use of the
orientations.
10.2.4 Academic Level Differences
The present study examined whether the children's use of moral orientations differed
according to their academic level, which the first study using Kohlberg's dilemmas
had not dealt with. Most differences in academic level were connected with other
factors such as age and/or gender differences and, moreover, those differences varied
across stories. Consequently, the academic level differences seemed to be desultory
at first glance. For instance, the children in the above average academic level group
generally used the utilitarian orientation more than those in the below average
academic level group in the Ass's story, while the opposite tendency was shown
concerning the Vulture's story although it was significant only in the 10 year old
group. With respect to the fairness orientation, the 10 year old children in the below
average academic group used the orientation more than those in the other academic
group for the Golden Egg's story. In contrast, the children at the same age showed
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the opposite pattern of the academic level difference in the use of the fairness
orientation concerning the Vulture's story.
In fact, there are doubts about some findings on the academic level differences in the
use of the orientations although they are found to be statistically significant. For
instance, concerning the use of the utilitarian orientation for the Ass's story, the
statistical analyses of the present study revealed that the children in the above average
academic group used the orientation more than those in the below average academic
group. However, each age group showed almost no academic level difference in the
use of the utilitarian orientation concerning the Ass's story when the use of the
,
orientations in each age group was examined respectively. Similarly, although there
were few differences between the two academic level groups in each age group, the
statistical analyses indicated that boys in the below average academic group
mentioned the ideal orientation more than those in the other academic group
concerning the Golden Eggs' story (see Tables 9.2.1 and 9.2.3 in the previous chapter,
Chapter IX). Thus it seems difficult to confirm the above academic level differences
unless further evidence is provided.
However, it seems that there were some general tendencies of the academic level
differences in the use of the orientations when paying more attention to the use of the
five orientations for each story at the same time, rather than examining each
orientation separately. Concerning the Golden Egg's story, the 7 year old girls at the
above average academic level used the egoistic orientation more than those at the
below average academic level. The findings on the general age differences in the
use of the orientations indicated that the youngest children used the egoistic
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orientation more than the other orientations and the use of the egoistic orientation
decreased with age while the use of the other orientations either increased or were
maintained at the similar level across age. These patterns of age difference in the
use of the orientations imply that the concept of the egoistic orientation presumably
develops earlier than the others and disappears as other orientations developed and
hence the children using the egoistic orientation seem to have immature moral
reasoning in comparison with those using the other orientations. Based on these
implications, it seemed that the children at the above average academic level lagged
behind those at the below average academic level in the developmental pattern of the
use of the orientations since the former used the egoistic orientation more than the
latter. However, considering the children's use of the five orientations for the story
at the same time, it was observed that many of the 7 year old girls in the below
average academic level group mentioned neither the egoistic orientation nor the other
orientations while the girls in the other academic group mainly used the egoistic
orientation for moral reasoning. That is, the 7 year old girls at the below average
academic level seemed to be incapable of providing any reason for their moral
decision through using the orientations. Thus the findings on the academic level
differences in the 7 year old girls group indicated that the 7 year old girls in the above
average academic group used the egoistic orientation possibly through being fully
aware of the orientation while the other 7 year old girls had not yet sufficiently
recognized even the egoistic orientation. In other words, among the 7 year old girls,
those at the above average academic level seemed to develop the use of moral
orientations one step ahead of those at the below average academic level.
Concerning the Golden Eggs' story, academic level differences were found in the
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children's use of the fairness orientation at the age of 10. The children in the below
average academic level group used the orientation more than those in the above
average academic group. The reason for this academic level difference at the age of
lOis not clearly illuminated here. However, the difference between the two groups
was very small and, furthermore, the pattern of the differences between the two
academic groups was reversed in the older group. The older children in the below
average academic level group tended to justify their moral decision with mainly using
the normative, the utilitarian, and the ideal orientations but not the fairness
orientations. In contrast, the older children in the other academic group referred to
the fairness orientation as well. The children showed a tendency to increase the use
of the fairness orientation with age as mentioned before. The fairness orientation is
regarded as one of the orientations which develops the latest among the orientations.
Thus the preponderance of the older children at the above average academic level to
those at the other academic level in the use of the orientations suggests that the
children at the below average academic level lag a little behind those at the above
average academic level. In other words, the latter begin to move towards the next
stage at which the individuals start considering fairness deeply while the former still
remain at a stage where the consideration of the fairness has not been sufficiently
developed yet.
According to the academic level differences in the use of the orientations for the
Vulture's story, the children, especially the girls, at the above average academic level
seemed to be a little ahead of those at the other academic level. Atthe age of 10, the
children - the girls in particular - at the above average academic level were more
likely to concentrate on the use of the fairness orientation, just as the older children
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did for the Golden Eggs' story, or to consider both the fairness and the ideal
orientations which are the last among orientations to be developed. Those at the
below average academic level, however, tended to use the utilitarian and the fairness
orientations at the same time. It seemed that the children in the below average
academic group still mainly adhered to the utilitarian orientation for their moral
reasoning whereas those in the other group began to consider fairness deeply. In
contrast, the children at the above average academic level had already fully developed
concepts of ideal consequences and fairness, and hence mainly considered these two
orientations rather than the others. At the age of 13, the girls in the above average
academic level group tended to use either the fairness' orientation or the ideal
orientation while those in the other academic level group concentrated on the use of
the fairness orientation as did the 10 year old children at the above average academic
level. Interestingly, at the age of 16, the girls in the below average academic group
showed the same tendency as the 13 year old girls in the above average academic
level group. That is, they tended to orient towards either ideal consequences or
fairness. However, most 16 year old girls at the above average academic level
mentioned both the ideal and the fairness orientations. The tendency of the 16 year
old girls at the above average academic level to use both the orientations could
compare with those of Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) since the fairness orientation in
Kohlberg's theory came under the justice orientation in Gilligan's theory while the
ideal orientation came under the care orientation. They reported that, when asked to
describe a moral problem or conflict they had recently faced, more than two-thirds of
a group of 80 educationally advanced adolescents and adults living in the US
represented considerations of both the justice and the care orientations in their
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interview narratives. Thus, they suggested that individuals tended to know and to
use both orientations in moral reasoning. Walker et al. (1987), through interviewing
240 participants from 80 family triads with hypothetical and real-life dilemmas also
found that individuals who were at a mature level of moral reasoning tended to use a
considerable mix of both just and care orientations. On the basis of the findings of
the present and the other empirical studies, it seems that individuals tend to consider
wider ranged aspects in order to make a moral decision when they are at a more
mature level ofmoral thinking.
According to the overall findings concerning the three stories, it seems that there was
a developmental tendency in the use of moral orientations and that the academic level
of the children could affect the development of the use of moral orientations. The
children seemed to develop the egoistic orientation first and the fairness and the ideal
orientations last. Also, the children tended to concentrate on the use of a certain
orientation when they were fully aware of the concept of the orientation. For
instance, the 7 year old girls at the above average academic level mainly used the
egoistic orientation for the Golden Egg's story. Similarly, the 10 year old girls at the
above average academic level and the 13 year old girls at the below average academic
level intensively mentioned the fairness orientation for the Vulture's story. It seems
that the children sufficiently recognized the concepts at that time. Afterwards, as
they presumably began to recognize another orientation, they started to alternate
between the two orientations, the newly recognized one and the one they had already
been using. The 13 year old girls at the above average academic level showed this
tendency concerning the Vulture's story. They tended, mainly, to use either the
fairness orientation or the ideal orientation. Lastly, when the children were fully
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aware of the concepts of both ideal consequences and fairness which seemed to
develop at the last stage, as well as concepts of the other orientations, they gave
reasons for their moral decision mainly on the basis of both the fairness and the ideal
orientations at the same time, rather than choosing one of the orientations. Also,
they still considered the other orientations for their moral reasoning. The 16 year old
girls at the above average academic level showed this pattern concerning the Vulture's
story. Most of them used both the fairness and the ideal orientations for their moral
reasoning, and sometimes in combination with other orientations.
According to the findings of the present study, both the academic level groups showed
these developmental patterns in the use of moral orientations. However, comparing
the two academic level groups, the children in the below average academic level
group lagged one step behind and followed the developmental pattern of those in the
above average academic level group. Therefore the children's academic level seems
to have an influence on these developmental patterns. However it should be noted
that not all of the age groups showed the significant tendency of academic level
differences regardless of gender and the content of stories. Besides, the time that the
children moved from one stage to the next stage in the use of the orientations tended
to vary across the stories even within the same academic level and gender group.
For instance, among girls at the above average academic level, the concentrated use of
the fairness orientation occurred at the age of 10 for the Vulture's story while, for the
Golden Eggs' story, it started at the age of 13. Therefore, according to the results of
the present study, it seems that children's academic level differences could affect the
developmental tendency of the use of moral orientations. However, the influence of
the level of academic achievement on the use of the orientations could vary across the
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stories and children's background and gender.
10.2.5 Summary
Overall findings on the use of moral orientations indicate that there are general
differences in children's use of the orientations across their background including age
and gender. Also, children's differences in academic level seem to affect the age
differences in the use of the moral orientations. However, all of the above
differences were not observed in each story without exception. The children tended
to favour particular orientations for certain contexts. This preference of the children
occurred sometimes in a whole group or sometimes only in a sub-group.
In spite of the differences in the use of the orientations across the content of fables,
the present study showed some general tendencies to use the orientations as indicated
below. The youngest children seemed to mainly consider egoistic consequences of
their moral decision. As they got older, they began to be aware of ideal
consequences and fairness and took them into account for their moral decision while
the consideration of egoistic consequences decreased. Their concern about
normative order and utilitarian consequences seemed to maintain similar levels across
age. Concerning the development of the use of moral orientations, the children
sometimes emphasized only one or two orientations of which they were fully aware at
that time. However, the tendency to emphasize a certain orientation tended to
diminish later and the children justified their moral decision in consideration of
various orientations altogether as they were sufficiently aware of all the orientations.
In other words, the children eventually diversified the use of the orientations although
they sometimes seemed to simply transfer their use from one to another orientation
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while the development of the use of the orientations was in progress. The academic
level differences seemed to affect the overall age tendency to use of the orientations.
The children at the above average academic level tended to be one step ahead of those
at the below average academic level.
Concerning the gender differences, the preponderance of the girls to the boys in the
use of the utilitarian orientation could also imply that the characteristics of Korean
society, which is that Korean society has different expectations for boys and girls,
influenced the use of the orientation.
In summary, the present study indicated general age tendencies in the use of moral
orientations regardless of children's gender and cultural background. Only the
children's academic level affected the age tendency. Apart from the age tendency,
children also showed gender differences. However, the present study showed
variations of these general tendencies across the content of stories and sub-groups.
10.3 UNSCORABLE RESPONSES
The Korean children in the present study using fables made some responses which
were unable to be matched to Kohlberg's system. In line with the claim of other
studies (e.g. Boyes & Walker, 1988; Dien, 1982; Iwasa, 1992; Ma, 1988b, 1992;
Shweder et al., 1990; Snarey, 1985; Tietjen & Walker, 1985) that Kohlberg's theory
of moral judgment has limitations since he missed or misunderstood some concepts
peculiar to non-Western cultures, the unscorable responses in the first study using the
dilemmas imply that there are some concepts which affect Koreans' moral reasoning
that Kohlberg did not grasp well. The present study also supports the insufficiency
of Kohlberg's system to Korean children through showing some responses which
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were unable to be scored with Kohlberg's system.
Korean children at the age of 7 tended to make their moral judgment based on
emotional consequences such as the restricted-simple sympathy as well as physical
consequences in the present study. This is inconsistent with Kohlberg's claim that
young children mainly gave moral reasoning based on the physical consequences.
The examples of 7 year old Korean children's responses to fables on the basis of
sympathy and the physical consequences were presented in section 9.3 in chapter IX.
No matter if they focused on emotional or physical consequences for their moral
reasoning, most children at the age of 7 commonly showed a restricted viewpoint.
That is, they tended to stick to only one point of view such as reasoning their moral
judgment only on their feeling towards a "poor goose," rather than taking multiple
perspectives on the situations. Thus, in the present study, the sympathy of the 7 year
old children is defined as "restricted-simple sympathy" (see section 6.4 in chapter VI
for details). The restricted-simple sympathy partially supports Kohlberg's claim that
the children at preconventionallevel make moral judgment with a rigid view and that
younger children are lacking mediating concepts such as deservingness or
intentionality through which the particular circumstances of the case alter its moral
significance. However, finding that Korean children revealed overtly sympathetic
moral reasoning which are unable to be scored with Kohlberg's system implies that
Kohlberg's system is insufficient even in scoring the responses of 7 year old Korean
children whose mean of moral stages is only 1/2. This indicates that some concepts
peculiar to a certain culture could influence the moral judgment not just after stage 3
but even at the preconventionallevel as opposed to the claim of other studies (e.g. Ma,
1992; Snarey, 1985) that Kohlberg's moral judgment up to the stage 3 seems
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applicable to individuals in most cultures.
When analysing the responses of children in all age groups, the restricted-simple
sympathy at the age of 7 seems to develop in two ways; respect for life and chung.
Concerning the children's concept of life, the responses to the Golden Eggs' and the
Vulture's stories show how the concept of the respect for life develops from the
restricted-simple sympathy with age. There are examples of the responses from each
age group;
"He (the farmer) should not kill the goose because dying is sad." (age 7)
"The farmer was bad because, as for the goose, there is no reason to be killed. It didn't
do anything wrong. I pity it." (age 10)
"I don't like the farmer. He is bad because he killed the innocent goose just for his
greediness." (age 13)
"He was good because he saved a life. You shouldn't kill any living thing without
good reason." (age 13)
"The farmer was good. He didn't just pass by the dying vulture but tried his best to
save its life. We should value life although it is the mere life of an animal." (age 16)
According to the responses, the 7 year old child judged that the farmer was bad only
because of simple feeling such as compassion for the goose's death. It seems that
the child has not yet conceptualized the value of life. The 10 year old child, like the
7 year old one, also sympathized with the goose, but based on rational reasoning (e.g.
It did not do anything wrong to be killed). At the age of 13, the children begin to
dimly express respect for life (i.e. He saved a life, You shouldn't kill any living thing
without good reason) and, finally, the child at the age of 16 clearly explains the
X Discussion 262
concept of respect for life (i.e. We should value life although it is merely the life of an
animal). Based on these responses, it is presumed that the restricted-simple
sympathy of young children could be the foundation of respect for life since
children's reasons for not killing or saving a life started from the restricted-simple
sympathy and the concept of the respect for life eventually emerged as a reason as
sympathy faded.
The restricted-simple sympathy of 7 year old children could also be the basis of the
concept of chung that appears at older age (see the section 3.4.2 in Chapter III for the
definition of chung). The development from the restricted-simple sympathy to the
concept of chung could be identified through analysing children's reasons for
"helping others."
Children at the age of 7 mainly gave the reason for helping others in two ways; one is
physical consequences, which is scorable with Kohlberg's system, and the other is the
unscorable reason with Kohlberg's system, the restricted-simple sympathy.
"It is important to help others because, if you didn't, you don't have any friends and
nobody likes you." (a response based on the physical consequence)
"We should help others because it is sad if someone died." (a response based on the
restricted-simple sympathy)
The reason for helping others extracted from emotional state such as sympathy is
almost absent at the age of 10. Rather they gave the reasons in terms of reciprocity
or positive desert which could be matched to Kohlberg's criteria judgments (e.g. "If
you help someone, the person might help you back"). It would be interesting to
compare this tendency to the findings of Eisenberg et al. (1987) that pragmatic
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concerns for prosocial moral reasoning increased at the age of 9 to 12. Based on the
similarity between the two findings, it can be said that this is a general tendency of
those in mid-childhood. At the age of 13, however, the children engaged emotional
concerns again as a reason for helping others. On the other hand, they begin to take
account of good relationships with others, which could be categorized into the
element of serving social ideal and harmony in Kohlberg's terms, as another reason
for helping others. There is an example showing the two kinds of responses
respectively.
"He shouldn't pass by the poor thing who needs his help because he probably feels
uncomfortable afterwards (ifhe did)."
"You can have a good relationship with others through helping others."
Children at the age of 16 seem to integrate the two reasons segregated at the age of 13
(the emotional concerns vs the emphasis on a good relationship) into the concept of
chung.
"We should help each other because that is what people should do in a society to make
the society be full ofchung (through helping others)."
'If someone minded only his own business and did not care for others, there is no chung
in a society and the society becomes dreary. He shouldn't do that."
The above example shows that 16 year old children argue that individuals should help
others for the sake of chung in a society. It seems that the concept of chung greatly
affects their moral judgment on the basis of the findings of the present study.
Although it clearly emerges during mid-adolescence, the concept of chung seems to
sprout at a much younger age in the form of the restricted-simple sympathy. The
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restricted-simple sympathy of 7 year old Koreans could be regarded as a primitive
form of chung since the restricted-simple sympathy shares with chung emotional
aspects which affect children's moral judgment.
According to studies (e.g. Dein, 1982; Ma, 1988b; Snarey et aI., 1985; Tietjen &
Walker, 1985), the view on an interdependent self in non-Western cultures tends to
promote another type of unscorable moral reasoning, which is based on collectivism.
In a collectivism-based culture, the tranquillity of community sometimes takes
precedence over the rights of individuals, thus the individuals are asked to relinquish
some freedom and identity in order for society to function. In the present study, the
16 year old children's reasons for "nut disturbing or harming others" clearly showed
the collectivist tendencies of Koreans. That is, Korean children seem to think that an
individual should not disturb or harm others because they were concerned about
others' welfare, but ultimately for the sake of the group where individuals are
interdependent on each other. These responses imply that Koreans, like many other
collectivism-based cultures, tended to give priority to the community rather than to
the individual in certain circumstances. Furthermore, Choi & Choi (199Gb) claimed
that the concept of "we" is representative of collectivistic thinking among Koreans.
Koreans' concept of "we" seems to relate to the Korean view of individuals, which is
similar to the view, so-called interdependent self, commonly found in non-Western
cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Koreans tend to view an individual as an
imperfect being who is part of its surroundings rather than an independent being and
hence try to make close interpersonal relationships with other partial individuals by
means of sharing the concept of "we" (Choi, 1997). Thus, the claim of Choi as well
as the findings of the present study support the existence of collectivism in Korean
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culture. However, it seems that collectivist tendencies did not clearly emerge before
mid-adolesence since the concept was found only in the 16 year old group.
In summary, overall findings that unscorable responses among Koreans generated
from some concept peculiar to Koreans such as "collectivism," "chung, " and "respect
for all living things" indicate that Kohlberg's system is insufficient to assess Koreans'
moral judgment. The fact that moral judgment based on the restricted-simple
sympathy of young Korean children at the stage 1 or 2 is also unscorable implies that
Kohlberg's system is insufficient even for young Korean children since Kohlberg de-
emphasized sympathy in his moral stages. Except for the restricted-simple
sympathy, most unscorable responses of Koreans appeared during adolescence. This
indicates that the influence of the concepts peculiar to Koreans on their moral
reasoning is greater during adolescence than childhood and hence the insufficiency of
Kohlberg's system is greater for adolescents.
10.4 ABILITY TO IDENTIFY AND GENERATE MORALS IN FABLES
The present study examined children's ability to identify and generate morals in
fables according to their age, gender, academic level and familiarity with the fables.
On the basis of the literature review (Chia, 1993; Dorfman, 1988, 1989, as cited in
Chia, 1993; Jose et al., 1992, as cited in Chia, 1993), it was predicted that older
children would identify morals in fables better than younger children and that the
ability to generate morals would develop with age from lower level literal
interpretations (i.e. nonprototypical morals) to higher level generalized, abstract
morals (i.e. prototypical morals). Among the prototypical morals, children would
draw abstract morals more than concrete morals as they get older since the former is
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regarded as more morally mature than the latter. It was also assumed that children's
gender, academic level and familiarity with the fables could also influence their
ability to identify and to generate morals.
The results only indicated age differences between the 7 year olds and the older
children concerning all the fables. There was little age difference among the 10, the
13, and the 16 year old groups. Most children in these age groups thought that there
were morals in fables and generated abstract morals, which were the most mature
responses. It seems that the children at the age of 10 have already fully developed
the ability to identify and to generate morals in fables, and hence little further
,
progress was observed after the age of 10. As predicted, significant age differences
were found only between the 7 and the 10 year old children. The 7 year old children
tended to identify morals in fables less than the older children. Furthermore, the
former were more likely to draw nonprototypical morals and less likely to draw
prototypical morals than the latter. Concerning prototypical morals only, the number
of 7 year olds who generated concrete morals were more or less similar to the number
who generated abstract morals, whilst, in the older group, most children drew abstract
morals and only a few children generated concrete morals. When asked to retell the
story in order to ascertain whether they understood the story, most of the 7 year old
children could retell the story. Although most 7 year old children seemed to
understand the stories, approximately 33% of the 7 year old children considered the
fables to have no moral. Among the 7 year old Korean children, only 67% of them
identified morals in fables while 90% of children at the same age in Chia's study
(1993) did. These differences between the two studies could be due to differences in
the way of assessing the children's ability to identify morals. In Chia's study, the
X Discussion 267
author regarded the children who said there was a moral but were not able to generate
it as those who could identify morals. However, the present study included only
those who generated a moral in that category since the present study assumed that the
children who could not generate morals were those who could not identify morals
even though they said "yes" to the question whether there was a moral in fables.
These differences between the two studies could imply a possibility that the present
study underestimated 7 year old children's ability to identify morals or alternatively
that the other study overestimated the children's ability.
Concerning the ability to generate morals from the fables, 52% of the 7 year old
children in the present study generated prototypical morals (29% of abstract and 23%
of concrete morals) and 48% of children generated nonprototypical morals. In
comparison with 7 year old children in other studies - 39% of 7 year old children in
Chia's study (1993) and 48% in Dorfman's study (1989 as cited in Chia, 1993) -, they
seemed to be at a similar level in generating morals.
However, differences in generating morals across the stories were found in the 7 year
old group. The findings imply that the fables could still vary in the level of
difficulty although only fables which were deemed to have a clear didactic point by
two raters were used in the present study. Abrahamsen and Sprouse (1995) pointed
out that children tended to generate morals more easily from some fables than from
others according to various factors such as difficulty in vocabulary, the degree of the
fable's adherence to story grammar, inclusion of one primary actor versus a
relationship between actors and the children's familiarity with the relationships
portrayed in thefable. In particular, they suggested that children were more likely to
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draw morals from fables in which events might correspond more closely to children's
own experiences than from the other fables. A cursory examination of the fables in
the present study also indicates that children might vary in terms of the ability to
generate morals in this regard. According to the findings, the children generated
prototypical morals in the Golden Eggs' story (58% of abstract and 12.5% of concrete
morals) the most, followed by the Vulture's story (17% and 34% respectively) and
then the Ass's story (11% and 22% respectively). These differences in generating
prototypical morals across stories could be understood through considering the 7 year
old children's general circumstances. Usually, among 7 year old children, the point
of the Golden Eggs' story - do not be too greedy - might be more relevant to them
than the points of the Vulture's story - do a favour for others - and the Ass's story - do
not shirk your own duty -. That is, young children often tended to show their
greediness such as taking all toys or food like sweets and not wanting to share them
with others, consequently they might often be taught by adults that it is wrong to be
greedy. However, considering fulfilment of duty, the moral that the least amount of
children generated, they could be considered too young to have been charged with
duty. Therefore, these general circumstances of 7 year old children possibly caused
the largest number of children to draw prototypical morals in the Golden Eggs' story
and the least amount of children in the Ass's story.
Interestingly, the children made no difference in identifying and generating morals
according to whether they had heard the fables before regardless of their age, gender,
and academic level. Most children over 10 generated abstract morals even in the
fables which were unfamiliar to them. Amongst the 7 year olds, some children
thought that there were morals in the fables and drew morals although they had not
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heard the fables before. At the same time, there were some other children who
thought that the fables had no moral although they had heard the fables before. They
seemed to regard the fables as just funny old tales rather than as didactic stories.
Pertinent to these findings, Stewig (1988) had already pointed out the recent attitude
of teachers towards fables. That is, teachers, nowadays, are more likely to share
fables with children for their literary qualities rather than for the morals they contain.
The fables seem to be valued as good teaching aids for their concise language rather
than their morals. Therefore, although children are familiar with fables, the
children's familiarity with particular fables seems not really to affect their ability to
identify and to generate morals in fables. That is, children at the age of 7 seem not
to have sufficiently developed their ability to generate morals in fable while older
children seem to have little difficulty in understanding morals in fables regardless of
their familiarity with them. The findings of empirical studies (e.g. Demorest et aI.,
1983; Nippold, et aI., 1984; Winner, et aI., 1976) that children improved in
understanding metaphors between the ages of 9 and 14 support the findings of the
present study that ability to generate morals seemed to have an age-related
developmental pattern beyond the matter of their familiarity with fables. However,
Baechle and Lian (1990) found that practice on metaphor could enhance the ability of
children with learning disabilities to comprehend figurative language. In the light of
the findings, familiarity with the fable genre and practice at drawing morals from
didactic stories but not just reading or hearing particular fables could accelerate
children's ability to identify and to generate morals in fables.
In brief, the present study examined whether children's age, gender, academic level
and familiarity with the fables could affect their ability to identify and to generate
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morals in fables. According to the findings, children seemed to develop the ability
with age only up to the age of 10. The children at the age of 10 seemed to have
already fully developed the ability and hence hardly showed further progress
afterwards. With regard to the 7 year old children, they seemed not sufficiently
equipped to draw the points hidden in fables although they were able to understand
the literal details in the fables. This suggests that using fables to teach 7 year old
children morals might not be appropriate. Familiarity with particular fables seems to
have no influence on the ability to draw morals in the fables. However, children's
ability to draw morals might be speeded up according to their familiarity with the
fables genre and experiences in drawing morals from didactic stories.
10. 5 CONCLUSION
The present study mainly examined the applicability of Kohlberg's theory of moral
reasoning to Koreans through using fables as an alternative method to Kohlberg's
dilemmas to assess moral judgment. Overall findings of the present study generally
support the findings of the studies using Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas. The
children in the present study, like those in other studies, showed developmental
patterns in terms of moral stages and the use of moral orientations in spite of showing
some differences in the use of the moral orientation. Some factors such as
individuals' gender and academic level, and the content of stories by themselves or
the interaction between these factors could allow variation of the general development
of moral reasoning, especially in terms of the moral orientations. Furthermore, the
present study found that some responses of the Koreans based on concepts peculiar to
Koreans cannot be scored with Kohlberg's system. This indicates that Kohlberg's
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system developed from the perspective of Western cultures could not thoroughly
capture some unique concepts of Koreans since these concepts stem from non-
Western perspectives, such as Buddhism and collectivism. Moreover, the unscorable
responses (the restricted-simple sympathy) of young children whose moral stages are
between 1 and 2 indicate that the concepts peculiar to Koreans are already beginning
to form and the influence of the concept on moral judgment starts in childhood. This
is contrary to the claims of other studies (e.g. Ma, 1988b; Snarey, 1985) which
suggest that the first three stages ofmoral judgment could be culturally universal.
In short, the present study showed that Korean children's moral stage and the use of
the moral orientations could be assessed with Kohlberg system but there are some
responses unscorable with Kohlberg's system. Based on overall findings, the
present study using fables concludes that Kohlberg's system of moral reasoning could
be applicable but insufficient to Korean children.
Concerning the use of fables as an alternative method, the findings on children's
ability to draw morals from fables suggest that it might not be appropriate to use
fables intact as an alternative method to assess the development of moral reasoning
with young children although the similar findings between the two studies in the
present research support the possibility. The present study showed that the 7 year
old children were able to make decisions and to provide reasons for their decisions
concerning characters and events in fables, and their responses were scorable with
Kohlberg's manual. However, the findings of the present study also indicate that the
7 year old children tended to have difficulties in drawing hidden morals from fables,
probably, because of the lack of understanding of figurative language. Therefore
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these findings suggest that, in order to assess moral reasoning in children as young as
7 years old, stories that explicitly reveal morals could be more useful than stories,
such as fables, that use metaphor. Furthermore, the present study also suggests that
fables modified to contain dilemmas rather than fables that draw conclusions would
be better to capture children's moral reasoning since cultural differences in chosen
issues were found in the present and the other studies. Concerning animal characters,
there would be little problems since children seemed to be familiar with and to enjoy
stories that personify animals. Thus, the present study suggests that further
empirical studies should consider the above points when developing an alternative
method to assess children's development of moral reasoning.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
FINAL DISCUSSION
The present study consists of two investigations of children's moral reasoning on the
basis of Kohlberg's theory. In the first, spontaneous responses of the Korean and the
British children to Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas were compared in order to
ascertain age, cultural and gender differences in moral reasoning. The second used
fables as an alternative method to assess moral reasoning in order to supplement the
findings of the first study. Only Korean children participated in the second study
and the differences in moral reasoning across age, gender and academic level were
examined through analysing their judgments and reasons concerning the characters,
events and conclusions in fables. Also, children's ability to identify and to generate
morals from the fables was explored in the second study. The findings of the two
studies are compared and discussed below.
11.1 MORAL STAGE
One of the aims of the present study is to examine the applicability of Kohlberg's
moral stages to children not only from England, a Western cultural setting but also
from Korea, a non-Western culture. Regarding age differences, both the first and the
second studies showed a clear tendency of moral stage to increase with age as did the
first study and other empirical studies (e.g. Edwards, 1975; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982;
Tietjen & Walker, 1985; Turiel et al., 1978). In the first study, both the Korean and
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Table 11.1.1 Analysis of Variance
Source
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
D.F
7
279
286
Sum of Squares
859674.43
174656.83
1034331.25
Mean Squares
122810.63
626.01
F
196.18
p
.001
British children showed a tendency of moral stages to increase with age regardless of
their gender. Similarly, in the second study, the Korean children's moral stages also
developed with age regardless of their gender and academic level. Finding that
moral stages increased with age in both studies supports Kohlberg's claim of the
sequential development of moral stages across age at least up to stage 4.
Furthermore, ANOVA, in combination with the Scheffe test, a post-hoc test, at p < .05
showed only significant differences between age groups F(?, 286) = 196.18, P < .001,
but not between groups in the first and the second studies within the same age group
(Table 11.1.1). Table 11.1.2 describes the mean of moral stages for each age group
in the first and the second studies. This could imply that the children's moral
reasoning develops with age at the similar rate at least up to stage 4 regardless of their
gender and cultural background, and the contents of stories.
Table 11.1.2 The Means of Moral Stages
Means (S.D) Groups (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
170.25 (29.97) 7 year olds in the Study I (1
168.10 (32.90) in the Study II (2
225.78 (26.75) 10 year olds in the Study I (3 * *
227.95 (22.91) in the Study II (4 * *
271.06 (17.61) 13 year olds in the Study I (5 * * * *
270.38 (27.94) in the Study II (6 * * * *
325.09 (18.32) 16 year olds in the Study I (7 * * * * * *
311.05 (17.95) in the Study II (8) * * * * * *
* denotes that the mean difference between groups is significant at p < .05 in Scheffe test
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Based on the findings of the two studies, some points could be made regarding
Kohlberg's moral stages. First, the findings support Kohlberg's claim that the
sequential development of moral stages with age at least up to stage 4 is universal.
Concerning fables as well as Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas, children's reasoning
for their judgment tended to develop in line with Kohlberg's moral stages. That is,
younger children tended to generate reasons which came under Kohlberg's lower
stages while older children were likely to justify their moral judgment with what
Kohlberg regards as higher stages. Furthermore, the finding that children's moral
reasoning for fables and for Kohlberg's dilemmas developed with age at a similar rate
implies that the development of moral stages with age tends to be consistent across
content. Secondly, the overall findings indicated that only age seemed to have
influence on the development of moral stages. However it should be considered
whether it is age itself that affects the moral stages. Usually, individuals
accumulated overall experiences as they got older. Thus these overall experiences
rather than age itself could be the actual factor to affect moral stages. Some studies
(e.g. Edwards, 1975, 1978, 1982; Tietjen & Walker, 1985) supported this view
through showing cultural variations in moral stages. Rest et al. (1986) and Walker
(1986a) also pointed out that individuals' overall experiences, such as educational and
sociocultural experiences could diversely influence development of moral stages.
Concerning educational experiences, the present study showed that increasing
schooling years might affect the development of moral stages although there was no
difference across the academic achievement level within the same schooling years.
Concerning sociocultural experiences, the present study indicated no difference in
moral stages between Korean and British children unlike other empirical studies (e.g.
XI. Final Discussion 276
Edwards, 1975, 1978, 1982; Park & Johnson, 1984; Tietjen & Walker, 1985). This
could be due to the fact that the children in both cultural groups were selected from
capital cities, Seoul and London, in which modernized large-scale societies are
formed. Since all of them were from large-scale societies, the overall experiences of
both Korean and British children in the present study might not be different enough to
generate differences in moral stages between the two cultural groups. Considering
the limitation of sampling to those in large cities, the present study suggests that
further study should select the participants reared not only in urban (i.e. large-scale
societies) but also rural areas (i.e. small-scale societies) in order to examine cultural
differences in moral stages. Although the scale of society possibly diminishes
cultural differences in moral stages between Korean and British children, the
traditions and norms which Korean society still keeps seem to influence the Korean
children's use of moral orientations. This will be discussed in the next section.
In conclusion, the present study showed that only the age factor was significantly
related with the development of moral stages. However, the possibility of other
factors such as educational and sociocultural experiences affecting the development of
moral stages still remains based on other empirical studies.
11.2 MORAL ORIENTATIONS
The present study explored the children's use of moral orientations as well as moral
stages. The first study examined the differences in the use of each orientation
according to children's background such as age, culture and gender, and the content of
stories whereas the second study included examining academic level differences in
the use of the orientations and excluded cultural differences. The findings of both
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studies revealed that children's use of the orientations varied across age, gender,
culture, academic level differences and the content of stories.
11.2.1 Age Tendencies
According to the findings, children's background as well as the content of the stories
was also influential in their use of the orientations. As far as age was concerned, the
first and the second studies showed similar age tendencies. Both studies showed that
the children's use of the ideal and the fairness orientations increased with age while
the use of the egoistic orientation decreased, coinciding with the findings of other
empirical studies (e.g., Tappan et al., 1987; Walker, 1989). Thus it seems that
individuals tend to orient toward ideal consequences and fairness and to make light of
the egoistic consequences as they become more developmentally advanced in moral
reasoning. However both first and second studies showed the variation of the age
tendency according to the content of dilemmas and fables. For instance, regarding
the Heinz's dilemma, the 7 year old Korean children unexpectedly mentioned the
egoistic orientation less than the 10 and 13 year old children. This is opposed to the
general tendency that younger children use the egoistic orientation more than older
children. The second study showed another exception of age tendency in the use of
the fairness orientation in the Golden Eggs' story. Unlike the general age tendency,
the children whose academic levels were below the average showed no age tendency
to increase the use of the fairness orientation with age since they rarely mentioned the
orientation regardless of their age. The above two examples of exceptions of general
age tendency indicate that children's background such as culture, academic level and
gender could produce variations of age tendencies in the use of moral orientations in
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connection with the content of stories.
With regard to the utilitarian orientation, previous empirical studies (Tappan et al.,
1987; Walker, 1989) reported that younger individuals were more likely to use the
orientation than older children. However, they examined the use of the utilitarian
orientation in combination with the use of the egoistic orientation and described the
tendency of the use of the combined orientations as the tendency of the use of the
utilitarian orientation. Unlike previous studies, the present study determined the age
tendency of the use of each orientation through examining the use of the utilitarian
orientation separately from the use of the egoistic orientation. When the use of the
utilitarian orientation was examined as an independent orientation, although some.
sub-groups showed various age differences in the use of the utilitarian orientation
across the content of dilemmas/stories, neither first nor the second study showed a
genuine age difference. Rather, children in all age groups tended to evenly use the
utilitarian orientation. Thus, the findings of other empirical studies, which revealed
that the use of the utilitarian orientation decreased with age, could be due to the strong
age tendency of the egoistic orientation which possibly screened the actual tendency
of the use of the utilitarian orientation.
Concerning the normative orientation, the present study showed the general tendency
for the use of the orientation to increase with age in the second study and no general
age difference in the first study. When all of the stories in both the studies were
examined separately, only Joe's dilemma in the first study revealed the tendency for
the use of the orientation to decrease with age as other empirical studies reported and
no age difference was found in the Vulture's story of the second study. However, 4
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out of 6 stories - Heinz's and Officer Brown's dilemmas in the first study and the
Ass's and the Golden Eggs' stories in the second study- showed a tendency for the
use of the normative orientation to increase with age. As far as the same patterns of
the age tendency strongly appeared in most of the stories in the two studies, regardless
of children's background, the tendency for the use of the normative orientation to
increase with age seemed too explicit to be attributed to a measurement error in the
present study. It could rather be said that the use of the normative orientation
generally increased with age although there were variations of the age tendency
according to the content of stories. These findings of the present study are
somewhat different from those of Walker's study (1989). Walker, through his
empirical study, concluded that children were less likely to be oriented to the
normative concerns as they got older. However, according to comparison between
age groups in terms of mean percentage of the use of the normative orientation, which
Walker described, the age tendency of the use of the orientation to decrease with age
was observed only among children between grade 1 and 7 (approximately age 6 to 12)
and the percentage differences between age groups were small, especially concerning
hypothetical dilemmas. Moreover, the use of the orientation tended to slightly
increase with age between children in grade 7 (approximately at the age of 12) and
adults. Therefore, the present study questions the conclusion of Walker that the use
of the normative orientation tended to decrease with age and claims that the use of the
normative orientation is rather steady across age as shown in the present study.
However, since the oldest age group in the present study is the 16 year old group, the
tendency for the use of the normative orientation to be steady across age may not be
applicable to those over 16. Furthermore, when the percentages of the use ofthe
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Table 11.2.1 General Age Tendencies in the Use of Moral Orientations
16 years old General Tendency
egoistic
utilitarian
normative
ideal
fairness
total
7 years old
9.3
100%
10 years old 13 years old
4.3 Decrease
Slight Decrease
No Consistent Tendency
Increase
Increase
five orientations within each age group were compared, the percentages of use of the
normative and the utilitarian orientations were maintained at the same level or slightly
decreased with age (Table 11.2.1) although the actual use of the orientations increased
or were at the same level across age. Thus, if the individuals in the present study
keep these age tendencies until adulthood, the use of the normative and the utilitarian
orientations might relatively decrease compared with the use of the ideal and the
fairness orientations.
Concerning the five orientations in terms of percentages of the use within the same
age group, the present study showed that young children tend to use the normative,
the egoistic, and the utilitarian orientations more than the ideal and the fairness
orientations. This could imply that the children at early ages tend to confine
themselves to the use of the former three orientations because their concept of ideal
consequences and fairness might not have been sufficiently developed. This
restricted use of the orientations seems to vanish as they get older. That is, children
at older ages tend to take all the orientations into account for their moral reasoning
and select the most appropriate orientations, having considered the situations.
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Consequently, the use of the orientations seems to be diversified with age rather than
simply transferred from one to another orientation.
Although the influence of academic achievement level on the use of the orientations
could vary according to story and children's background and gender, the findings of
the children's academic level differences in the use of moral orientations seem to
enhance the developmental tendency in the use of moral orientations. According to
the findings, the children seemed to develop the egoistic orientation first and the
fairness and the ideal orientations last. Furthermore, the children tended to
concentrate on the use of a certain orientation when they were fully aware of the
concept of the orientation. For instance, the finding that the 7 year old girls at the
above average academic level and the 10 year old girls at the above average academic
level tended to concentrate on the egoistic orientation for the Golden Eggs' story and
the fairness orientation for the Vulture's story respectively indicates that the children
sufficiently recognized the concepts at that time. Afterwards, as they presumably
began to recognize another orientation, they started to alternate between the two
orientations, the newly recognized one and the one they had already been using.
Concerning the Vulture's story, the 13 year old girls at the above average academic
level tended to use either the fairness orientation or the ideal orientation. Lastly,
when the children were fully aware of the concepts of both ideal consequences and
fairness which seemed to develop at the last stage, they gave reasons for their moral
decisions mainly on the basis of both the fairness and the ideal orientations at the
same time, rather than choosing one of the orientations. The 16 year old girls at the
above average academic level showed this pattern concerning the Vulture's story.
However, it does not mean that the children disregarded the other orientations.
XI. Final Discussion 282
Rather, they still considered the other orientations for their moral reasoning. Most of
them used both the fairness and the ideal orientations for their moral reasoning in
combination with other orientations such as the utilitarian orientation. That is,
children at older ages seemed to take all the orientations into account for their moral
reasoning and selected the most appropriate orientations for the situations they faced.
Therefore, the findings on academic level differences support the findings on age
tendency, which showed that the use of the orientations diversified with age rather
than simply being transferred from one to another orientation.
In brief, the findings of the present study elicited several points on age tendency of the
use of moral orientations. First, it seemed that younger children mainly gave moral
reasoning in terms of the three orientations such as the normative, the egoistic, and the
utilitarian orientations. Older children tended to add the use of the ideal and the
fairness orientations to the use of the normative and the utilitarian orientations and
were less likely to mention the egoistic orientation. The overall age tendency of the
use of the orientation partially supports the claim of Walker (1989) on age tendency
that the use of the normative, the egoistic, and the utilitarian orientation decreased
with age while the use of the ideal and the fairness orientations increased. Second,
the findings of the present study indicated that there could be variations of age
tendency within the use of an orientation according to children's background as well
as the content of stories. Lastly, it should be noted that the findings of age tendency
in the present study might not be applicable to adults since the present study involved
individuals only up to the age of 16 as participants.
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11.2.2 Cultural and Gender Differences
Concerning the cultural differences, it is assumed that the use of orientations would
differ between Korean and British children based on the findings of empirical studies
which showed cultural variations in the use of moral orientations (Tappan et al, 1987;
Tietjen & Walker, 1985; Walker, 1986a, 1989; Walker & Moran, 1991).
Furthermore, Korean society has its own unique characteristics which are different
from those of Western societies such as the British society. For instance, Korean
society still shows a strong tendency to maintain traditional, authoritarian, age-graded
culture compared with the Western societies (Park & Johnson, 1984). These
differences between the two cultures consolidated the assumption that there could be
cultural differences in the use of moral orientations. In order to examine the
assumption of cultural differences in the use of moral orientations, the two cultural
groups - the British and the Korean groups - were compared in terms of the use of the
moral orientations in the first study. The results of the first study showed cultural
differences in the use of some orientations and those differences were explained in the
light of the uniqueness of Korean society. It could be difficult to affirm the cultural
differences that the first study had showed in the second study, in so far as the second
study was not a cross-cultural comparative study. However, the second study
showed many unique tendencies of Korean children in terms of the use of moral
orientations in line with the findings of the first study. Here the cultural differences
found in the first study are discussed in conjunction with the findings of the second
study.
The first study showed that the Korean children used the fairness orientation more
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often than the British children, especially in Officer Brown's and Joe's dilemmas.
The value peculiar to Koreans, so-called "the rewards of virtue and the punishment of
vice" - this concept is somewhat different from Piaget's concept of immanent justice
(see section 6.2 in Chapter VI) - seemed to influence the preponderance of Korean
children's use of the fairness orientation over the British children's. According to
their responses to Officer Brown's and Joe's dilemmas, the Korean children seemed
to think that virtues should be rewarded while vices should be punished. For
instance, many Korean children said that Heinz should be punished in some way for
his misdeed even though the circumstance and the motivation were taken into account
in Officer Brown's dilemma. Also, they tended to justify the act of the judge in
giving him a sentence in order to maintain equity in the society. These responses
seemed to reflect the children's concept that the punishment of vice is fair. Korean
children revealed their belief in the rewards of virtue in Joe's dilemma through stating
that both the upbringing of offspring and working hard are virtues worthy of reward.
That is, they said that the father and Joe should get some kind of reward for the
upbringing of the son and for working hard respectively. The fact that most Korean
folk tales contain the concept of reward of virtue and punishment of vice (Lee &
Chang, 1986) indicates that Koreans have traditionally valued the concept of reward
of virtue and punishment of vice. Consequently, it could be natural for the Korean
children in the first study to justify their moral decision in terms of the concept of the
rewards of virtue and the punishment of vice since they have presumably read and
listened to those folk tales from an early age.
Although, in the second study, the two cultural groups could not be compared in terms
of the use of the fairness orientation, the second study still showed that many of the
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Korean children used the fairness orientation, especially concerning the Vulture's
story. The fairness orientation was the second most commonly used among the five
moral orientations, just following the use of the normative orientation, when the three
stories were regarded as a whole. Moreover, the children mentioned the fairness
orientation far more than the other orientations in Vulture's story only. According to
other empirical studies, the fairness orientation were used the least among the five
moral orientations. For instance, both Canadians and Chinese, who were in the
studies of Walker (1986a) and Walker and Moran (1991) respectively, used the
fairness orientation less than the other orientations. The British children in the
present study also used the fairness orientation the least.' These samples are not
exactly comparable with one another. However, as opposed to the general tendency
of the use of the fairness orientation, the second study as well as the first study
showed that quite a large number of Korean children mentioned the fairness
orientation. Thus, it seems that Korean children consider the fairness orientation for
their moral reasoning more than those in other cultures do.
The preponderance of Korean children to others in terms of the use of the fairness
orientation was explained with "the reward of virtue and the punishment of vice,"
which was regarded as a concept peculiar to Koreans, in the first study, and the
second study partially supports this explanation. The children in the second study
explicitly expressed the concept of rewards of virtue concerning the Vulture's story.
For instance, many of them gave reasons why they liked the story, the characters
and/or the conclusion of the story through stating that the farmer was rewarded for his
good deeds and that was fair enough. These responses seemed to reflect the
children's concept of the rewards of virtue. Surprisingly, even 7 and 10 year old
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children mentioned the fairness orientation in the Vulture's story although they were
supposed not to have developed the concept of fairness fully enough at that stage to
be able to use it. The younger children's use of the fairness orientation implies that
younger children may be aware of the concept of fairness although they rarely refer to
fairness in their moral reasoning. Furthermore, they are probably capable of using
the fairness orientation in certain conditions just as the 7 year old children did
concerning the Vulture's story in the present study.
The children revealed the concept of the punishment of vice as well but not as
strongly as the concept of the reward of virtue. Concerning the Ass's and the
Golden Eggs' stories, the children stated that it was right for the ass in the Ass's story
and the farmer in the Golden Eggs' story to get bad results because of their misdeeds.
However, they showed their understanding of the characters' behaviours at the same
time. For instance, many of the children said that most people, including themselves,
were also lazy and/or greedy sometimes so that the behaviour of the characters
wasunderstandable. This kind of thinking of children - i.e. putting themselves in the
character's shoes - seemed to weaken the children's adherence to the concept of the
punishment ofvice.
In short, it could be said that the findings that Korean children used the fairness
orientation more than those in other cultures seemed to reflect the tendency of
Koreans to hold a strong concept of reward of virtue and punishment of vice.
However, the Korean children did not strongly show the concept of the rewards of
virtue and the punishment ofvice in every circumstance. It implies that evocation of
the concept could depend on the context.
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The children also revealed cultural differences in the use of the utilitarian orientation
for Joe's dilemma in the first study. That is, Korean girls tended to be concerned
about the utilitarian consequences more than not only British girls but also Korean
boys through mentioning the matter of "hurting feeling of other family members." It
seemed that the Korean girls' use of moral orientations was under the influence of the
traditional expectation of Korean society for girls, which is that the girls should show
concern for other family members' welfare in order to maintain family concord. The
traditionally ideal type of woman in Korean society, the so-called "wise mother and
good wife," clearly shows this social expectation for girls. Koreans traditionally
have praised women who do their best and even sacrifice themselves for the sake of
other family members as wise mothers and good wives. The Korean girls seemed to
have internalized this traditional concept of woman from a very young age, probably
through social interaction. Thus, as mentioned in Chapter VI, the traditional concept
of Koreans on women seemed to result in that preponderance of Korean girls to the
other children in the use of the utilitarian orientation. However, in the second study,
Korean girls, especially the 16 year olds showed great concern for the welfare of
others beyond the family members. Concerning the Ass's and Golden Eggs' stories,
many girls said that people should not be selfish, be considerate and not offend others
in order to have good consequences for themselves as well as others. Based on the
findings of the use of the utilitarian orientation in the first and the second studies, the
present study suggests that the Korean girls generally orient to the utilitarian
consequences more than the Korean boys and the British girls in their moral decision-
making concerning family matters. However, the girls at an older age seemed to
extend their consideration for welfare and happiness to others in their community
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while younger girls still tended to limit their concern only to family members.
According to the findings, Gilligan's claim (1982), namely that girls typically use the
responsibility orientation (the egoistic, the utilitarian, and the ideal orientations) while
boys use the right orientation (the normative and the fairness orientations), seems
applicable to Korean children. However, the findings could only partially support
the claim since the gender differences were found only concerning the use of
utilitarian orientation. Furthermore, as opposed to Gilligan's claim, the British
group showed that the boys used the utilitarian orientation more than girls in the first
study. The preponderance of British boys to British girls in the use of the utilitarian
orientation occurred in the younger age group concerning Heinz's dilemma. The
finding that the gender difference of the British group in the use of the utilitarian
orientation was opposite to that of the Korean group suggests that there are possibly
gender differences in the use of moral orientations and the gender differences could
vary across cultures rather than be universal. That is, if the society maintained
different expectations for boys and girls as in the Korean society, it could affect the
gender differences in the use of orientations. However, in most Western societies,
different role expectations for each gender have faded, therefore almost no gender
difference in the use of orientations was found. Indeed, the first study using the
British children and many studies conducted in Western societies (e.g. Walker, 1991;
Walker et aI., 1987; Walker & Moran, 1991) reported no significant gender difference
in the use ofmoral orientations.
In brief, with respect to cultural differences in the use of moral orientations, Korean
children in the first study showed some unique tendencies in the use of moral
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orientations, which were different from those of the British children. Besides, the
findings of the second study generally support the unique tendencies of the Koreans,
which were found in the first study. According to the findings, the present study
concludes that there are some concepts peculiar to Koreans and these concepts seem
to affect the Korean's use of the moral orientations, and hence to generate differences
between Koreans and individuals in other cultures in terms of the use of the
orientations.
11.2.3 Summary
Overall findings on the use of moral orientations indicate that there are general
differences in children's use of the orientations across their background including age,
gender and culture. Also, children's differences in academic level seem to affect the
age differences in the use of the moral orientations. However, not all of the above
differences were observed in each story. The children tended to favour particular
orientations for certain contexts. This preference of the children occurred sometimes
in a whole group or sometimes only in a sub-group (e.g. a cultural group or a gender
group).
In spite of the differences in the use of the orientations across the content of
dilemmas/stories, the present study showed some general tendencies to use the
orientations as below. The youngest children seemed to mainly consider the egoistic
consequences of their moral decision. As they got older, they began to be aware of
ideal consequences and fairness and took them into account for their moral decision
while the consideration of the egoistic consequences decreased. Their concern about
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normative order and utilitarian consequences seemed to maintain similar levels across
age. Concerning the development of the use of moral orientations, the children
sometimes emphasized only one or two orientations of which they were fully aware at
that time. However, the tendency to emphasize a certain orientation tended to
diminish later and the children justified their moral decision in consideration of
various orientations altogether as they were sufficiently aware of all the orientations.
In other words, the children eventually diversified the use of the orientations although
they sometimes seemed to simply transfer their use from one to another orientation
while the development of the use of the orientations was in progress. The academic
level differences seemed to affect the overall age tendency to use the orientations.
The children at the above average academic level tended to be one step ahead of those
at the below average academic level.
Concerning the cultural influence, the Korean children tended to show greater use of
the fairness and the normative orientations in certain contexts. It seems that the
Korean children internalized some concepts peculiar to Korean society such as the
concept of reward of virtue and punishment of vice. The preponderance of Korean
girls to Korean boys in the use of the utilitarian orientation could also imply that the
characteristics of Korean society, which is that Korean society has different
expectations for boys and girls, influenced the use of the orientation.
In summary, the present study indicated general age tendencies in the use of moral
orientations regardless of children's gender and cultural background. Only the
children's academic level could affect the age tendency. Apart from the age
tendency, children also showed gender differences, only in the Korean group, as well
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as cultural differences between Korean and British children in the use of moral
orientations. However, the present study showed variations of these general
tendencies across the content of stories and sub-groups.
11.3 CHILDREN'S CHOSEN ISSUE
In the first study, cultural differences in chosen issues for Heinz's and Officer
Brown's dilemmas were found in relation to the concept of law-abiding and fulfilment
of duty. Korean children were more likely to choose the punishment issue than the
morality and conscience issue in Officer Brown's dilemma. That is, approximately
two thirds of the Korean children said that Officer Brown should report Heinz's
misdeed and the judge should give him a sentence rather than let Heinz go free
because of the importance of being law-abiding and the fulfillment of duty. Park &
Johnson (1984) reported that Korean society tends to stress the importance of abiding
the law. Song et al. (1987), in their study, also characterized Korean society as a
society that emphasizes the importance of authority, conformity and duty as public
justification for adhering to all rules. Concerning the findings of the present study in
combination with other studies, these characteristics of Korean society seem to
influence the Korean children to have a strong concept of law-abiding. Furthermore,
Korean girls showed the concept of law-abiding in Heinz's dilemma as well while
Korean boys did only so in Officer Brown's dilemma. Concerning Heinz's dilemma,
Korean girls chose the law issue more often than the life issue. That is, Korean girls
argued that Heinz should not steal the drug in order to obey the law although he could
not save his wife's life while others including Korean boys argued that Heinz should
steal the drug to save his wife's life although it was illegal. It seems that obeying the
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law took precedence over saving a life among Korean girls. This gender difference
in the Korean group indicated that the adherence of Korean girls to the concept of
abiding the law were greater than that of Korean boys. It implies that girls are more
likely than boys to conform to the demands of society, at least in Korean society.
Moreover, the finding that the Korean girls used the normative orientation more than
the British girls concerning Heinz's dilemma seems to strengthen the Korean girls'
strong tendency to conform to the normative order of the society. In short, the first
study indicates that the Koreans, especially the Korean girls, are more likely to take
into account the normative order than the British children through showing a strong
concepts of abiding the law and fulfilment of duty as a member of society.
Unlike in the first study, it was impossible to examine children's chosen issues in the
second study since the fables did not contain dilemmas. Furthermore, it was not
possible to find out from the second study whether Koreans greatly emphasized the
concept of abiding the law since the stories used in the second study contained
scarcely any reference to the concept of abiding the law. However, the second study
showed that the Korean children tended to express the importance of the fulfilment of
duty through explaining the reasons to use a great amount of the normative orientation,
especially in the Ass's story. That is, many children disapproved of the ass shirking
its duty and emphasized the importance of hard work and doing one's duty. The
children used the normative orientation more than the other orientations for the
Golden Eggs' story as well as for the Ass's story. However, concerning the Golden
Eggs' story, they used the normative orientation in terms of blaming/approving and
retribution/exoneration rather than the concept of fulfilment of duty. They
condemned the farmer's behaviour because greediness and selfishness, which underlie
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the farmer's behaviour, were socially disapproved of. Furthermore, the children
agreed to retribution for the farmer's misdeed. According to the cultural differences
in children's chosen issues in the first study and the children's reasons to use the
normative orientation in the second study, Korean children, especially girls, seem to
orient towards the normative order, and hence to emphasize the conformity to the
norms and rules of the society more than those in other cultures. This could reflect
that the Korean children internalize the characteristics of Korean society, which stress
maintenance of the normative order through fulfilling duties and adhering to
prescribed rules and roles.
In the study of Nisan and Kohlberg (1982), Turkish village children aged 10 to 15
tended to emphasize the normative order through choosing the law issue in Heinz's
dilemma and the punishment issue in Officer Brown's dilemma more than those in a
Turkish city. The authors explained this emphasis on the normative order in the
children in a Turkish village by the characteristics of culture of a Turkish village.
That is, in the traditional village in Turkey there could be high pressure to adhere to
normative order, and hence generated the tendency to choose issues relevant to the
normative order rather than the other issues. Like those in a Turkish village, Korean
children put great emphasis on the normative order. However, in the study by Nisan
and Kohlberg, only the younger group, the 10 to 15 year old group, showed cultural
differences in adherence to the normative order while the older group, the 16 to 28
year old group, did not. This leads to the possibility that a strong concept of the
normative order among Koreans could be attenuated after the age of 16.
Unfortunately, the present study did not examine the use of the normative orientation
in individuals after the age of 16.
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Snarey et al. (1985) found cultural differences between Kibbutz and Middle Eastern
adolescents in chosen issue, but only concerning Joe's dilemma. In their study, most
of the kibbutz adolescents aged 15 to 17 chose the contract issue while Middle
Eastern youth at the same age often chose the authority issue and argued that the son
should give his father the money. Snarey et al. explained this difference by the fact
that individuals were more likely to draw on culturally defined values and norms from
the social institutions to which they belonged in order to provide their moral
reasoning. That is, the fact that the Middle Eastern society was more likely to
emphasize parental respect and authority than the kibbutz society probably generated
the cultural differences in the chosen issue for Joe's dilemma.
Korean society, like Middle Eastern society, greatly stresses parental respect and
authority based on the traditional concept of filial piety so that Korean children were
expected to choose the authority issue more than the contract issue in Joe's dilemma.
Contrary to the expectation, the Korean children in the present study chose the
contract issue much more than the authority issue as did the British. That is, the
Korean children, as well as the British children, considered Joe's right and his father's
right equally rather than advocating only the father, which probably indicates that
filial piety has diminished among Koreans. However, through analysing their
spontaneous responses to the dilemma, it was found that many Korean children still
consider filial piety very important in their relationship to their fathers. Thus it
seems that filial piety itselfhas not been eroded but the concept of filial piety has been
changed in terms of absolute obedience of children to the authority of their parents as
Kim (1992) claims. The change of the concept of filial piety is probably generated
from the recent tendency of Korean parents to be more tolerant and less strict with
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their children owing to the decrease in the number of children in a family and hence,
the change of the family system from an authority-based large family to a child-
centred nuclear family (see section 3.4.2 in Chapter III for details).
In brief, children's chosen issues in the first study indicate cultural differences in
terms of the concepts of abiding the law and fulfilment of duty and the change in the
traditional concept of filial piety among Korean children. The cultural differences in
the concepts of abiding the law and fulfilment of duty are probably due to the
characteristics of Korean society, which greatly considers maintenance of the
normative order. The Korean children's frequent use of the normative orientation
and their reasons for the use in the second study also support Koreans' emphasis on
the normative order.
11.4 UNSCORABLE RESPONSES
Some studies (e.g. Boyes & Walker, 1988; Dien, 1982; Iwasa, 1992; Ma, 1988b,
1992; Shweder et al., 1990; Snarey, 1985; Tietjen & Walker, 1985) claimed that
Kohlberg missed or misunderstood some concepts peculiar to non-Western cultures so
that his theory is insufficient. In line with the claim, finding some unscorable
responses ofKorean children in both the first and the second parts ofthe present study
implies that there are some concepts which affect Koreans' moral reasoning that
Kohlberg did not grasp well. These unscorable responses in the first study contained
older children's concepts of "a life with pure conscience or honour," "compromise
and reconciliation rather than choice and commitment when confronting interpersonal
conflict," "filial piety," "collectivism," and "chung" and younger children's
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consideration of the restricted-simple sympathy as well as physical consequences for
their moral decision. Unfortunately, it is difficult to ascertain the findings of the first
study on the concepts of Korean children on "pure conscience," "filial piety," and
"reconciliation" in the second study through fables, probably because the content of
fables was insufficient to let the children express those concepts. However, the
tendency of young children to sympathize with only one person (character) and older
children's concepts of chung and collectivism clearly appeared in the second study.
Furthermore, the second study showed another type of unscorable responses of
Korean children, the concept of "the respect for all living things," which was not
found in the first study.
The Korean children at the age of 7 tended to make moral judgments based on
emotional consequences such as the restricted-simple sympathy as well as physical
consequences in both the studies using dilemmas and fables. In contrast, as
Kohlberg claimed, the 7 year old British children in the study using dilemmas focused
on physical consequences and rarely mentioned emotional consequences in order to
make the moral judgment. This finding on British children seems to support the
findings of Eisenberg and her colleagues (e.g. Eisenberg-Berg, 1979; Eisenberg-Berg
& Hand, 1979; Eisenberg-Berg & Neal; 1979). They reported that children rarely
referred to empathic .considerations concerning prohibition dilemmas such as
Kohlberg's dilemmas although there is evidence of empathic concerns in prosocial
moral reasoning of the Western children. Eisenberg, based on the findings, argued
that some young children gave their moral reasoning with reference to the needs of a
protagonist in a prosocial dilemma and these mentions could be regarded as primitive
empathic concerns. However, among the young children, the most frequent reason
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for their moral judgment is hedonistic reason (i.e. justification for the behaviour with
reference to the expected gain for the self). Moreover, Eisenberg, Shell, Pasterneck,
Lennon, Beller, & Mathy (1987) found that sympathetic reasoning for prosocial
dilemmas was not used with any real frequency until at least age 9 to 10. Overtly
empathic considerations emerged among some school-aged children and increased in
use with age concerning prosocial-oriented moral dilemmas. Based on the findings,
Eisenberg (1990) concludes that children's emphatic and sympathetic consideration
which Kohlberg de-emphasized in his moral stages could enhance maturity of
children's prosocial moral reasoning. Unlike children in Western cultures, among
Koreans, even the 7 year old children tended to make moral judgments based on overt
sympathy. They relied on sympathy not only for prosocial moral reasoning but also
for prohibition-oriented reasoning in both Kohlberg's dilemmas and fables. This is
probably due to characteristics of Korean society that emphasize emotional concerns
more than Western society.
Although the 7 year old Korean children could consider emotional consequences for
their moral reasoning, most of them seemed to have a restricted viewpoint.
According to Kohlberg, young children at preconventional level are lacking in
mediating concepts such as deservingness or intentionality through which the
particular circumstances of the case alter its moral significance. As a result, they
tended to make rigid moral judgment. Unlike Kohlberg who only pertained to a
rigid viewpoint in terms of physical consequences, the present study found young
children's rigid viewpoint in their responses not only referring to physical
consequences but also emotional concerns. For instance, with respect to the Golden
Eggs' story, they tended to make their moral judgments only based on their feeling
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towards a "poor goose," rather than multiple perspectives. Thus, the present study
defined the younger children's emotional concerns having a rigid viewpoint as the
"restricted-simple sympathy." Kohlberg's claim on young children's rigid view
seems to partially support the restricted-simple sympathy as far as it also focused on
children's rigid view. The similarity between young children's sympathy and moral
judgment, both are based on the restricted view, could be explained by Dunn's
findings (1988) that emotional development is parallel to cognitive development.
She pointed out that the links between emotion and cognitive change are usually
understood in terms of cognitive change that underlies emotional development while
the possibility that emotional experiences contribute to cognitive development has
been seldomly considered. In line with Dunn's view, Korean children's restricted-
simple sympathy could be viewed in terms of an early stage in emotional
development which proceeds in parallel to a child's cognitive development.
In short, the present study found that only Korean children revealed overtly
sympathetic moral reasoning even in Kohlberg's dilemmas and that the responses
based on the restricted-simple sympathy were unable to be scored with Kohlberg's
system. These findings imply that emotional aspects seem to play a larger role in
Korean children's moral judgment than in British children's and that Kohlberg's
scheme does not cater for them. Some studies (e.g. Ma, 1992; Snarey, 1985) argued
that Kohlberg's moral judgment up to the stage 3 seemed applicable to individuals in
most cultures. The matter of applicability could be true since in the present study
most responses of Koreans and the British were scorable. However, the findings of
the present study on young children's unscorable responses imply the insufficiency of
Kohlberg's system even for 7 year old Korean children whose mean ofmoral stages is
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only 1/2. This indicates that some concepts peculiar to a certain culture could
influence the moral judgment not just after stage 3 but even at the preconventional
level.
As one of the developed concepts of restricted-simple sympathy, the Korean children
at older ages gave unscorable responses showing a concept of respect for life (see
Chapters IX and X for details). Some British children in the study using dilemmas
also pointed out the importance of saving an animal's life concerning Heinz's
dilemma. However, most of them argued that Heinz should steal the drug for his pet
based on the affiliation norm (e.g. he should steal the drug because the pet is his
friend) in line with the system of Kohlberg, who also values human-being's life and
the life of the pets only for whom people have affection. In contrast, especially in
the case of the fables, Koreans showed great emphasis on saving life, including those
of animals, because of the respect for the life itself rather than affiliation. Korean
children's concept of respect for life, even in the case of animals, seems to come from
Buddhism, one of the traditional concepts of Koreans. According to Buddhism,
benevolence should be applied to animals and all living things in nature as well as
human-beings (Tachibana, 1975). Ma (1992) encapsulated a similar concept,
defined as "sainted altruism" in his theoretical model of moral development for
Chinese people. It seems that Korean and Chinese people share the concept on the
respect for all lives and the concept equally seems to influence their moral judgment.
However, Ma regarded this concept as the concept that appeared at the highest stage
while the present study revealed that children at ages 13 to 16 have already expressed
the concept of the benevolence for all living things in the form of mentioning the
importance of saving the life of a mere animal. This could suggest that the concept
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develops with age, probably starting from the restricted-simple sympathy, rather than
suddenly appearing at the highest stage as Ma claims.
As another type of unscorable responses, both the first and the second studies found
Korean children's responses pertaining to the concept of chung. Choi pointed out
that chung is the fundamental concept in interpersonal relationships among Koreans
as is the concept of "we" (Choi, 1997; Choi & Choi, 1990b). This implies that
Korean children's moral judgment on the basis of chung could relate to the Korean
view of individuals. Western people view the individual as an independent, self-
contained, autonomous entity who compromised a unique configuration of internal
attributes such as abilities, traits and values, and behaves primarily as a consequence
of these internal attributes (Dien, 1982; Shweder & LeVine, 1984). In contrast,
individuals in non-Western cultures tend to view the individual as an imperfect partial
being in the surrounding context rather than an independent being (Markus &
Kitayama, 1991). The Koreans' view of individuals seems similar to the view
commonly found in non-Western cultures, namely the interdependent self. Thus,
sharing the concept of "we" and chung, which relates to emotional state seems to
show Koreans' tendency to make close interpersonal relationships with other partial
individuals (Choi, 1997). Furthermore, according to the analysis of the children's
responses for "helping others" in the second study, the concept of chung had in
common with the restricted-simple sympathy in terms of emotional aspect which
affected their moral judgment (see Chapters IX and X for details). Thus, as the
concept of respect for life did, the concept of chung that appeared at older age seemed
to stem from the restricted-simple sympathy of 7 year old children. That is, the
restricted-simple sympathy of 7 year old Koreans could also be regarded as the
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primitive form of chung found in older children's responses.
According to some studies (e.g. Dein, 1982; Ma, 1988b; Snarey et al., 1985; Tietjen &
Walker, 1985), the view of the interdependent self in non-Western cultures tends to
promote moral judgments based on collectivism which leads the individual to
consider the tranquillity of community before the rights of individuals. As a result
the individual is sometimes asked to relinquish some freedom and identity in order for
society to function. Choi & Choi (1990b) claimed that the concept of "we" is the
representative of collectivism among Koreans. In the present study, the collectivist
tendencies of Koreans was clearly captured in the 16 year -old children's reasons for
"not disturbing or harming others." That is, the Korean children seemed to think that
an individual should not disturb or harm others because they were concerned about
others' welfare but ultimately for the sake of the group where individuals were
interdependent on each other. These responses imply that Koreans, like many other
collectivism-based cultures, tended to give priority to the community rather than the
individual in certain circumstances. Also, it can be said that they think of the society
as a kind of "we" group. These type of responses were often found among Korean
children not the British children in relation to fables as well as Kohlberg's dilemmas
and this seems to indicate that Korean society is another collectivism-based culture
like many other non-Western cultures.
In summary, overall findings that unscorable responses among Koreans generated
from some concepts peculiar to Koreans indicate that Kohlberg's system is
insufficient to assess Koreans' moral judgment. The finding that moral judgment
based on the restricted-simple sympathy of young Korean children at the stage 1 or 2
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is also unscorable implies that Kohlberg's system is insufficient even for young
Korean children since Kohlberg de-emphasized sympathy in his moral stages.
Except for the restricted-simple sympathy, most unscorable responses of Koreans
appeared during adolescence. This indicates that the influence of the concepts
peculiar to Koreans on their moral reasoning is greater during adolescence than
childhood and hence the insufficiency of Kohlberg's system is greater for adolescents.
11.5 ABILITY TO IDENTIFY AND GENERATE MORALS IN FABLES
The present study, like other empirical studies (e.g. Chia, 1993; Dorfman, 1988, 1989,
as cited in Chia, 1993; Jose et aI., 1992, as cited in Chia, 1993), shows the children's
age differences in drawing morals from fables regardless of their gender and
familiarity with the fables. However, the age difference was significant only
between the 7 year old group and the older group. That is, the children at the age of
10 seemed to have already fully developed the ability to identify and generate morals
in fables and hence hardly showed further progress afterwards. With regard to the 7
year old children, they were able to understand the literal details in the fables and
hence to provide reasons for their moral judgments although they seemed not
sufficiently equipped to draw the points hidden in fables. This suggests that fables
could be used as an alternative method to assess children's moral reasoning although
using fables to teach 7 year old children morals might not be appropriate.
Furthermore, at the age of 7, when the development was still in progress, the children
showed academic level differences in the Ass's story. This indicates a possibility of
the influence of the children's academic level on their ability to generate morals.
Finding no influence of familiarity with the fables on the ability to draw morals in the
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fables suggests that not the familiarity with particular fables but the familiarity with
the fables genre and experiences in drawing morals from didactic stories might affect
children's ability to draw morals.
11. 6 MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN LIGHT OF THE VIEWS OF DOMAIN-
SPECIFICITY AND CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY
Many researchers have criticized Kohlberg's theory of moral development. Among
these researchers, the theorists of domain-specificity (e.g. Turiel & Smetana, 1984;
Turiel & Davidson, 1986) criticized Kohlberg's theory especially in terms of the
unitary moral development and young children's inability to distinguish morality and
conventions. Here, the findings of the present study will be discussed in light of the
contrasted theories, the Kohlberg's theory and the theory of domain-specificity. In
addition, the present study will illuminate the findings through the perspective of
cultural psychologists.
First of all, in recent years, it has become increasingly apparent from development
research that younger and older children as well as adolescents and adults make social
judgments that can be characterized as multifaceted and heterogeneous rather than
unitary (Turiel & Davidson, 1986). Like those in the other empirical studies
(summarized in Turiel, 1983), some children in the present study also seemed to refer
to such a type of judgment. They did not consistently uphold a particular moral
issue for all the probe questions in a dilemma. For instance, in Joe's dilemma, they
sometimes oriented towards authority and at other times chose the contract issue in
contradiction with authority. They both accepted and rejected rules or norms in
Heinz's and Officer Brown's dilemmas. Furthermore, the present study showed that
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the children's tendency to take moral orientations into account diversified with age.
As they got older, they did not simply replace an orientation at lower level with
another at higher level but considered more various moral orientations at the same
time. These patterns of children's judgment seemed to reflect the coexistence of
multifarious orientations - i.e. heterogeneity - in their mind and the development of
moral reasoning. Thus the findings of the present study as well as other empirical
studies, as opposed to Kohlberg's claim, seems to challenge the existence of a general
structure in the individual's thought forming a unitary or homogeneous system.
However, these multifaceted moral judgments seem to relat~ to content (Nisan, 1984).
That is, the direction of moral decision - whether an individual chooses the law issue
or the life issue - is a matter of moral content, which refers to internalized behavioural
instructions regarding right and wrong, or so-called norms. Here, it should be noted
that Kohlberg focused on a general structure of moral development rather than content.
Regardless of the direction of decision in moral dilemmas, Kohlberg proposed that
individuals reached each moral stage in accordance with social perspective and logic.
For instance, individuals in the second stage make moral decisions based on concrete
rewards and punishment, dictated by the holders of power. The standard for those in
the third stage is the expectations of significant others. In the forth stage, rules and
laws of a more formal character and in the fifth stage, rules and laws examined in
light of agreed-upon principles within a social-contract framework are the main
considerations. Thus, each stage represents certain types of standards that are
largely independent of the logic of that stage rather than the specific content of the
standard.
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Furthermore, changing into a higher stage does not mean that an individual shifts his
or her perspective from one to another, which is totally different from the previous
one. It rather seems that, as an individual develops into a higher moral stage, his or
her considerations broaden and the main consideration in one stage becomes a
subordinate rationale of the next higher stage. Thus, consideration of interpersonal
reciprocity and sympathy, the main reason for a moral decision at stage 3, constitutes
only a part of reasons of stage 4, in which it is integrated into a more formal social
perspective. This proposition of Kohlberg, in a way, corresponds with the findings
of the present study that, as the children got older, they considered more various
orientations for their moral decisions.
Based on the comparison between the findings of the present study and other theories
- i.e., Kohlberg's and domain specificity theories' - up to now, the present study
could not accept one theory and reject the other since both theories partially support
the findings of the present study. As Nisan (1984) suggests, it is necessary to ascribe
to moral content an independent status in moral development alongside the mora!
structure. According to Nisan, Kohlberg's approach only concentrated on moral
structure so that it is insufficient in explaining the development of moral judgment.
It is undoubted that individuals do not have a conception of morality innately but
primarily establish it through adapting beliefs accepted from the outside world, from
authorities such as parents and teachers. For instance, giving priority to the life issue
in comparison with the law issue and vice versa, could be related to which issue the
culture emphasized more importantly. In addition, judging whether an issue pertains
to morality or conventions also seems culture dependent. In the study of Shweder et
al. (1990), individuals in India considered a widow eating fish morally wrong,
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regardless of the existing law, because they believe it constitutes an insulting and
hence harmful behaviour for the soul of her deceased husband. In contrast,
Americans consider the same behaviour a convention since they do not consider it to
be harmful to anyone. These examples imply that individuals could reach different
moral decisions although using similar structure according to their cultural
background. If a researcher tried to examine moral stages of individuals in a non-
western culture with Western culture-biased instruments without understanding the
cultural background, he or she could easily misinterpret and hence over or
underestimate the individuals' moral stages. Thus, the present study suggests not
focusing on either moral structure or content but both aspects in order to examine the
development of moral judgment. Concerning the present study, the interpretation of
Korean children's responses, in particular, should be made based on the consideration
of uniqueness of Korean culture.
Secondly, the domain-specific theorists opposed Kohlberg in terms of young
children's ability to distinguish between morality and conventions. According to
Kohlberg, children at young ages viewed all rules as stemming from authority
commands so that they had a unitary concept of social rules and treated all social rules
alike. Thus, he assumed that the children failed to differentiate between moral and
nonmoral rules and their social judgments were based on the orientation to power,
punishment and physical consequences. In contrast, domain-specific theorists
assumed that an individual's social judgment consists of several distinct domains so
that each domain develops independently and entails differential social experiences.
Thus the individual can distinguish between the domains from their early ages (e.g.
Turiel, 1977, 1983; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987; Turiel & Smetana, 1984; Weston
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& Turiel, 1980). Domain-specificity theorists (e.g. Tisak, 1995; Weston & Turiel,
1980) actually found that young children could distinguish between two social
domains - morality and conventions - through providing different justifications for
moral and conventional transgressions. They found that the children tended to make
moral judgments based on individuals' welfare and rights, justice, equity, and fairness
whereas, concerning conventions, they oriented towards authority, punishment
avoidance, and customs or traditions although young children considered both moral
and conventional transgressions to be wrong. Weston and Turiel (1980) argued that
young children distinguished between morality and conventions through finding that
they made moral judgments, unlike conventional judgments, on the basis of factors
intrinsic to acts, such as harm inflicted on others and violation of rights. A number
of studies in non-Western cultures has also been conducted in order to examine
whether children in different cultures made similar distinctions between moral and
conventional rules (e.g. Song, Smetana, & Kim, 1987; Nisan, 1987; Shweder et al.,
1990). Among the studies, the study in Korea (Song et al., 1987) showed that
Korean children, like American children (e.g. Nucci, 1981; Smetana, 1981, 1985;
Turiel, 1980; Weston & Turiel, 1980), distinguished between the moral and the
conventional rules from their early ages. That is, Korean children tended to provide
different justifications for moral transgressions and conventional transgressions
respectively. Unfortunately, the present study did not explicitly show whether the
children distinguished morality from conventions. However, finding that the 7 years
old children's judgments based on the restricted-simple sympathy indicates that the
children even at their young ages did not make social jugdments solely depending on
an orientation to power, punishment and physical consequences. The restricted-
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simple sympathy could be categorized as a criterion for moral judgment since it
pertained to an individual's harm. Thus, in contrast to Kohlberg's proposition,
finding that children pertained to the restricted-simple sympathy for their moral
reasoning could imply that the children considered an individual's harm for their
moral judgment. However, the present study also found that they still gave moral
reasoning in terms of the authority and punishment avoidance. With respect to this
matter, Turiel (1983) states that children's focus on the authority and punishment
avoidance rather than on individual's harm in making moral judgment does not mean
that the children solely made moral decisions based on authority and punishment
avoidance. Rather it seems to reflect an inability to coordinate the two aspects.
Although young children distinguished between moral and conventional events from
their early ages, age differences in their distinction and justifications were found (e.g.,
Davidson et al., 1983; Tisak & Turiel, 1988). Concerning their ability to distinguish
between moral and conventional issues, the youngest children (the 6 years olds)
distinguished between moral and conventional events more sharply on familiar than
on unfamiliar issues. By the age of 10, however, children applied their moral
reasoning to relatively unfamiliar as well as familiar issues (Davidson et al., 1983).
According to the findings of the above studies (e.g., Davidson et al., 1983; Tisak &
Turiel, 1988), children, as their social interactions increased with age, seemed to
apply the distinctions between moral and conventional acts to a broader range of
social acts, including more abstract and unfamiliar social acts. Although the present
study did not explicitly show the influence of familiarity on children's distinction
between moral and conventional issues, it seemed to indicate that the young children
tended to generate more mature moral responses from fables concerning familiar
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moral issues. That is, they tended to give more abstract responses to familiar issues
such as "not to being too greedy" than unfamiliar issues such as "not to shirk your
own duty" and "to do a favour for others" (see Chapter X for details). In the present
study, only the 7 year old children, not older children, showed such differences.
These findings of the present study might support the studies (e.g., Davidson et al.,
1983; Tisak & Turiel, 1988) showing that moral development proceeded from a
reliance on specific personal experiences to an ability to abstract or generalize
unfamiliar events.
Besides, Davidson et al. (1983) found that there were age ~ifferences in the types of
justifications used. Age differences indicated that older children's conceptual
regulations were more comprehensive. Most children, regardless of their ages,
tended to explain that moral transgressions were wrong because they caused harm.
However, for younger children, the concern for welfare and avoidance of harm was a
consolidated reason and reasons based on relational issues of justice were not
elaborated. By the age of 10 years, children consolidated a more abstract concern
for maintaining justice, which included a concern with achieving just reciprocity
between the welfare claims of various individuals (Turiel & Davidson, 1986). In this
age tendency, the domain-specificity theorists argued that it did not mean that prior
levels of reasoning disappeared but that they were subordinated to the subsequent
levels in the form of elements. That is, the concern for welfare, a regulation in
young children's moral reasoning became an element in a subsequent level of moral
reasoning (Davidson et al., 1983). Therefore, earlier levels gradually became the
basis for, and part of, later levels over a period of time (Turiel and Davidson, 1986).
These results suggested that reasoning within the moral domain developed and
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became more sophisticated with age. That is, individuals seemed to consider a
broader range of components for their moral judgments and to regulate the
components as their social interaction increased with age. The age tendency in the
use of moral orientations in the present study, in a way, seemed to support these
assumptions of domain-specificity theorists concerning moral reasoning. The
findings of the present study showed that the young children emphasized only one or
two orientations of which they were fully aware at that time whereas the older
children justified their moral decisions in consideration of various orientations at a
time as they were sufficiently aware of all the orientations. The youngest children,
in the present study, tended to make their moral decision mainly based on egoistic
consequences.rnormative order and utilitarian consequences. This tendency could
correspond to the finding of Turiel and his colleagues (Turiel & Smetana, 1984; Turiel
& Davidson, 1986) that younger children focused on welfare and avoidance of harm
for their moral justification. As they got older, the children in the present study
became aware of ideal consequences and fairness and added them to their prior moral
reasomng. This tendency could also be matched to the findings of Turiel and his
colleagues that older children are concerned with a wider range of components,
including a more abstract concern for achieving just reciprocity between the welfare
claims of various individuals, for their moral reasoning. Thus, the present study
suggests that the children, with age, eventually diversify the use of the orientations
and hence elaborate their reasoning.
Furthermore, unscorable responses developing from the restricted-simple sympathy to
chung also imply the age tendency in moral reasoning. As mentioned earlier, young
children making moral decisions based on the restricted-simple sympathy showed a
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rigid view focusing on only one person. For example, although they recognized that
Heinz was wrong, they stated that the judge should let Heinz go free because Heinz
would be sad if he had to go to a jail. Similarly, concerning the Golden Eggs' story,
they said that the farmer should not kill the goose because dying is sad. Responses
based on the restricted-simple sympathy seem to result from children's lack of an
ability to coordinate more than two different perspectives at the same time - e.g.,
Heinz's sadness vs. moral transgression. As they reached higher stages, however,
the children take into account various standpoints at the same time. That is, they
revealed that ability to coordinate different perspectives. For instance, they
mentioned the importance of having good relationships with individuals as a reason
for helping others. At the age of 16, they stated that people should help each other
for the sake of chung, which is supposed to make a society function well. This age
difference in the responses showed that the children's consideration for moral
judgment extended from focusing on one person to more than two persons, and then
eventually to the society. This could also imply that the ability to coordinate
different perspectives develops with age.
These overall findings of the present study support Kohlberg's moral stages that
develop in accordance with social perspective. At the same time, the present study
supports TurieI's claim that an individual tends to broaden the range of components
for evaluating moral judgments with age (Turiel & Smetana, 1984; Turiel & Davidson,
1986). Showing children's use of the restricted-simple sympathy for their moral
judgment in the present study also supports a general assumption of the domain
specificity theorists' claim that the young children were likely to judge moral
transgressions based on not authority and punishment avoidance but individuals' harm.
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Thus, the findings ofthe present study support Kohlberg's theory on one hand and the
domain specificity theory on the other.
In addition, as opposed to Kohlberg, the cultural psychologists (e.g., Shewder et al.,
1990) argued that, although individuals in most cultures recognized a domain of
moral issues centred around issues of justice, there were more than one moral code
across cultures. Individuals in non-Western cultures emphasising collectivism
tended to give great priority to duties over rights in order to make moral judgments
whereas those in Western cultures emphasizing individualism tended to give priority
to rights. Each tendency is defined as "duty-based" and "justice-based'' moralities
respectively (Shweder et al., 1990). Korean society is westernized and, on the other
hand, still keeps the collectivistic view. This ambivalence might cause the Korean
children's tendency to make both scorable and unscorable responses with Kohlberg's
manual. The scorable responses indicate that Koreans have the right-based morality.
The unscorable responses, however, seemed to indicate that Koreans also used the
duty-based moral judgment. Some responses such as emphasizing the concept of
"we" seemed to indicate that they had the duty-based morality through subordinating
their rights and the domain ofwhat is private to interpersonal duties.
Furthermore, some researchers (e.g., Gilligan, 1982; Haste & Baddeley, 1991)
assumed that differences in moral reasoning existed not only between cultures but
also within cultures (i.e. subcultures). Haste and Baddeley (1991) found that both
boys and girls had access to both the justice and the care orientations but girls were
more likely than boys to show greater mixture and easier movement between them.
The Korean children in the present study showed a similar pattern. Although Korean
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boys and girls considered both the justice and the care orientations, the girls tended to
use the utilitarian orientation, a kind of the care orientation, more than the boys and
there was no gender difference in the use of the other orientations. This, in line with
other findings (e.g., Johnson, 1988; Wingfield & Haste, 1987), implies that girls,
unlike boys, were exposed not only to the dominant cultural message but also to the
alternative female culture. Thus, these findings support the claim of Haste and
Baddeley (1991) that some cultures consisting of a variety of subcultures were more
complex than could be accounted for by a single dominant moral theory and that
gender experience could be at least a quasi-culture.
Up to now, the findings of the present study were discussed in light of the theories of
Kohlberg, domain-specificity and cultural psychology. Based on that, the present
study supports some points which Kohlberg, domain-specificity theorists and/or
cultural psychologists claimed. First, the present study supports Kohlberg's basic
assumption that moral reasoning develops with age in accordance with their social
perspective regardless of their cultural background through showing age tendencies in
moral stages, the use of orientations, and the unscorable responses. However, the
present study found that Kohlberg's system is insufficient especially in relation to the
claim that young children's moral judgment is mainly based on punishment avoidance.
Finding children's moral judgment based on authority and punishment avoidance
seems to indicate the lack of coordination of different perspectives rather than the
inability to distinguish between morality and conventions. Moreover, finding the
young children's unscorable responses based on the restricted-simple sympathy
implies that young children could make moral decisions based on individual harm not
authority and punishment avoidance. Thus these findings and implications partially
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support the claim of domain specificity theorists that for young children authority and
punishment avoidance are not the main reasons for making moral judgment. Lastly,
finding the development of unscorable responses with age, from the restricted-simple
sympathy to chung, and the influence of collectivism on moral reasoning supports
cultural psychologists claim that understanding individuals' cultural background
should be preceded examining the individuals' moral judgment. In fact, many
studies including the present study questioned the sufficiency of Kohlberg's moral
system since he did not considered cultural influence on moral development in depth.
Based on the above, the present study suggests that it would be necessary to consider
children's moral reasoning in light of the theories of domain-specificity and cultural
psychology as well as Kohlberg's theory in order to understand the development of
moral reasoning more sufficiently. Accordingly, the present study suggests that the
moral stages should include judgment based on individual harm which is elaborated
with age. Concerning the development of moral reasoning of Koreans in particular,
the present study suggests that further study should focus on how the concepts
peculiar to Koreans, such as the restricted simple sympathy which extends to chung
later on, develop and how they affect Koreans' moral development through life-span
until adulthood and compare the findings with the claim of Kohlberg and domain
specificity theorists.
11.7 CONCLUSION
The present study mainly focused on the applicability of Kohlberg's theory of moral
reasoning, and relied on fables as an alternative method to Kohlberg's dilemmas to
assess moral judgment. There are conclusions and suggestions in terms of the above
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two aspects below.
Concerning the use of fables as an alternative method, the findings on children's
ability to draw morals from fables suggest that it might not be appropriate to use
fables intact as an alternative method to assess the development of moral reasoning
with young children although the similar findings between the two studies in the
present research support the possibility. The present study showed that the 7 year
old children were able to make decisions and provide reasons for their decisions
concerning characters and events in fables, and their responses were scorable with
Kohlberg's manual. However, the findings of the present study also indicate that the
7 year old children tended to have-difficulties in drawing hidden morals from fables,
probably, because of the lack of understanding of figurative language. Therefore
these findings suggest that, in order to assess moral reasoning in children as young as
7 years old, stories that explicitly reveal morals could be more useful than stories,
such as fables, that use metaphor. Furthermore, the present study also suggests that
fables modified to contain dilemmas rather than fables that have drawn a conclusion
would be better to capture children's moral reasoning since cultural differences in
chosen issues were found in the present and other studies. Concerning animal
characters, there would be little problems since children seemed to be familiar with
and enjoy stories that personify animals. Thus, the present study suggests that
further empirical studies should consider the above points when developing an
alternative method to assess children's development of moral reasoning.
As for the applicability of Kohlberg's theory to Koreans in particular, both the studies
indicated that the Korean children's developmental patterns of moral judgment are
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similar to those of the British children not only in terms of moral stages but also in the
use of moral orientations in accordance with Kohlbergians' claim. Therefore, the
claims that children developed their moral reasoning with age and that the
developmental tendency could be captured through using Kohlberg's dilemmas
seemed plausible. Additionally, similar developmental patterns of moral reasoning
between the two cultures imply that Kohlberg's system could be applicable to those
not only in Western societies but also in other cultures, such as the Korean culture,
which are modernized but maintain their unique traditions and norms. However, it
should be noted that some factors such as individuals' background and the content of
stories could allow variation of the general development of moral reasoning,
especially in terms of the moral orientations.
In spite of the applicability, the present study questioned the sufficiency of Kohlberg' s
theory based on the findings of the present study in connection with the theories of
domain specificity and cultural psychology. First, Kohlberg's theory explains the
justifications of moral judgment at early stages only based on authority and
punishment avoidance. This seems insufficient since the present study as well as the
studies of domain specificity theorists found that children at early moral stages tend to
make moral judgments based on individual harm. Second, Kohlberg claimed
universality of moral development without considering cultural influence on the
development in depth. However, in line with the claim of cultural psychologists, the
present study found the moral reasoning undoubtedly reflects culture. Without
understanding his or her cultural background, an individual's moral reasoning could
be misinterpreted.
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In conclusion, Kohlberg's theory seems applicable but insufficient to assess the
development of moral reasoning. Thus, the present study suggests that further
research is needed to complement Kohlberg's theory especially in terms of the two
aspects above.
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APPENDIX A
*(Starred questions may be eliminated if time for interviewing is limited.)
Dilemma III
In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one
drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist
in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the
druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid £400 for
the radium and charged £4,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's
husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money and tried every legal
means, but he could only get together about £2,000, which is half of what it cost.
He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let
him pay later. But the druggist said. "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to
make money from it." So having tried every legal means, Heinz gets desperate and
considers breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.
1. Should Heinz steal the drug? (Dilemma related)
1a. Why or why not?
Questions 2 and 3 are designed to elicit the subject's moral type and should be
considered optional.
*2. Is it actually right or wrong for him to steal the drug?
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*2a. Why is it right or wrong? (Dilemma related)
*3. Does Heinz have a duty or obligation to steal the drug?
*3a. Why or why not? (Dilemma related)
4. [If subject originally favours stealing, ask:]
If Heinz doesn't love his wife, should he steal the drug for her?
4. [If subject originally favours not stealing, ask:]
Does it make a difference whether or not he loves his wife?
4a. Why or why not?
5. Suppose the person dying is not his wife but a stranger.
5a. Should Heinz steal the drug tor the stranger?
Why or why not?
*6. [If subject favours stealing the drug for a stranger, ask:]
Suppose It's a pet animal he loves. Should Heinz steal to save the pet
animal?
*6a. Why or why not?(Dilemma related)
7. Is it important for people to do everything they can to save another's
life?
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7a. Why or why not? (General issue)
*8. It is against the law for Heinz to steal. Does that make it morally wrong?
*8a. Why or why not? (Issue cantered)
9. In general, should people try to do everything they can to obey the law?
9a. Why or why not? (General issue)
9b. How does this apply to what Heinz should do? (Issue cantered)
*10. In thinking over the dilemma, what would you say is the most
responsible thing for Heinz to do?
10a. Why? (Dilemma related)
*Dilemma III'
Heinz did break into the store. He stole the drug and gave it to his wife. In the
newspapers the next day there was an account of the robbery. Mr. Brown, a police
officer who knew Heinz, read the account. He remembered seeing Heinz running
away from the store and realized that it was Heinz who stole the drug. Mr. Brown
wonders whether he should report that Heinz was the robber.
*1. Should Officer Brown report Heinz for stealing?
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*1 a. Why or why not? (Dilemma related)
*2. Suppose Officer Brown were a close friend of Heinz, should he then
report him?
*2a. Why or why not? (Dilemma related)
Dilemma III'
Officer Brown did report Heinz. Heinz was arrested and .brought to court. A jury
was selected. The jury's job is to find whether a person is innocent or guilty of
committing a crime. The jury finds Heinz guilty. It is up to the judge to determine
the sentence.
3. Should the judge give Heinz some sentence, or should he suspend the
sentence and let Heinz go free?
3a. Why is that best? (Dilemma related)
4. Thinking in terms of society, should people who break the law be
punished?
4a. Why or why not? (General issue)
4b. How does this apply to how judge should decide? (Issue centred)
5. Heinz was doing what his conscience told him when he stole the drug.
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Should a lawbreaker be punished if he is acting out of conscience?
(General issue)
Sa. Why or why not?
*6. Thinking back over the dilemma, what would you say is the most
responsible thing for the judge to do? (Dilemma related)
*6a. Why?
Dilemma I
Joe is a fourteen-year-old boy who wanted to go to camp very much. His father
promised him he could go if he saved up the money for it himself. So Joe worked
hard at his paper route and saved up the £100 it cost to go to camp and a little more
besides. But just before camp was going to start, his father changed his mind.
Some of his friends decided to go on a special fishing trip, and Joe's father was short
of the money it would cost. So he told Joe to give him the money he had saved from
the paper route. Joe didn't want to give up going to camp, so he thinks of refusing to
give his father the money.
1. Should Joe refuse to give his father the money?
1a. Why or why not? (Dilemma related)
*2. Does the father have the right to tell Joe to give him the money?
Appendices 351
*2a. Why or why not? (Dilemma related)
*3. Does giving the money have anything to do with being a good son?
*3a. Why or why not? (Issue centred)
*4. Is the fact that Joe earned the money himself important in this situation?
*4a. Why or why not? (Issue centred)
5. The father promised Joe he could go to camp if he earned the money.
Is the fact that the father promised the most, important thing in the
situation?
5a. Why or why not? (Issue centred)
6. In general, why should a promise be kept? (General issue)
7. Is it important to keep a promise to someone you don't know well and
probably won't see again?
7a. Why or why not? (General issue)
8. What do you think is the most important thing a father should be
concerned about in his relationship to his son?
8a. Why is that the most important thing? (General issue)
9. In general, what should be the authority of a father over his son?
(General issue)
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9a. Why?
10. What do you think is the most important thing a son should be
concerned about in his relationship to his father?
10a. Why is that the most important thing? (General issue)
*11. In thinking back over the dilemma, what would you say is the most
responsible thing for Joe to do in this situation?
*11a. Why?
This is used for 7 years old children.
*(Starred questions may be eliminated iftime for interviewing is limited.)
DILEMMA III
In Europe, a woman was very ill so she was nearly dying. There was one medicine
that the doctors thought might save her. It was made from radium and a chemist in
the same town had made it a month ago. The medicine was expensive to make, but
the chemist was charging ten times what the medicine cost him to make. He paid
£400 for the radium and charged £4,000 for a small amount of the medicine. The
sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money and
tried every legal means, but he could only get together about £2,000, which is half of
what it cost. He told the chemist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it
cheaper or let him pay later. But the chemist said, "No, I made the medicine and I'm
going to make money from it." So having tried every legal means, Heinz gets
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desperate and thinks of robbing the chemist's shop to steal the medicine for his wife.
1. Should Heinz steal the medicine?
1a. Why or why not?
*2. Is it actually right or wrong for him to steal the medicine?
*2a. Why is it right or wrong?
3. [If subject originally favours stealing, ask:]
If Heinz doesn't love his wife, should he steal the medicine for her?
3. [If subject originally favours not stealing, ask:]
Does it matter whether or not he loves his wife?
3a. Why or why not?
4. Suppose the person dying is not his wife but a stranger.
4a. Should Heinz steal the medicine for the stranger?
Why or why not?
*5. [If subject favours stealing the drug for a stranger, ask:]
Suppose It's a pet animal he loves. Should Heinz steal to save the pet
animal?
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*5a. Why or why not?
6. Is it important for people to do everything they can to save another's
life?
6a. Why or why not?
*7. It is against the law for Heinz to steal. Do you think Heinz really did
something wrong?
*7a. Why or why not?
8. Usually, should people try to do everything they can to keep the law?
8a. Why or why not?
8b. Then how should Heinz do in this story?
*9. In thinking over the story, what would you say is the best thing for Heinz
to do?
9a. Why?
*DILEMMA III'
Heinz did break into the store. He stole the medicine and gave it to his wife. The
next day the robbery was written in the newspapers. Mr. Brown, a police officer
who knew Heinz, read the story of the robbery. He remembered seeing Heinz
running away from the store and realized that it was Heinz who stole the medicine.
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Mr. Brown wonders whether he should report that Heinz was the robber.
*1. Should Officer Brown report Heinz for stealinp?
*1a. Why or why not?
*2. Suppose Officer Brown were a close friend of Heinz, should he then
report him?
*2a. Why or why not?
DILEMMA III'
Officer Brown did report Heinz. Heinz was arrested and brought to court. A jury
was chosen. The jury's job is to find out if a person is innocent or guilty of
committing a crime. The jury finds Heinz guilty. It is up to the judge to put Heinz
in a jailor let him go free.
3. Should the judge put Heinz in a jailor let Heinz go free?
3a. Why is that best?
4. For society, should people who break the law be punished?
4a. Why or why not?
4b. Then, how should the judge decide in this story?
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5. Heinz stole the medicine because he thought it was right to steal.
Should a lawbreaker be punished when he is doing something that he
thought it was right?
5a. Why or why not?
*6. Thinking back over the story, what would you say is the best thing for the
judge to do?
*6a. Why?
DILEMMA I
Joe is a fourteen-year-old boy who wanted to go to on a camping holiday very much.
His father promised him he could go ifhe saved up the money for it himself. So Joe
worked hard at his paper round and saved up the £100 it cost to go to camping and a
little more besides. But just before the holiday was going to start, his father changed
his mind. Some of his father's friends decided to go on a special fishing trip, and
Joe's father wanted to go too. But the father was short of the money it would cost.
So he told Joe to give him the money he had saved from the paper round. Joe didn't
want to give up going camping, so he thinks of not giving his father the money.
1. Should Joe give his father the money or not?
1a. Why or why not?
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*2. Does the father have the right to tell Joe to give him the money?
*2a. Why or why not?
*3. Does giving the money have anything to do with. b.eiAg. a good son?
*3a. Why or why not?
*4. Joe earned the money himself. Is the fact that Joe earned the money
himself important in this story?
*4a. Why or why not?
5.. The father promised Joe he could go to camp if he earned the money.
Is the fact that the father promised the most important thing in the story?
5a. Why or why not?
6. Usually, why should a promise be kept?
7. Is it important to keep a promise to someone you don't know well and
probably won't see again?
7a. Why or why not?
S. What do you think is the most important thing a father should keep in
mind about the way he acts towards his son?
Sa. Why is that the most important thing?
9. Usually, what should be the behaviour of a father over his son?
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sa. Why?
10. What do you think is the most important thing a son should keep in mind
about the way he acts towards his father?
10a. Why is that the most important thing?
*11. In thinking back over the story, what would you say is the best thing for
Joe to do in this story?
*11a. Why?
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STANDARD SCORING SHEET
FORM A (Circle Chosen Issue)
Dilemma III
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LIFE LAW
Q# CJ#/ nann & element stage Q# CJ#/nonn &element stage
(notes) (notes)
ISSUE SCORE ISSUE SCORE
Dilemma III'
MORALITY & CONSCIENCE PUNISHMENT
Q# CJ#/nonn &element stage Q# CJ#/nonn &element stage
(notes) (notes)
ISSUE SCORE ISSUE SCORE
Dilemma I
CONTRACT AUTHORITY
Q# CJ#/nonn &element stage Q# CJ#/nonn &element stage
(notes) (notes)
i
ISSUE SCORE ISSUE SCORE
Summated
Weights
from Issue
1 _
2 _
3 _
4
----------5 _
Overall Protocol Score
Global
WAS
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APPENDIXB
STORY I; THE ASS CARRYING SALT
An ass crossing a stream with a load of salt on his back lost his footing and slipped
into the water, so that all of the salt was dissolved. The ass was pleased to find
himself relieved of his burden when he got up on his legs again. Provoked by the
loss, his master drove the ass back to market and loaded him with fresh goods.
When they came to the same stream, the lazy ass, desiring' to make light of his load,
conspired to dunk himself in the water on purpose. However, this time the ass was
loaded with sponges instead of salt. No sooner was he in the water when the
sponges became soaked through and, instead of lightening his burden, they more than
doubled the weight of his load.
Questions for Fables
1. Do you understand the stories?
2. Can you draw any lesson from the story?
If you say "Yes", what is the lesson that teaches us?
3. Do you like the stories? Why/why not?
4. Do you like the ass? Why/why not?
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5. Do you like the conclusion? Why/why not?
6. If you could change the story, what do you want the story to be like?
7. Have you ever heard or read this story before?Yes/No.
8. How important do you think is the lesson given by the story? Why/why
not?
STORY II; THE GOOSE AND THE GOLDEN EGGS .
A farmer had the good fortune to possess a goose that laid golden eggs. Every day
the farmer went to the barn and would find an egg of pure gold. But as the farmer
grew rich he also grew greedy. He was too impatient to wait for wealth to come in
driblets, and, thinking that the bird's inside must be solid gold, he made haste to kill it.
One night the farmer cut the goose open. Not only were his hopes disappointed, but
he got no more golden eggs. There was nothing inside the goose but ordinary flesh
and blood.
Questions for Fables
1. Do you understand the stories?
2. Can you draw any lesson from the story?
If you say "Yes", what is the lesson that teaches us?
Appendices 367
3. Do you like the stories? Why/why not?
4. Do you like the farmer? Why/why not?
5. Do you like the conclusion? Why/why not?
6. If you could change the story, what do you want the story to be like?
7. Have you ever heard or read this story before? Yes/ No
8. How important do you think is the lesson given by the story? Why/why
not?
STORY III; THE FARMER AND THE VULTURE
A farmer who found a wounded vulture cured it and let it go free afterwards. The
vulture showed him that it was not ungrateful for this treatment. Seeing him sitting
one day under a crumbling rock, it flew up and snatched in its talons the hat that he
was wearing. The man jumped up and pursued it: the vulture then dropped the hat
and he picked it up and complained of the vulture-s behaviour. On returning he
found how wonderfully the bird had repaid his kindness. The rock had collapsed
just where he had been sitting.
Questions for Fables
1. Do you understand the stories?
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2. Can you draw any lesson from the story?
If you say "Yes", what is the lesson that teaches us?
3. Do you like the stories? Why/why not?
4. Do you like the farmer? Why/why not?
5. Do you like the vulture? Why/why not?
6. Do you like the conclusion? Why/why not?
7. If you could change the story, what do you want the story to be like?
8. Have you ever heard or read this story before? Yes/No
9. How important do you think is the lesson given by the story? Why/why
not?
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